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Preface 
Watch out when you go around a corner  warned young Tropicalia artists in late-
1960s Latin American music festivals1. In the agitated political and cultural universe 
of that decade, the slogan repeatedly reminded us to be alert and strong, to pay 
attention to the high-up windows when we step on the asphalt, to the blood on the 
ground. Humankind does not walk the same block round and round, but anyone 
who has been following global political events in recent times may also find 
themselves asking the  questions: Are we rounding a corner? What comes 
next? As with them in the 1960s, it is hard to know and to predict new developments. 
We can, however, follow their advice and keep our eyes steady, for this sun, for this 
. 
This fourth Alternautas issue gathers the articles published during the first half of our 
third year of existence. We are an academic blog focused on discussing development 
through critical lenses and from a Latin American perspective. During the last three 
years, we have published original and translated articles from young and prominent 
scholars from Latin America and the world, contributing not only to academic 
discussions, but also to create a fertile environment where non-mainstream ideas and 
perspectives on development can flourish.  
This issue collects the articles published by the blog during the first half of 2016. 
Through their own perspectives and problems, all of them contribute to a collective 
                                                          
1 
Gilberto Gil. It was sung for the first time by Gal Costa in a music festival of Record, a Brazilian TV channel, 
in 1968 and became one of the most representative songs from the Tropicalia movement. The movement 
arose in the late 1960s, combining a fusion of traditional Brazilian culture with foreign influences and offered 
strong political criticism, in particular of the dictatorship that followed the 1964 Brazi tat. 
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effort to map, understand and propose alternative paths to our contemporary 
scenario. While the first section is dedicated to alternative development thinking in 
a broader sense, the second section features the first dossier that Alternautas has 
organized. Our guest editor, Gerardo Muñoz, curated an insightful collection of 
essays and interviews focused on the current crisis of the progressive governments of 
Latin America. 
The first section starts with a theoretical contribution by Aníbal Quijano, translated 
by Sebastian Garbe. Here, Quijano places the idea of   emerging from 
indigenous populations in Latin America as an  form of  that 
directly tackles the problem of  of  a theory that the author has 
been engaged with since the early 1990s. In this piece, Quijano sums up the promises 
and limitations of the development paradigm in Latin America, reaching deep 
contradictions by the end of the last century with the emergence of neoliberalism, 
financialisation, globalisation and a growing environmental crisis. According to him, 
these elements imposed a truly   to the global coloniality of power, 
in a process that profoundly questions Eurocentrism and the separation between 
humankind and nature, taking for granted the exploitation of the latter by the former. 
He proposes a  of  based on new social practices, such as social 
equality of heterogeneous and autonomous individuals, reciprocity between social 
groups, egalitarian distribution of resources and products, and communal association 
at local, regional and global scales. Quijano argues that the emergence of critical 
development theories and alternatives particularly from Latin America is not 
accidental, since the region had a foundational role in the constitution of the 
coloniality of power through its centuries of colonisation and therefore later also 
acquired an important role in its subversion. 
With similar concerns, but tackling the environmental crisis more directly in a 
perspective stemming from critical economic thought, Alberto Acosta discusses the 
need to adopt a -  and -  development paradigm. In his 
article, translated by Dana Brablec, he criticises mainstream economic theory for 
establishing  as the only way to fight the major problems facing humankind 
today, such as poverty, social inequalities and even the environmental damage caused 
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by growth itself. Drawing on a number of scholars, particularly Enrique Leff, he 
proposes a change in the global economic rationality, which would assume the task 
of seriously discussing -  in the global North and overcoming the 
extractivist model in the global South. This alternative framework would pursue a re-
encounter between human beings and nature, as Quijano argued, in which capital 
would be subordinated to the demands of both, now understood as interdependent 
elements. The idea of   appears again as an important concept stemming 
from indigenous practices in Latin America, supporting the redistribution of wealth, 
the democratisation of the economy, and the decentralisation and re-territorialisation 
of social practices. 
The other three articles presented in the first part of the issue present exciting new 
studies on Latin American economy and society. Nicolás Perrone interrogates power 
mechanisms behind international arbitration procedures that became increasingly 
important since the 1990s, when foreign investment started to be the dominant 
development model for the global South. Studying the dispute between Ecuador and 
Occidental Petroleum (Oxy) II, Perrone argues that that international arbitrators 
equated  with   ignoring damages imposed on a country 
because their sovereignty has been limited. Thus, these mechanisms of arbitration, 
the author argues, create a  of  that seriously 
undermines local  ability to determine their own strategies of development. 
Iokiñe Rodríguez and Mirna Inturias recount in their piece a fascinating experience 
with participatory videos, a methodology of action research, among the Monkox 
people of Lomerio, Bolivia. The Monkox people live in an indigenous autonomous 
territory in the lowlands of Santa Cruz department, with an economy highly 
dependent on forestry management. The videos served as tools to examine and give 
public visibility to local notions of environmental justice in community forestry, 
opening a process of community self-reflection. Through the videos, Monkox people 
were able to narrate their own history of land struggle across successive generations 
and to expose problems of unequal distribution of forestry resources, particularly 
among elders and women. 
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Finally, the last contribution of this first section is a compelling study by Juliette 
Roguet that analyses the phenomenon of bricherismo in the highly touristic district 
of Cuzco, Peru. The article discusses the amorous encounters between bricheros, 
 of seduction and a romantic expert in conquering  and 
female Western travellers that perceive them as authentic and exotic  
 Roguet describes the complexity of the power relations that emerge with 
bricherismo, since its intersection of gender, sexuality, class and race constantly shifts 
dominated and dominant positions.  
The second part of this issue comprises a special dossier dedicated to discuss the  
of the progressive cycle in Latin  Edited by Gerardo Muñoz and including 
articles from Bruno Cava, Sergio Villalobos-Ruminott, Salvador Schavelzon, Michela 
Russo, Diego Valeriano, Jon Beasley-Murray and Gerardo Muñoz himself, this 
timely collection of essays critically reviews the contours of contemporary politics in 
Latin America. Even though the contributions collected by the dossier come from 
different theoretical and regional perspectives, there is a common thread that unites 
them: the identification of the limitations of the Latin American  and of 
the need to propose a new political imaginary in the continent. This imaginary, our 
authors argue, is deeply committed to expanding the democratic horizon of Latin 
American societies, seriously questions the centripetal forces of populism, directly 
tackles the problem of the extractivist model, and seeks to overcome the limitations 
of identity politics. The dossier also presents a special interview with Maristella 
Svampa, a poem by Andrés Ajens and a review of Ticio  book Imagen e 
interperie, by Michela Russo. 
Throughout all of the contributions in this new Journal issue, we wish to invite 
readers and contributors to retrace the path that we have explored in this first half of 
2016 in the hope that it will elicit new questions, ideas and perspectives. We are 
facing an exciting second half of the year, with new members joining the Editorial 
Board and our new team of English editors, a new dossier on Water and Extractivism 
(the call for papers is still open!), new initiatives with the Latin American Bureau, 
and new conference projects in the pipeline. We are enthusiastic about the future and 
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grateful to all of our contributors, readers and collaborators of every kind for 
continuing to accompany us in the Alternautas journey off the beaten path! 
 Happy reading! 
 
The Alternautas Editorial Team,  
Adrian E. Beling, Ana Estefanía Carballo, Gibrán Cruz 
Martínez, Emilie Dupuits, Anne Freeland, María Eugenia 
Giraudo, Sue Iamamoto, Juan Jaime Loera González, María 
Mancilla García, Louise de Mello, Diego Silva, Martina 
Tonet, Julien Vanhulst and Johannes M. Waldmüller.  
 
From a virtual Abya Yala, July 2016. 
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  
 
 
  
ANIBAL QUIJANO 1 
   Between  
and the De/Coloniality of Power 2 
 
The whole extensive historical formational process of the Global Coloniality of 
Power has entered a deep crisis. The   an expression of the 
indigenous populations of Latin America, is shaping an alternative for social 
life that can only be realized as a De/Coloniality of Power. 
What I am proposing here, opens a crucial question of our crucial moment in history: 
Bien Vivir,3 in order to be an effective historical realization, cannot be but a complex 
                                                          
1 ANIBAL QUIJANO is a Peruvian sociologist and political theorist. He is a Professor at the Department of 
Sociology at Binghamton University, United States. He is known for having developed the concept of 
"colonially of power" and his body of work has been influential in the fields of decolonial studies and critical 
theory. 
2 This article was translated by Sebastián Garbe and originally published in 
http://www.alternautas.net/blog/2016/1/20/bien-vivir-between-development-and-the-decoloniality-of-
power1 on January 20th, 201.  
3 
most of all of the indigenized populations in Latin America towards a different social existence that has been 
imposed by the Coloniality of Power. 
resistance against the Coloniality of Power. Interestingly, it was adopted in the Viceroyality of Peru by no one 
else but Guamán Poma de Ayala approximately in 1615 in his Nueva Crónicas y buen gobierno. Carolina Ortiz 
Fernández is the first who paid attention to this historical fact. 
Guamán Poma de Ayala, Clorinda Matto, Trinidad Henríquez y la teoría crítica. Sus legados a la teoría social 
con The differences cannot 
be merely linguistical but rather conceptual. It will be necessary to demarcate the alternatives, as well as in 
Latin-American Spanish, as in the most common variants of Quechua in South America and in Aymara. In 
Quechua of northern Peru and in Ecuador, one says Allin Kghaway (Well Living) or Allin Kghawana (Good 
s translated 
who want to make Sumac the same as Suma and propose to say Suma Kawsay. 
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of social practices oriented towards the democratic production and reproduction of 
a democratic society, another mode of social existence with its own and specific 
historical horizon of meanings, radically alternative to the Global Coloniality of 
Power and the Eurocentred Coloniality/Modernity.4 This model of power is still 
globally hegemonic today, but also in its deepest and most existential crisis since its 
constitution for not much more than 500 years. In these conditions, today, Bien 
Vivir, might make sense as an alternative form for social existence, as a De/Coloniality 
of Power. 
 a Eurocentric paradox: modernity without de/coloniality 
Development was, most of all as debated in Latin-America, a key term of a political 
discourse associated with an elusive project of deconcentration and relative 
redistribution of the control of industrial capital as part of a new geography within 
the configuration of global colonial-modern capitalism at the end of the second 
World War. 
                                                          
4 The theory of the Coloniality of Power or Global Coloniality of Power and of Eurocentrism or Eurocentred 
Modernity/Coloniality as its specific historical horizon of meanings has been originally proposed in my 
writings since the beginnings of the last decade of the 20th century. For the purpose of the present debate, 
it might be useful to cite only the most impo
World- International Social Science Journal, Nr. 134, 
November 1992, UNESCO/Blackwell, 549-
published in Problemas del Desarrollo, Instituto de Investigaciones Económicas, UNAM, Vol. XXIV, Nr. 95, 
October-Dezember 1993,  José Carlos Mariategui y 
Europa. Amauta, 1993, 167-188, Lima, 
Future Anterieur: Amérique Latine, Democratie et Exclusion
Anuario Mariateguia, 1998, Vol. IX, Nr. 9, 113-122, 
Familia Y Cambio Social. Cecosam
E , in Edgardo Lander (ed.), Colonialidad del Saber, Eurocentrismo y Ciencias 
Sociales, UNESCO-CLACSO, 2000) 201-246; 
published in Festschrift for Immanuel Wallerstein, in Journal of World Systems Research, Vol. VI, Nr. 2, 
Autumn/Winter 2000, 342-388, Special Issue, Giovanni Arrighi and Walter L. Goldfrank (ed.), Colorado, USA; 
 San Marcos, Second Cycle, Nr. 25, July 2006, 51-
104, Universidad de San Marcos, Lima, Peru. At the moment, this theory is being debated on a worldwide 
scale. 
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At a first moment it was a virtually official discourse. Nevertheless, it gave space to 
complex and contradictory questions, which derived in a rich and intense debate with 
worldwide resonance as a clear expression of the magnitude and the deepness of the 
socio-political conflicts of interest that were part of this whole new geography of 
power and, particularly, in Latin-American. In this way, a wide range of categories 
became produced (mainly development, underdevelopment, modernization, 
marginality, participation on the one hand and on the other imperialism, 
dependency, marginalization, revolution), which was deployed in close contact with 
conflictive and violent movements of and in society that lead to dead-end processes 
or relatively important, but unfinished, changes in the distribution of power.5 
In short, one could say that in Latin America the main result was the destitution of 
the   and of some of its expressions in the social existence of those 
countries population. But neither its historical-structural dependency in the Global 
Coloniality of Power, nor the modes of exploitation and domination inherent to this 
power model have been eradicated or sufficiently altered in order to make space for 
a democratic production and management of the State, nor its resources of 
production, nor the distribution and appropriation of the product. Despite its 
intensity, this debate never managed to liberate itself from the hegemony of 
Eurocentrism. In other words, these changes did not lead to  
Otherwise it would not be possible to understand why the term always manages to 
reappear, for instance now, as the ghost of an unfinished past.6 
The global coloniality of power and the ghost of the nation-state 
In this debate, the hegemony of Eurocentrism lead to perceive  in 
Latin America only in relation to the Nation-State. But, in the context of a Global 
                                                          
5 The names of Raúl Prebisch, Celso Furtado, Aníbal Pinto, Fernando Henrique Cardoso, Enzo Faletto, 
Andrew Gunder Frank, Rui Mauro Marini, Theotonio Dos Santos, José Nun among those who took part in 
that debate are probably known to most of the readers. And there is, of course, a huge body of literature 
available in that regard. 
6 Revista Venezolana de 
Economía y Ciencias Sociales, 2/2000, 73-91, Universidad Central de Venezuela, Caracas, Venezuela. Of the 
Oito Visoes da America 
Latina. SENAC, 49-87, Sao Paulo, 2006, Brazil. 
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Coloniality of Power, this perspective was historically misleading. What is more, 
precisely after the second World War, this power model entered a long period of 
decisive changes on a global scale. It is pertinent to summarize those: 
1. Industrial capital began to be structurally connected with, which was known 
at that time as the -scientific  This relationship 
implied, on the one hand, a reduction of the need for living and individual work 
force and consequently for paid labor as structurally inherent to capital in that 
new period. Unemployment ceased to be a temporary or cyclical problem. 
  was the term, which later was employed by more 
conservative economists to make sense of that process. 
2. These transformation tendencies of the relationships between capital and 
labor implied an amplification of the range of speculative accumulation  not 
only cyclically but also as a structural tendency , which was understood as a 
progressive   In that way a new industrial-financial 
capital was formed, which soon experienced a relatively fast global expansion. 
3. A process of tecnocratization/instrumentalization of subjectivities, 
imaginaries and all historical horizons of meanings specific to the Eurocentred 
Colonial Modernity. Strictly, it is about the growing withdrawal of the original 
promises of the so-called   and, in that sense, a deep change 
in the ethical-political perspective of the original Eurocentric version of 
 Despite its new character, it did not cease to be 
attractive and persuasive although it turned out to be more and more paradoxical, 
ambivalent and ultimately historically impossible. 
4. Development and the expansion of the new industrial-financial capital, 
together with the defeat of national-socialist/fascist sectors of the global 
bourgeoisie, in a struggle over the hegemony of capitalism during the second 
World War, facilitated the disintegration of European colonialism in Asia and 
Africa and, at the same time, the prosperity of bourgeois groups, the middle 
classes and even considerable sectors of the exploited Euro-American working 
classes. 
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5. The consolidation of the bureaucratic despotism (renamed  existing 
 and its sudden expansion inside and outside of Europe happened 
inside the same historical process. This mode of domination became affected 
more profoundly and irremediably by this technocratic and instrumental flow of 
colonial/modern  
6. In this context, the hegemony of that version of  had the 
function of the most powerful domination mechanism of subjectivity, as well as 
through the global bourgeoisie as through the despotic bureaucracy of the so-
called   In that way and despite their rivalry, both modes of 
domination, exploitation and conflict converged in a repressive antagonism of 
the new movements of and in society, particularly regarding the social ethic of 
labor, gender, subjectivity and collective authority. Contrarily, it would be much 
harder to explain the successful alliance of both modes of domination to 
overthrow most of all juvenile movements (be that in Paris, New York, Berlin, 
Rome, Jakarta, Tlatelolco or Shanghai and Prague). At the end of the 60s and 
beginning of the 70s, they fought as a minority, but in the whole world, not only 
more against labor exploitation, colonialism and imperialism, but also against 
colonial-imperial wars (for that period Vietnam is the emblematic case), but also 
against the social ethic of productivism and consumerism; against the pragmatic 
bourgeois and bureaucratic authoritarianism; against the domination through 
 and  against the repression of all non-conventional forms of 
sexuality; against the technocratic reductionism of instrumental rationality and 
for new aesthetical-ethical political frameworks. Fighting, consequently, for a 
radically different historical horizon of meanings than that of the Eurocentred 
Coloniality/Modernity. 
7. At the same time a new model of conflicts came up. First, the delegitimation 
of the whole domination system assembled through the axis 
 This tendency already began since the end of the 
second world war as a result of the global repudiation regarding the atrocities of 
national-socialism and Japanese military authoritarianism. The 
racism/sexism/ethnicism of those despotic regimes was consequently not only 
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defeated in war, but also and to no lesser extent and as a part of the delegitimizing 
references of racialization, patriarchy, ethnicism and militarist authoritarianism 
converted within the power relations. But it was mostly during the decade of the 
60s in the 20th century that a great debate on  and  could gain a 
new and definitive prominence, announcing the enormous contemporary global 
conflict regarding the control over these areas of social behavior and praxis. 
8. Despite the defeat of those anti-authoritarian and anti-bureaucratic 
movements and the following imposition of  as the new Global 
Colonial Capitalism, the seed of a new historical horizon was able to survive 
among the new historical-structural heterogeneity of global imaginaries and 
momentarily germinates as one of the most visible signs in the proposition for a 
Bien Vivir. 
The new historical period: the existential crisis of the global coloniality of 
power 
The evolvement of these new historical tendencies of industrial-financial capital lead 
to a prolonged booming and changing period, culminating in an explosion of an 
existential crisis in the power model as such, the Global Coloniality of Power, its 
ensemble and its crucial elements, since the second half of 1973. 
Together with that crisis, the world entered a new historical period, whose specific 
processes have a similar deepness, magnitude and implication with the period that 
we call -bourgeois  although with opposing signs. The terms 
  and  (which cannot be discussed 
here at length)7 present with reasonable efficacy and despite of all their ambivalences 
                                                          
7 My contribution to that debate, principally in: Modernidad, Identidad y Utopía en América Latina. 
, originally in 
TENDENCIAS BASICAS DE NUESTRA ERA. Instituto de Estudios Internacionales Pedro Gual, 2001. Caracas, 
Venezuela. An updated version in: SAN MARCOS, Nr. 25, July 2006, Universidad de San Marcos, Lima, Peru; 
inally in AMERICA LATINA EN MOVIMIENTO, Nr. 341, October 
PENSÉE SOCIALE CRITIQUE POUR LE 
XXI SIÉCLE, Melanges en l´honneur de Samir Amin. Forum du Tiers- Monde, L´Harmattan 2003, 131-149, 
HUESO HUMERO, Nr. 53, 
April 2009, 30-59. Lima, Peru. 
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and complexities the character and the main tendencies of this new period. 
The first consists basically in the ultimate imposition of the new financial capital in 
the control of the global colonial-modern capitalism. Precisely, it is about the 
worldwide imposition of a   woven by the  
 The second is about the imposition of that definitive framework on 
all countries and the whole human population, initially in Latin America through the 
bloody dictatorship of general Augusto Pinochet in Chile and later through the 
governments of Margaret Thatcher and Ronald Reagan in Britain and the U.S. 
together with the support and/or subjugation of all other countries. 
This imposition produced a social dispersion of the exploited workers and the 
disintegration of their main social and political institutions (mainly trade unions); 
the defeat and disintegration of the so-called   and virtually of all 
regimes, movements and political organizations involved. China and later Vietnam 
chose to be on the side of the new industrial-financial and globalized  existing 
 under a reconfigured bureaucratic despotism as a partner of the mayor 
global financial corporations and of the Global Imperial Bloc.8  
Finally,  denominates in a rather unsatisfactory way, the ultimate 
imposition of tecnocratization/instrumentalization of what was known as  
 that is the Eurocentred Colonialiy/Modernity. 
We are then deep within a historical process of a complete reconfiguration of the 
Global Coloniality of Power, the hegemonic power model of the planet. It is about, 
in a first stance, the acceleration and deepening of a re-concentration tendency 
regarding the control of power. 
The central tendencies of that process consist, in a brief overview, in: 
1. The re-privatization of public spaces, mainly the State; 
2. The reconcentration of the control over labor, the resources of production 
and of production-redistribution; 
                                                          
8  
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3. The extreme and increasing social polarization of the world population; 
4. The aggravation of the  of  
5. The hyperfetishization of the market, even more than of the product; 
6. The manipulation and control of technological resources of communication 
and of transportation in order to impose the 
tecnocratization/instrumentalization of Coloniality/Modernity; 
7. The mercantilization of subjectivity and life experiences of individuals, 
mainly of women; 
8. The universal aggravation of individualist dispersion of people and of 
egoistic conduct, cross-dressed as individual liberty, which is the equivalent of 
the universalization of the   in social praxis, perverted as the 
nightmare of brutal individual quest for wealth and power against others; 
9. The  of religious ideologies and their corresponding 
social ethics, what ultimately re-legitimizes the control over the main areas of 
social existence; 
10. The growing use of the so-called   (most of all images, 
cinema, TV, video, etc.) in the industrial production of terror and mystification 
of experiences, leading to a legitimation of the  of 
ideologies and repressive violence. 
The  of  and the crisis of the global coloniality of power 
Although only in an allusive way, it is pertinent to point out that one of the 
foundational elements of the Eurocentred Coloniality/Modernity is the new and 
radical Cartesian dualism that separates  from 9 Hence, one of the 
most characteristic ideas/images of eurocentrism in any of its expressions is the 
 of  as something that does not require any further justification, 
                                                          
9 
Goldfrank (2000), op. cit. 
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expressed properly in the productivist ethic originated in the   
It is not difficult at all to perceive the inherent presence of the idea of  as part 
of   as an explanation and justificaction for the exploitation of  
 
Under the protection of this metaphysical mystification of human relations with the 
rest of the universe, the dominant groups of the homo sapiens, within the Global 
Coloniality of Power and especially since the   lead the species 
to impose its exploitative hegemony on all other species of animals as well as a 
predatory conduct over all other existing elements of the planet. Based on that, the 
Global/Colonial Capitalism performs an increasingly fierce and predatory conduct, 
that leads to jeopardize not only the survival of the whole species on the planet, but 
also the continuity and the reproduction of the conditions of life, the whole life on 
the planet. With its imposition, today we are killing each other and destroying our 
common home. 
From that perspective, the so-called   of the global climate or the 
  far from being a  phenomenon that happens within 
something we call  and supposedly separated from us as members of that 
animal species Homo Sapiens, is the result of the aggravation of that global 
disorientation of our species on earth, which has been imposed by the predatory 
tendencies of the new industrial-financial capitalism within the Global Coloniality of 
Power. In other terms, it is one of the most central expressions of this existential crisis 
of this specific power model. 
The new resistance: towards the de/coloniality of power 
Since the end of the 20th century, a growing proportion of the victims of that power 
model began to resist these tendencies in virtually the whole world. The oppressors, 
the  of  whether as owners of big financial corporations or rulers of 
despotic-bureaucratic regimes, answer with violent repression, not only inside the 
conventional borders of their own countries, but passing through and by them, 
developing a tendency of global re-colonization, using the most sophisticated 
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technological resources, which allow to kill more people, quicker and with less cost. 
Based on these conditions, the Crisis of the Global Coloniality of Power and 
especially of the Eurocentred Coloniality/Modernity, the aggravation of conflictivity 
and violence has been set up as a globalized structural tendency. 
Such aggravation of conflictivity, fundamtentalisms and violence, coupled with the 
growing and extreme social polarization of the world population, causes the resistance 
itself to produce a new conflict model. 
Resistance tends to evolve as the production of a new sense of social existence, life 
itself, precisely because the vast concerned population perceives with a growing 
intensity, that what is at stake here and now is not only their poverty as their never-
ending way of existence, but rather and nothing less than their own survival. Such a 
discovery implies necessarily that one cannot defend human life on earth without 
defending at the same time and in the same movement the conditions of the very life 
on earth. 
In that way, the defense of human life and its conditions on the planet becomes the 
new sense for resistance struggles for an enormous majority of the world population. 
And without subverting and disintegrating the Global Coloniality of Power and its 
colonial-global capitalism in its most predatory period today, these struggles may not 
advance towards the production of a historical meaning alternative to the 
Eurocentred Modernity/Coloniality. 
De/coloniality of power as a continuous democratic production of social 
existence 
This new historical horizon of meanings, the defense of the conditions of  own 
and  life on this planet, is already under consideration in the struggles and 
alternative social practices of the species. Consequently, against all form of 
domination/exploitation within social existence. That is, a De/Coloniality of Power 
as a point of departure and the democratic self-production and reproduction of social 
existence as a continuous orientational axis of social practices. 
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It is this historical context, where it is necessary to locate the whole debate and 
elaboration of the proposition of Bien Vivir. Following, it is most of all about 
admitting this open question, not only in debate, but also in the everyday social praxis 
of populations who decide to warp and inhabit historically this new possibility of 
social existence. 
In order to evolve and consolidate itself, the De/Coloniality of Power would imply 
social practices configured by: 
a. The social equality of heterogeneous and diverse individuals, against the de-
equalizing racial and sexual social classification and identification of the 
world population; 
b. Consequently, neither the differences nor the identities will be any longer a 
source or argument for the social inequality of individuals; 
c. The groups, belongings and/or identities might be the product of a free and 
autonomous decisions of free and autonomous individuals; 
d. The reciprocity between socially equal groups and/or individuals in the 
organization of labor and in the distribution of products; 
e. The egalitarian redistribution of resources and products, tangible and 
intangible, of the world between the world population; 
f. The tendency of communal association of the world population on a local, 
regional or global scale as a way of producing and managing collective 
authority directly and, with that precise meaning, as the most efficient 
mechanism to distribute and redistribute rights, obligations, responsibilities, 
resources, products, between groups and their individuals, in every area of 
social existence (sex, labor, subjectivity, collective authority) and a co-
responsibility regarding the relationship with all other living beings and 
entities on the planet or the whole universe. 
The  of the   and the proposition of bien vivir: open 
questions 
It is not an historical accident that the debate about the Coloniality of Power and the 
Eurocentred Coloniality/Modernity has been produced, foremost, in Latin America. 
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Neither, that the proposition of Bien Vivir comes from, basically, the new movement 
of Latin-American  
Latin America is the place constituted through the   (ironic 
reference to the common idea of the  10 And by that, as the the kick-
off time and space of a new historical world and a new power model, the Global 
Coloniality of Power. At the same time, as the original time/space of the first 
 of the survivors of the colonizing genocide, as the first population 
of the world suppressed through the  of their new identity and their 
subjugated place inside the new power model. 
Latin America and the  population, then, have an elemental, 
foundational role in the constitution and history of the Coloniality of Power. From 
there derives their actual place and role in the political-ethic-aesthetic-historic-
theoretic-epistemic subversion of this power model in-crisis, implied in the 
proposition of a De/Coloniality of Power and Bien Vivir as an alternative social 
existence. 
But still if America and particularly Latin America was the first new historical identity 
of the Coloniality of Power and their colonized population the first  of 
the world, since the 18th century all the rest of the planet and its populations have 
been conquered by Western Europe. And those populations, the vast majority of the 
world, have been colonized, racialized and consequently  Their 
contemporary emergence does not constitute, then, just another   
It is about a whole new movement of and in society whose development could lead 
to a Global De/Coloniality of Power, meaning to another social existence, liberated 
from domination/exploitation/violence. 
The crisis of the Global Coloniality of Power and the debate and struggle for the 
De/Coloniality, prove at plain sight that the social relation of 
domination/exploitation grounded upon the idea of  is a product of the history 
of power relations and not of any Cartesian  But it also shows the extreme 
                                                          
10 Finley, Robert 2003. Las Indias Accidentales, Barcelona, Barataria. 
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historical heterogeneity of the  population, first in their pre-colonial 
history and second in their history produced through the experiences under the 
Coloniality of Power for almost half a millennium. During the latter, a new historical 
movement of and in society is now producing the De/Coloniality of Power. 
It would make no sense, though, to wait for this historically heterogeneous 
population, which composes the overwhelmingly vast majority of the world, to 
produce or to take over a universal, homogenous historical imaginary as an alternative 
to the Global Coloniality of Power. This would not even be conceivable taking only 
into account the population of Latin America or the Americas as a whole. 
In fact, all these populations, without any exception, come from historical 
experiences of power relationships. Until now, power seems to have been, in all 
known history, not only a phenomenon of all long-term social forms of existence, 
but particularly the main motivation of the historical collective conduct of the 
species. Such experiences of power relations are without any doubt different between 
each other and regarding the Coloniality of Power, but nevertheless possible common 
experiences of colonization. 
However, the  population under colonial rule, first in Iberian 
 and later in the whole world under the rule of  Europe  not only 
shared universally the perverted forms of domination/exploitation imposed by the 
Global Coloniality of Power. Also, paradoxically but effectively, the resistance against 
those forms made it possible to share common historical aspirations against 
domination, exploitation and discrimination: the social equality of heterogeneous 
individuals, the freedom of thought and expression of all those individuals, the equal 
redistribution of resources as well as the egalitarian control over all of the central areas 
of social existence. 
It is because of that, that within the historical  of those victimized 
populations under the Global Coloniality of Power, lies not only the heritage of the 
past, but also the lessons for a historical resistance on such a long time span. We are, 
therefore, walking towards the emergence of a new historically-structurally 
heterogeneous identity whose development might produce a new social existence 
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liberated from domination/exploitation/violence, which is one central demand of the 
World Social Forum: Another world is possible! 
In other words, the new historical horizon of meanings is emerging in all its historical-
structural heterogeneity. 
In that perspective, the proposition of Bien Vivir, is necessarily a historically open 
question,11 which requires continuous inquiry, debate and praxis.
                                                          
11 In that regard, for example the recent interviews by Aymaran leaders in Bolivia, made and diffused by E-
Mail of the CAOI. The journal América Latina en Movimiento of the Latin American Information Agency 
 
entirely to this debate. Regarding the social praxis itself, there is a very important movement of specific 
research. 
Esperanza et. al., Medellín, Universidad de Medellín, 2010. 
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NICOLÁS M. PERRONE1 
International Investment Law, 
Development and Sovereignty:  No 
Harm? 2 
Foreign investment-led development and the international investment regime 
Since the 1990s, foreign investment has been presented as a strong means for 
development. Foreign investment serves to climb the value ladder, bridge the 
investment gap, and maintain a  effective utilization of economic 3 
Yet, attracting and enabling foreign investment is not an easy task for governments. 
In a context of fierce competition for capital, this requires an active state promoting 
policies that match the needs of foreign investors. As a result, the control and steering 
of foreign investment of the 1960s and 1970s was quickly replaced with a model in 
which governments must facilitate foreign investor initiatives and reap the benefits 
of multinational corporate activity. The basis of this development model is to 
organise local resources around the expectations of foreign investors, and rely on 
sovereign powers as a means to reach this objective: e.g. as a means to implement 
extractivism and maquilas.  
The international investment regime, which consists of more than 3,000 treaties for 
the protection of foreign investment, has been fundamental in promoting this 
development model and in supervising states that tried to defy its orthodoxy. Like 
                                                          
1 NICOLÁS MARCELO PERRONE is an Assistant Professor at the Universidad Externado de Colombia. He holds 
a PhD from the London School of Economics and Political Science.. 
2 Article originally published in http://www.alternautas.net/blog/2016/3/9/international-investment-law-
development-sovereignty-no-harm on March, 3rd 2016.  
3 United States- Ecuador Bilateral Investment Treaty, preamble, signed 27 August, 1993. 
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UNCTAD explained in the early World Investment Reports, an initial purpose of 
investment arbitration was to lock-in a foreign investment-led development project. 
International arbitrators were in charge of preventing governments from changing 
their minds, and disappointing foreign investor expectations.4 Most of the criticisms 
against the international investment regime, however, are not based on these grounds. 
The main argument sustains that some investment arbitrators have gone too far, 
limiting regulation to curb negative externalities and market abuses involving, for 
instance, plain-tobacco packaging. The increasing discussion about the right to 
regulate, in this way, has eclipsed a more profound debate about the role of the 
international investment regime in limiting alternative forms of development and 
policy experimentation. 
The Oxy II awards: a tale on the commodification of sovereignty 
This short essay aims to illustrate this more general debate by looking at the awards 
in the case Occidental Petroleum (Oxy) II v Ecuador, where the tribunal imposed 
one of the highest awards against a host state. In 2011, an investment tribunal found 
that Ecuador had acted disproportionately against Oxy condemning the state to pay 
1.77 billion US dollars in compensation.5 Ecuador requested the annulment of this 
decision under the International Centre for Settlement of Investment Disputes 
(ICSID) rules, and a few months ago a committee annulled part of the award 
reducing the compensation to a little more than 1 billion US dollars.6 As most high-
level investment disputes, this case is so rich in facts and details that the narrative of 
the award becomes one of the most important justifications for the final decision. In 
this particular dispute, the striking detail is that Oxy deliberately breached the 
investment agreement with the Ecuadorian government the two tribunals 
                                                          
4 UNCTAD, 1993 World Investment Report. Transnational Corporations and Integrated International 
Production (1993), at 214-5.  
5 Occidental Petroleum Corporation v Ecuador (ICSID Case No. ARB/06/11), Award, 5 October 2012 
(hereinafter: Oxy II Award). 
6 Occidental Petroleum Corporation v Ecuador (ICSID Case No. ARB/06/11), Decision on Annulment of the 
Award, 2 November 2015 (hereinafter: Oxy II Annulment). 
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acknowledge this point  but the oil company is still awarded 1 billion US dollars in 
compensation. 
To state the facts briefly: Oxy had committed not to transfer any rights or interests 
over its investment in the oil sector without the previous approval of the Ecuadorian 
government. But that is exactly what Oxy did. It transferred economic interests over 
the project to a Canadian investor without the approval of the Ecuadorian 
government. According to the investment agreement between the foreign investor 
and the state, this kind of breach would result in the termination of the investment. 
However, here comes the trick in the investment award. For the tribunal and the 
annulment committee, Ecuador did not suffer any harm at all, or if there was any 
harm, it was a minor one. Consequently, the arbitrators found that the termination 
of the investment by Ecuador was a disproportionate measure demanding 
compensation. This compensation consists of the total harm suffered by Oxy minus 
a twenty-five per cent discount due to the contractual breach. 
The award is perplexing because of the way in which the tribunal reached the 
conclusion that Ecuador suffered no or little harm. The decision is based on two 
important premises: the commodification of sovereignty, and the reduction of the 
national interest on natural resources to a minor concern. These premises confirm 
that the international investment regime has an impact on the idea of sovereignty 
and, in particular, on how we think about harm to national sovereignty. 
The arbitral tribunal explains the relevance of the harm element in detail. First, the 
arbitrators reject the Ecuadorian argument that this is a sole contractual case that did 
not require the application of proportionality. The arbitrators note that there always 
needs to be a relationship of proportionality between any penalty imposed by a state 
and the harm created by a private actor. For the tribunal, a severe penalty like the 
termination of the investment agreement  would have only been justified in the 
case of a serious harm and a flagrant breach. The arbitrators highlight that only in 
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very exceptional circumstances states may impose a severe penalty only for deterrent 
purposes.7 
The tribunal then continues with the question of the severity of the harm. The 
arbitrators point out that the transfer of economic interests over the oil project from 
Oxy to a Canadian corporation, in fact, was going to be beneficial for Ecuador 
because it meant more foreign investment.8 The tribunal recognises that states have 
the duty to protect their natural resources, but conceives this duty as protecting the 
stream of public income generated by the oil sector.9 
Ecuador replies to this argument by highlighting that the harm was imposed on its 
legal system, on the integrity of its legal order. The arbitrators are not completely 
unsympathetic to this point. They accept that Oxy  some public authority 
by doing something that was prohibited by the investment agreement.10 But they 
note that this did not impose a severe harm on Ecuador and, therefore, the 
government was not entitled to applying a severe penalty like the termination of the 
agreement. The tribunal suggests that there were other less serious sanctions that 
Ecuador could have applied to Oxy. In this respect, the arbitrators highlight that any 
sanction had to be balanced against the economic interests of Oxy. In essence, the 
Ecuadorian acts were problematic for the tribunal because the termination implied a 
big loss for Oxy, while the transfer did not create any economic loss for Ecuador  
on the contrary, according to the award, it was going to benefit the country 
economically. The tribunal, lastly, does not accept that the termination of the 
contract was necessary for deterrence purposes. Ecuador, as a result, acted 
disproportionately in violation of the investment treaty.11 
                                                          
7 Oxy II Award, 416-7, 422, 425, 427. 
8 Ibid., 444-5. 
9 Ibid., 446-7. 
10 Oxy II Award, 448. 
11 Ibid., 434, 449-50. The dissenting arbitrator Stern has a different opinion about the harm imposed on 
Ecuador by Oxy. She considers that E
International Investment Law, Development and Sovereignty | 28 
The international investment regime, sovereignty and harm: Can states and 
local populations trust foreign investors? 
As noted above, the criticism against investment arbitration has been increasing in 
recent years. There are two different strands in the literature. One criticises 
investment arbitrators for their conflict of interests or simply for promoting their and 
law  economic interests.12 The other strand of the literature is concerned with 
awards that limit the right to regulate, potentially creating situations of regulatory 
chill and moral hazard.13 The Oxy II awards, in my view, give us the opportunity to 
think beyond these two categories, reflecting on the structural consequences of the 
international investment regime and investment arbitration. This regime cannot be 
seen in isolation from the dominant development model, which is based on foreign 
investment and multinational corporate initiative.   
In this particular case, the reasoning of the Oxy II awards commodifies the idea of 
sovereignty over natural resources. A severe harm to sovereignty is therefore equal to 
a severe harm to corporate interests: i.e. a loss of economic benefits. It is interesting, 
in this respect, that while the tribunal refers to the idea of harm, sometimes it also 
uses the notion of loss.14 This conception of sovereignty disregards years of debate 
and struggle at the United Nations, where the Global South demanded a conception 
of sovereignty in particular related to natural resources  that allowed their 
governments to implement their own political, economic and legal institutions.15 For 
this view, sovereignty is important to enable communities to decide their own 
preferences and values. In Ecuador, for instance, this relates to the indigenous notion 
                                                          
conduct constituted a quite severe breach. For this reason, she suggested a fifty per cent discount on the 
compensation. Oxy II Award, Dissenting Opinion of Brigitte Stern, 4, 7. The Annulment Committee confirms 
the reasoning of the tribunal, Oxy II Annulment, 344, 346, 368.  
12 See Gus Van Harten, Investment Treaty Arbitration and Public Law (2007); Cecilia Olivet and Pia Eberhardt, 
Transnational Institute, November 27, 2012. 
13 See Stephan Schill (ed.), International Investment Law And Comparative Public Law (2010); Santiago Montt, 
State Liability In Investment Treaty Arbitration: Global Constitutional And Administrative Law In The Bit 
Generation (2009). 
14 Oxy II Award, 445. 
15 See Anthony Anghie, Imperialism, Sovereignty and the Making of International Law (2004), pp. 196-244. 
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of good life, buen vivir or Sumak Kawsay. The Oxy II awards subvert this notion of 
sovereignty: by whom and how a  natural resources are used becomes a 
minor question as long as wealth is maximised. 
We should not forget, in this regard, that the imposition of strict requirements to 
transfer interests over strategic natural resources, like oil, is not only the policy of 
Ecuador. Many nations impose similar restrictions to foreign investors. It is worth 
pondering, then, what a tribunal would decide if Petroecuador invested in the United 
States, with a similar prohibition, but this corporation still decided to transfer an 
interest over the project without governmental approval to, let us say, a Chinese 
investor. It seems unlikely that a tribunal would not consider this a severe harm  
even if the United States were going to receive a large economic benefit. The United 
States have rejected foreign investment for national security reasons, including 
Chinese investment, and such a transfer without a government approval could put 
national security at risk according to US law.16 
Natural resources are strategic for all countries. In the case of Latin America, natural 
resources have triggered foreign military interventions, military coups, and a large 
number of investment disputes since the 19th century. All this suggests that who the 
foreign investor is becomes of ultimate importance for every state in Latin America. 
These countries have the same if not more national security reasons than the United 
States to screen foreign investment. In this context, the Oxy II awards are against 
fundamental principles of international law, like sovereignty and the right of each 
state to screen and reject foreign investment. The tribunals support the claim that 
Ecuador could have imposed a less severe sanction to Oxy. Ultimately, however, this 
means that foreign investors can disregard fundamental legal requirements like 
entry requirements  because they know that they will only suffer a minor sanction 
at the most. 
This leads to the broader question of whether or not states and local populations in 
the Global South can trust foreign investors with their resources. Foreign investment 
                                                          
16 -China Investment 
Economics, No. PIIEB15-1 (2015), at 34-40. 
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may be very useful to promote the kind of development that each population desires, 
but this needs foreign investors who are willing to adapt to local aspirations and make 
a profit within those boundaries. This requires, first, having a strict control over who 
those foreign investors are. Under the current international rules, this and other 
crucial themes have not been analysed in detail. The current discussions about the 
right to regulate fail to address the structural problems of a foreign investment-led 
development project, and overlook the contribution of the international investment 
regime to these problems. It is as if somebody or something is being harmed, but we 
do not take notice of it. 
References 
Treaties 
United States-Ecuador Bilateral Investment Treaty, signed 27 August, 1993. 
Cases 
Occidental Petroleum Corporation v Ecuador (ICSID Case No. ARB/06/11), 
Award, 5 October 2012. 
Occidental Petroleum Corporation v Ecuador (ICSID Case No. ARB/06/11), 
Decision on Annulment of the Award, 2 November 2015. 
Bibliography 
Anghie, Anthony, Imperialism, Sovereignty and the Making of International Law 
(2004). 
Bergsten, F., et al (eds),  a US-China Investment  Peterson Institute 
for International Economics, No. PIIEB15-1 (2015), at 34-40. 
Montt, Santiago, State Liability In Investment Treaty Arbitration: Global 
Constitutional And Administrative Law In The Bit Generation (2009). 
Olivet, Cecilia and Pia Eberhardt, ng from injustice: How law firms, 
arbitrators and financiers are fuelling an investment arbitration  Transnational 
Institute, November 27, 2012. 
3 1  |  A L T E R N A U T A S  3  ( 1 )   J U L Y  2 0 1 6  
Schill, Stephan (ed.), International Investment Law And Comparative Public Law 
(2010) 
UNCTAD, 1993 World Investment Report. Transnational Corporations and 
Integrated International Production (1993).  
Van Harten, Gus, Investment Treaty Arbitration and Public Law (2007). 
Cameras to the Perople | 32 
 
IOKIÑE RODRIGUEZ1 AND MIRNA INTURIAS2 
Cameras to the People: Reclaiming local 
histories and restoring environmental  
justice in community based forest 
management through participatory 
video3 
Indigenous  histories and memories are almost invisible to the eyes and ears 
of Western civilization. When we do hear about them, we generally do so through 
accounts and reconstructions made by naturalists, priests, explorers and more recently 
historians, geographers, and anthropologists  rarely from indigenous people 
themselves. The invisibility of local histories is not accidental. It is the result of a 
historical hegemonic knowledge production system that has privileged particular 
ways of knowing the world, at the expense of others (dos Santos et al 2007, Quijano 
2000). This lack of attention to locally experienced realities is a common feature of 
environmental narratives that place the blame of environmental change on local 
resources uses and practices (Leach & Mearns 1996, Martinez-Alier 2003), thus 
reinforcing the need for external control (western science-based knowledge) over 
indigenous  lands. Erasing local histories is also convenient for de-rooting 
people from their lands as part of the imposition of development agendas by the state 
and the private sector interested in promoting extractive activities and other projects 
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of   in indigenous  territories (Acosta 2015, Swampa 2013, 
Harvey 2014). 
Yet indigenous peoples in Latin America are very much aware that an important part 
of their struggle for cultural and physical survival involves telling the world their own 
histories.  must tell government officials who we are and make them understand 
the importance of reconstructing our  (Carlos Morales, Uwottüja Indigenous 
Leader).  have to unearth our own  (Belkis Bueno, Bariva Indigenous 
Leader). These were some of the urgent actions identified by a group of 50 
Venezuelan indigenous leaders that participated in an  Conflict 
Transformation and Interculturality  that took place in Puerto Ayacucho 
in October 2014 (Mirabal, 2015). Similar comments are heard throughout the region 
all the time as part of indigenous  wellbeing agendas (Buen Vivir) 
(Huanacuni 2010). 
Some indigenous people are making important progress reconstructing their past as 
part of the development of their own   (Planes de Vida) (Cabildo de 
Guambia 1994; COINPA 2008; Jansasoy & Perez-Vera 2006; Roroimokok Damuk 
2010, Espinosa 2014). A Plan de Vida is a plan made by indigenous organizations 
and communities in an effort to survive and to maintain traditions, customs, and the 
hope of establising a society with its own identity based on the traditional knowledge 
of its people. It is a way to guaranty better conditions and a better quality of life for 
indigenous communities (Perez 2009). Yet, the construction of Life Plans is not a 
linear or conflict free process. They can be difficult to develop due to frequent 
tensions between community fractions that often have different and conflicting value 
systems and views about what local well being should be (Rodriguez 2016). 
Something similar happens with the formalization of territorial rights, which often 
generates new conflicts at community level due to clashing notions of authority 
(Larson et al 2015), among others. Many of these tensions are often associated with 
market dynamics, which create social disassociation and weakening of community 
and intercommunity rules, making it all the more difficult to develop a common or 
shared view of well being or to consolidate the territorial autonomy agenda. 
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Here we discuss how   (PV) can help with indigenous  
needs for cultural reassertion as well as with creating opportunities for restoring 
environmental justice in their territories when community-based natural resource 
management and autonomous development themselves have become issues of local 
contention. 
The story we share is the one of the Monkox people of Lomerio, Bolivia, who recently 
started using video cameras to reconstruct the struggle for land rights in their territory 
and to document tensions around community forestry management as part of a 
participatory research project with the Universidad NUR from Santa Cruz, Bolivia, 
and the School of International Development (DEV) from the University of East 
Anglia (UEA). As we will see, participatory videos can have great power as part of an 
activist and practise based approach for environmental justice research. 
The use of participatory videos in research 
Participatory videos are part of a new global trend in action research (Shaw & 
Robertson 1997, White 2003). As video production has become increasingly easy to 
use by the general public, many facilitators and researchers are using it worldwide in 
different settings as part of research approaches that seeks to promote social change. 
According to Tamara Plush (2012), participatory videos share three features with 
action research: 
 Awareness raising and knowledge: participatory video as a medium for 
raising awareness about knowledge as power.  
 Capacity building for action: strengthening social actors in the use of 
videos at community level with the objective of generating knowledge 
in a participatory manner within a long term framing. 
 People centered: using videos as a strategy to communicate the 
knowledge generated by communities and to influence policy making at 
a global, national and local level. 
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Additionally, on a similar trend to other media based action research methods of 
Latin American origin like  Theater of the  (Boal 1993), participatory 
videos are known for their potential for stimulating local reflexivity and building 
communication as part of a wider research agenda. As suggested by Kolb (1984), 
action research involves repeated cycles of activity followed by reflection on that 
action, with the purpose of improving some aspect of the social world. In this sense, 
participatory video can be conceptualized as an emergent interactive process, 
involving iterative cycles of learning in this action research tradition, rather than a 
way of producing research output. Therefore, the research interactions that evolve are 
better perceived as akin to the ongoing conversation of ethnography, which may 
contribute to a research report, rather than a way of collecting data such as interviews 
to be delivered on video (Shaw 2012). 
Thus, the process of doing participatory videos and not just the product (the video) 
is perceived as having a great value both for research, assisting in the understanding 
of  views, choices, hidden narratives and power relations during the different 
phases of the video production, and for social change, due to the learning process and 
reflexivity that it triggers when local views, knowledge and marginalized voices are 
made visible and discussed collectively. 
Due to its visual nature and ability to capture the voices of peoples and of 
marginalized groups, participatory video has the potential to educate, persuade and 
influence decision making in a way that can bring about positive change. In Latin 
America, there are interesting experiences where participatory videos are used with 
this aim in some intercultural research and programs in universities (e.g. the 
International Network of Intercultural Studies of the Universidad Católica from Peru 
(RIDEI-PUCP) http://red.pucp.edu.pe/ridei/sobre-ridei/presentacion/). 
Participatory videos have proven to be a valuable tool promoting intergenerational 
dialogue, making social, economic and education inequities visible and helping to 
revalue and recover local knowledge, practices and identities (see for example 
Sandoval 2015). This method is also increasingly used in the region as a tool for social 
mobilization and awareness-raising about environmental injustices associated with 
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development projects and extractive and industrial activities4. Yet, its use in 
environmental justice research, such as to help to uncover the complexities of social 
exclusion in community led natural resource management, seems to be in its infancy. 
In the following paragraphs, we discuss a case in which participatory video has helped 
to shed light to different dimensions of environmental (in)justice (procedure, 
distribution and recognition) in community forest management while helping to 
revitalize local identities and develop a sense of restorative justice. 
Introducing the Monkox people of Lomerio, Bolivia 
The communal indigenous territory (TCO) of Lomerio is an area of 256,000 hectares 
located in the department of Santa Cruz, in the lowlands of Bolivia, legally owned 
and managed by the Monkox indigenous peoples since 2006. 
In 2009, after a process of intense political mobilizations, Bolivia changed its national 
constitution to become a  Nation-  that acknowledges 
differentiated rights for indigenous peoples (Article 2). TCOs are legally owned 
indigenous territories that resulted from this intense period of mobilizations. There 
are currently 190 TCOs in Bolivia, covering 20.7 million hectares. 
The TCO land distribution model has important implications for the management 
of common property resources such as forests, as it provides the legal framework for 
local control and property rights on natural resources for the use and management of 
forests through community forest management plans. 
Thus, forestry marks the identity of the conquest for land in Lomerio, as developing 
a communal forestry model in the area was a strategy used by the Monkox People to 
gain property rights over the territory and control illegal logging in the area. Lomerio 
                                                          
4 Visit http://www.newsreel.org/guides/Maquilapolis/MAQ_DiscussionGuide_Espanol.pdf for an example of 
the use of participatory video in a transnational campaign against maquila factories in Mexico. Also visit 
http://revoluciontrespuntocero.com/cheran-keri-para-nosotros-aqui-en-el-pueblo-los-partidos-politicos-
estan-muertos/ for an example of a community television project in Cheran, Mexico, where participatory 
videos are used as part of a wider communication strategy of strengthening local identity, autonomy and 
territorial control. For a series of 15 participatory videos developed in Peru against mega mining visit: 
https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=WL93OHxUTEQ&index=2&list=PLokUKtHRc9TibkfbbjT5b-
7Q6Y7ntXg8l 
3 7  |  A L T E R N A U T A S  3  ( 1 )   J U L Y  2 0 1 6  
is the first case of forest certification in Bolivia through the Forest Stewardship 
Council (FSC). The Lomerianos are also known as one of the first indigenous peoples 
in Bolivia to fight for territorial indigenous autonomy. Currently, all villages in 
Lomerio are trying to establish a market-oriented forestry management model under 
local control. There are a total of 23 communities in Lomerio that have set aside areas 
for this kind of management. 
Despite the success in obtaining territorial property rights and the existence of a 
communal forestry model, the collective management of this vast territory is complex 
due to the diversity of actors and public policies pressuring for access and use of its 
rich natural resources. Public policies to support community resource management 
models are still weak. There is also an increasing pressure from external informal 
mining cooperatives to exploit the territory. Additionally, the national government 
is incentivizing cattle grazing projects in the communities, which could create a large 
scale land conversion process in the area in the coming years. 
CICOL, the Indigenous Organization of the Native Communities of Lomerio, the 
legal authority over the territory, is experiencing great difficultly to regulate resources 
management in the area. Some communities enter into very unfavorable negotiations 
with timber companies without following CICOL recommendations. The 
government on its side is promoting mining and incentivizing cattle grazing without 
undergoing free, prior and informed consent procedures or involving CICOL in local 
territorial planning. What is perhaps more worrying to the Monkox leaders and elders 
is that despite the success in obtaining legal rights over their territories, the younger 
Monkox generations are oblivious of how the conquest of the land took place and 
know very little about their own history. The Monkox elders and leaders feel an 
urgent need to help remember the past, in order to revitalise their identity, and have 
a clear view of a desired future among the younger generations. 
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Making participatory videos on environmental justice in Lomerio 
In 2013, CICOL started a research partnership with Universidad NUR from Santa 
Cruz and the School of International Development (DEV) at the University of East 
Anglia (UEA) to carry out the  Justice and Markets  (CJM). 
Participatory videos were used in conjunction with other ethnographic methods, such 
as interviews, participant observation and secondary data collection, as a tool to 
examine local notions of environmental (in)justice in community forestry and to help 
give public visibility to environmental justice concerns. CICOL chose four of its 
members (three young women and a member of the council of elders) to work as 
community researchers in the project for a year, hand-in-hand with two external 
researchers/facilitators (the authors of this paper). 
Participatory videos were made entirely by village members through a process that 
involved: 
 Learning by practicing: overcoming the fear of cameras through games. 
 Participatory analysis (through the use of a variety of participatory 
assessment tools used to help creating the story (e.g. time lines, community 
mapping, problem tress, Venn diagrams, thematic pictures). 
 Creating a story line. 
 Filming, screening and editing. 
The realization of each video took approximately 10 days, excluding the time to fine-
tune the editing. This final editing process generally takes longer, depending on the 
type of support images community members wish to include in the video, and 
normally requires external support due to the equipment and software needed. 
Three participatory videos were made. The first one, titled  the road to freedom: 
the History of the Monkox  focuses on reconstructing the long struggle of 
the Monkox people of Lomerio to obtain territorial rights over their lands. It was 
carried out by a team of 10 people from CICOL. The remaining two videos, titled 
 forest is our life, our  and  forest, our  were carried 
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out by community members from two small villages (Todos Santos and Santo 
Rosario respectively) and focus on experiences of (in)justice in community forest 
management. 
The final versions of the video have been shown and discussed in general and with 
community assemblies, and are being used by CICOL as a dissemination tool in 
meetings with other Bolivian indigenous peoples related to claims for territorial 
autonomy. They have also been posted in YouTube for their wider dissemination. 
What environmental injustices did the videos reveal? 
The making of the videos as well as their stories revealed significant feelings of 
injustice in community forest management at different levels and over different 
issues. 
As mentioned before one of the biggest concerns of many Monkox leaders and elders 
is that current young generations do not value the heritage they have received from 
those who fought for a very long time to obtain legal rights over their territories and 
natural resources. They perceive that younger generations are responsible for a 
generalized lack of local governance in community forest management and worse of 
all that they are being left out from benefit sharing from community forestry. These 
concerns were captured in the initial exploratory interviews, which as we shall see 
bellow, were brought out to the open in the forestry videos: 
 that we have a joint title, people  want to respect the other 
communities. Before, people  use to go through or carry out activities in 
the territory of other communities without seeking permission from the 
community authorities. Now, they  respect, they go through as if they were 
the owners, there is none of that common respect. What will it be like later? You 
will have to think about what you are going to do with your children [talking to 
the community researchers]. You have to educate them so that they  lose 
their  (Interview with Domingo Tubari Soqueré) 
 gave a good fight, we won our battle with the State, but with time, this has 
created problems. The younger generations now manage our heritage. We ended 
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up working for them, but it should not be like that. Those who fought for what 
we have should be the first to benefit, then the others.  important that the 
young ones know how much it cost us to have what we have. But as they have 
no idea, they  care. And we, who struggled to obtain what we have, suffer 
when only some people benefit. The community, those of us who are the 
absolute owners, have not benefited. We are still in  (Group interview 
with José Chávez García, Juan Chuvé Soqueré, Santiago Peña) 
It is with this concern in mind that the research team, in conjunction with  
Board of Directors, decided to devote the first participatory video to reconstructing 
the long struggle for liberation and territorial rights in Lomerio. The first half of this 
video captures, through the living testimonies of the elders, the long history of 
oppression experienced by the Monkox ancestors since the establishment of Jesuit 
Missions in the Bolivian lowlands (17th century), followed by the rubber boom of 
the late 19th and 20th century, when the Monkox were brutally exploited as forced 
laborers on plantations. Elders describe their own parents as having been slaves and 
subject to exploitation by large landowners, which continued into the late 20th 
century, even after they had escaped the mission towns and (re)established in their 
territory. The second half of the video recounts the process of liberation experienced 
by the Monkox people in this last century, as initiated first through the agrarian and 
education reforms in the late 1950s and more recently since the 1990s through new 
legislation and structural political reforms that acknowledge indigenous  
differentiated rights, including among others, property rights to their collective 
territories through new figures like the TCOs. In this latter part of the video, 
attention is paid to explaining the contribution that the lowland indigenous 
movements, including CICOL, had in making these political reforms possible. The 
video production team also devoted considerable time to reconstructing the different 
processes that CICOL had to undergo to obtain the territorial rights for the Lomerio 
TCO. 
The forest videos focuse on exposing injustices related to community forest 
management and use. In both cases, the story lines emphasize situations of injustice 
as perpetuated by actors outside of the TCO. The two main concerns relate to 
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inequitable negotiations with the external timber companies or intermediaries when 
selling their timber, and regulations from the central government in forestry 
management. The latter weakens local control on the activity and subjects villagers 
to significant fines when forestry procedures are not correctly followed. In one of the 
communities were the research project was based (Santo Rosario), the village was 
charged a 10.000 US$ fine by the Bolivian Forestry Agency (ABT) for not complying 
with forestry regulations when carrying out its forest management plan. The feeling 
of injustice behind this huge fine is expressed very strongly in the Santa Rosario Forest 
Video. 
Yet, interestingly, the making of the PVs also helped to air internal frictions in 
forestry management, giving a voice to marginalized community groups to express 
their justice claims, in particular elders and to a lesser extent, women. Elders vocalized 
a strong resentment for being excluded from local forestry management. A major 
source of tension concerns the monetization of forests, leading to some opposing 
forestry activities altogether. Many of them claim that the TCO was created for 
protecting the forests and not for finishing them off. Others however, base their claim 
on the fact that they do not receive any monetary benefit out of the exploitation of 
forests, as observed in the following extracts from the participatory videos: 
Video 1 (Todo Santos) Mr. Anacleto, what benefits have you perceived as 
representative of the village elders from participatory forest management plan? 
Well, in the last plan, I was promised 5,000 Bolivianos, but until now I have 
received nothing, I  know why. In this new plan, I hope they can think as 
brothers, that they  act so selfishly among brothers and neighbors  
in this new plan we will be able to see this money, or whatever there is to share, 
because I need to buy things to improve my house. It is only fair that everybody 
benefits from that money. So that our children and those that are to come can also 
benefit, because the wood might run out, and then there will be no more to share. 
Video 2 (Abuelo Jacinto, Santa Rosario) In the first management plan I  
understand anything because I was not taken into account.  what happened. 
But I always attended the meetings. In the second plan I have attended 4 meetings. 
It was clearer. The engineer came and explained everything. He said that everybody 
was going to benefit. Then, the young ones received motorcycles, but nobody told 
me anything else. Everybody has kept very quiet. The people from Santa Rita asked 
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me, have you received anything? And I said, nothing. I  know anything, I said. 
In Santa Rita and San Simon, they have all benefited, but in Santa Rosario, nothing! 
These and other similar claims were made during the PV training activities and also 
as off-camera comments during the filming of the videos, and in the case of Todo 
Santos, as part of the video story line. Women on their part, although less vocal than 
elders, had their own preferences for benefit distribution from forestry activities that 
have not been taken into account so far. These included buying mills to grind corn 
for making chicha and peeling rice, buying a communal truck to transport agriculture 
crops and setting up a plant nursery to grow tree seedlings to replace those that are 
felled for commercial purposes. These views were expressed during the exploration of 
environmental justice issues in the video training activities and were included as part 
of the story line in the two videos. 
All these claims touch upon different justice dimensions. They clearly address the 
issue of distribution, as  and  needs are not being represented in the 
way income distribution is taking place. So far, in both communities, young men 
and some families seem to be getting the bigger share out of commercial forestry. The 
inequitable distribution of benefits being experienced by elders and women also 
touches upon procedural justice. Although decisions about income distribution are 
taken in community assemblies, elders seem to have little opportunity to 
meaningfully participate as they are no longer active participants in the forestry sector 
and therefore viewed by the wider community as  Instead, it is 
assumed that benefits will trickle down to them through benefits perceived by their 
children and grandchildren. Both claims are in contradiction with the principle of 
equitable distribution of common resources, which should guide community life in 
Lomerio and which commonly plays an important part in indigenous  value 
systems: 
With regards to benefit distribution, we respect the  decisions, because 
we believe that communities have communal principles, which gives them 
sovereignty over their decisions. In their assemblies they must decide how to invest 
their income. We know communities invest in the needs that they prioritize. Some 
for instance have decided to invest in house furniture, transport units and others in 
home infrastructure improvements. Communities do this as part of the principles 
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of equitable distribution, where by all should benefit on equal terms.  Thus, we 
always appeal to this principle, of collective benefit, of social communal benefit, and 
also to the principle consensual decision making through our customary decision 
making institutions, which are the assemblies. (General Chief of CICOL, Anacleto 
Peña, Santo Rosario video). 
Despite  distributive concerns, the core of their complaint stems from an issue 
of recognition. Not only are they claiming rights to a common resource by appealing 
to equitable distribution communal values, but they are also demanding public 
acknowledgement of the key historical role they have played in the consolidation of 
existing communities and current forest management and territorial rights. 
Although the justice claims expressed in the Lomerio videos largely placed the blame 
of the injustices in disrespect to community procedures and values, such injustices 
must be understood as part of a wider and complex process triggered by forestry 
becoming a market based economy. Similar processes of communal values erosion 
around equitable distribution of benefits from common resources have been reported 
in other parts of Bolivia where forestry activities have been strongly influenced by the 
market: 
Our data shows that when indigenous communities are not pressured by timber 
companies or forestry concessions, they manage to carry out a satisfactory wood 
sawing activity without breaking basic rules of allocation of family benefits through 
the use and exploitation of communal forests. But when indigenous communities are 
pressured by timber companies or forestry concessions, wood sawing and distribution 
becomes a mechanism for social disassociation and weakening of community and 
intercommunity rules for forest use (Betancourt 2013).  
The outcome of the process 
From what we have discussed above, it is clear that the Monkox People from Lomerio 
face big challenges in the management of their common property resources and their 
territory. The shift to a plurinational nation-state has with no doubt represented an 
improvement of their rights in society and general well being, but it has not solved 
all their problems. If anything, new challenges have emerged with the new structure 
Cameras to the people | 44 
of territorial ownership, plus the pressures from the market remain more or less the 
same as with the mono-cultural nation-state model. This is coupled by the facts that 
public policies still provide little support to common property natural resource 
management and that younger generations are subject to strong cultural changes 
which create tensions with traditional value systems and governance rules. 
Reflecting collectively about this context and the challenges involved in achieving a 
just and sustainable management of their territory has been an important 
contribution of the research process to the Monkox people. Participatory videos have 
helped make this process of self-reflection possible, with important concrete 
outcomes. 
First, participatory videos have had a great value bringing about a sense of restorative 
justice among the Monkox through creating their own (public) narrative of their 
history and of  in community forestry. 
The history video in particular has been valuable strengthening the self-esteem and 
dignity of the Lomerianos, particularly of the CICOL members, who found a way of 
making their story of struggle for liberation and indigenous rights known to the 
younger generations and the general public. Recounting and making public the long 
and arduous process behind gaining territorial rights has been important for 
 legitimacy as territorial authority of the TCO. Most importantly, as said 
by the General Chief of CICOL, Anacleto Peña,  the first time we are the 
protagonist of our own history, and we have been able to tell the story ourselves, not 
someone from the outside. That is why  are the narrators and not some external 
person talking about  
The videos also helped giving visibility and public recognition to community 
fractions (elders, women) that are being excluded from forestry benefit distribution, 
with the elders being particularly successful in making their views heard and taken 
into account. For instance, in the Santa Rosario video, the  claims for more 
benefit sharing from forestry were included as part of the story line. In contrast, in 
the Todos Santos video, the group decided to emphasize in the story line the 
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important role that the elders have played historically in developing the first 
community forest management plans and consolidating the TCO territory. 
Most significantly, as a result of the PV process, the Chief General of CICOL who 
participated in the production of the three videos, decided to make a public 
pronouncement in support of the elders, which was included in the Santa Rosario 
Video. The pronouncement reads as follows: 
We request all communities that benefit from commercial forestry to take into 
account the need to support the elderly, because it is this sector of the adult 
community who struggled and gave their lives for the consolidation of our 
communal lands. They are the ones that made it possible for us to have legal rights 
over our lands and that this is now a TCO. Thus, this pronouncement is requesting 
that all those community members that are currently fit for work and form part of 
the active population, consider giving a just percentage of the economic resources 
generated by forestry activities to the elderly, so that they feel satisfied and are 
compensated for all the effort that they invested in the foundation of our villages. 
This is a request from CICOL and the technical team that has been reconstructing 
this history.  
The videos also triggered a process of critical reflexion about how to overcome 
asymmetries in their relationship with the timber market and the Bolivian Forestry 
Agency (ABT) in community forestry. Some of the suggestions made in the public 
screenings of the forest videos to ensure better prices when doing business with timber 
companies was agreeing on common prices among all villages to sell the timber, 
paying more attention to having a proper contract and finding more about the 
business ethics and trajectories of buyers before selling timber.  
On a different level, the experience of participatory video and their mobilizing 
potential within the community has prompted CICOL to start using participatory 
videos as an education tool in schools to revitalize and document knowledge and 
skills of the communities in their everyday life as present in their oral history, 
language, practices and relationship with nature. As the Monkox people are 
predominantly an oral culture, they require tools like the videos to document their 
knowledge and cultural heritage. The new Bolivian education model integrates the 
communities into the schooling system, which opens opportunities for the whole 
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community to be involved in the systematization of their knowledge and skills in 
order to strengthen local culture and identity. Videos can be a very useful resource in 
this process. Due to its accessibility, it is a tool that can be used by any community 
member regardless of his/her level of education, allowing to rescue the voices and 
different histories of elders, women and youth, thus decolonizing knowledge 
(Quijano 2000). These local experiences can be shared with other communities, 
indigenous peoples, public policy makers and officials, and the "scientific 
community" at different levels: local, national and global, potentially playing a role 
in the construction of intercultural dialogues. 
Additional to the value that participatory videos have had to the Monkox people 
from Lomerio, it stands out from this experience that they are also a powerful tool 
for the co-production of knowledge in research. Participatory videos: 
 Help build trust and collaboration very quickly 
 Cede control of research to community (they are a way of 
democratising science) 
 Are a fun and dynamic way to co-produce knowledge 
 Create a final product that is accessible to oral cultures 
 Make the co-construction of knowledge of great local relevance 
and significance 
 Allow external researchers to learn and examine aspects of the 
social reality that are often hidden or invisible to outsiders. 
Thus, not only indigenous people and local communities but also the academic 
community can benefit greatly from its use. In environmental justice research, in 
particular, they proved to be very useful for unpacking different justice claims in 
territorial and forest management and for understanding the different dimensions of 
justice that these claims allude to. 
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Links to the Lomerio participatory videos can be found here: 
On the Road to Freedom 
https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=AdeWZXFqcWQ 
 forest, our  (Santo Rosario Community) 
https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=tTBIgbx3wkQ 
 forest is our life, our  (Todos Santos Community) 
https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=tuUzTfFH6fM 
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ALBERTO ACOSTA1 
Post-Growth and Post-Extractivism: Two 
Sides of the Same Cultural 
Transformation2 
Marx said that revolutions are the locomotive of world history. But perhaps things 
are very different. It may be that revolutions are the act by which the human race 
travelling in the train applies the emergency brake. 
Walter Benjamin (1892-1940) 
 
Mainstream thinking  embedded within capitalist globalisation  leads us to accept 
the impossibility to imagine an economy that does not promote growth, as much as 
a world without oil, mining and agribusiness is impossible. Within this mainstream 
thinking, we can find people from every political stance, from neoliberals to socialists. 
Reality, however, is that we must overcome such views, that is the great task of this 
moment. On the one hand, we must rethink the question of economic growth, and 
free ourselves from its shackles before we enter into a global socio-environmental 
debacle with unforeseeable consequences. On the other, it is increasingly urgent to 
move from an extractivist perspective focused on the demands of capital, towards a 
                                                          
1 ALBERTO ACOSTA is an Ecuadorian economist. Professor and researcher at FLACSO, Ecuador. Former 
Minister of Energy and Mines. Former President of the Constitutional Assembly. Former candidate to the 
Presidency of Ecuador. 
2 -crecimiento y Buen Vivir. Propuestas globales para la 
-ILDIS, Quito, 2014), and later reproduced in La 
Linea de Fuego on 31st March 2015 (URL: http://lalineadefuego.info/2015/03/31/poscrecimiento-y-
posextractivismo-dos-caras-de-la-misma-transformacion-cultural-por-alberto-acosta/) . It has been translated 
and reproduced here with consent from the author. For Alternautas, it was translated by Dana Breblac, with 
assistance of Sarah Lupberger and published in http://www.alternautas.net/blog/2016/4/6/post-growth-and-
post-extractivism-two-sides-of-the-same-cultural-transformation on April 4th, 2016. 
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view that prioritises a dignified life to its fullest extent and enables the construction 
of structurally democratic societies. This task puts the capacity of critical thinking to 
test, as well as the capacities of our societies, states, and that of social and political 
organisations to engage in innovative and creative thinking. 
Closing the door to this debate would entail closing the door on democracy itself. 
Economic growth, a dead end 
without growth. They are even unable to imagine a society without economic growth. 
Therefore, without going into further analysis of what really happens in each case, 
countries with high rates of growth are touted as successes, such as China or Peru. In 
these cases, they are successful only because they have had significant rates of 
economic growth for a substantial period of time. The Chinese case is particularly 
significant to the extent that China has already become the world's largest economy, 
measured in GDP terms. But it is important to question whether these countries have 
actually achieved development. This question can be extended to major industrialised 
countries, where we also find "mal-development" (Tortosa 2011). 
Even some Marxist perspectives assert  without hesitation  that growth cannot be 
stopped. That would lead, they say, to stopping the evolution of productive forces 
which  from their point of view  are the basis for the development of civilisation. 
It is these same forces which, eventually, through adequate control and distribution 
schemes, will solve all our problems. 
It is wearily repeated that we should grow  a concept that is often confused with 
accumulating money  to be able to address the issue of poverty, to technologically 
develop, and even to solve environmental problems caused by growth itself. 
A true conceptual gibberish dominates the debate. 
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The environmental limits of economic growth 
In environmental terms, the global emission limit of 400 parts per million of CO2 
has already been surpassed. The fact that we will never return to a lower figure, and 
its already detrimental effects are a clear warning of the dangers of continuing down 
the same path. Endless material growth could culminate in a collective suicide. 
The environmental effects of economic growth, driven by the demands of capital, are 
obvious: it is sufficient to consider the impacts of increased atmosphere warming, the 
deterioration of the ozone layer, the loss of fresh water sources and wild biodiversity, 
agricultural erosion, the high level of nitrogen in the atmosphere, the soil degradation 
or the accelerated disappearance of the living spaces of local communities. Therefore, 
Eduardo Gudynas (2009) is right when he concludes that there is no future in the 
mechanistic and endless accumulation of material goods, ensconced in the 
indiscriminate and growing exploitation of Nature. Furthermore, this process has not 
led or will lead to development  quite the opposite. 
Consequently, what do the economy and the society of growth represent should be 
urgently examined. There is a kind of obsession regarding economic growth, as 
Herman Daly (1989) stated in 1971. Earlier, this same economist, in line with the 
thinking of Nicholas Georgesku Roegen, of Romanian origin and the great pioneer 
of ecological economics, anticipated threats in the making. He therefore concluded 
on the need to contemplate an economic slowdown or de-growth, as growth 
constitutes a kind of harakiri for humanity. He said, "the most desirable state is not 
an unchanging state but a state in de-growth. Undoubtedly, this growth must cease 
or, indeed, change sign" (Daly 1971). Kenneth Boulding (1966), an economist who 
saw the Earth as a spaceship  also in line with Georgesku-Roegen  is credited for 
claiming that "anyone who believes that exponential growth can go on forever in a 
finite world is either a madman or an economist." 
However, at certain times, to assume these biophysical limits, as warned by the Club 
of Rome Report in 1972 (Meadows 1972), was seen as part of an imperialist proposal. 
Its real intention, according to some critics, was to limit the possibility of 
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development for countries in the global South. Even the particular thesis of the right 
to development emerged then, which today is used, for example, by China. 
The key point to question the continued growth of the economy focuses on the fact 
that Nature has limits economies must not exceed. Climate change, especially due to 
the overconsumption of energy and the transformation of land use, provides 
undeniable evidence. Meanwhile, mainstream thinking, functional to capital 
accumulation, limits itself to reflect and propose the transformation of 
"environmental goods and services" into tradable commodities, through the 
endowment of property rights over these functions. Others rely with blind faith on 
technological progress. This situation can be understood as the generalisation of a 
selfish and short-sighted behaviour, unable to recognise that a resource has a limit or 
threshold before collapsing, while also ignoring the inherent constraints of 
technologies. 
The critical position expressed here does not reflect a conservative view on the idea 
of rogress, but questions its meaning. Modern technology is subsumed to the process 
of valuation, which makes it harmful in many ways. But perhaps the problem is 
deeper and involves questioning the meaning of what is human at a time when 
barbarism appears to be approaching, as Rosa Luxemburg warned. From that 
perspective, in order to have a different kind of technique, it is necessary to transform 
the conditions of social production. At the same time, it is necessary to pay attention 
to the so-called "rebound effect", which is reflected in the increase in consumption 
as a result of efficiency gains. 
ssed, it is 
essential to build environmental solutions seen as a universal task. A reference 
framework could be established, in conjunction with the proposal for a Universal 
Declaration of the Rights of Nature, to give depth to this task that falls to all 
humankind. 
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The economic and social limits of economic growth 
It is imperative to rescue the classic reflections of development thinkers such as Albert 
Hirschman, who in the late fifties stated that development economics must avoid 
borrowing from growth economics. As we have seen, this recommendation has not 
been adequately followed. People have continued to believe for decades that growth 
was synonymous with development. Somehow, that vision still prevails in broad 
sectors of society and in almost every government.[i] 
However, the fact that economic growth is only a means, not an end, has been 
gradually making its way. Amartya Sen (1985), the only Nobel prize in economics 
that comes from an "underdeveloped" country, was very clear on this matter: 
I believe the real limitations of traditional development economics arose not from the 
choice of means to the end of economic growth, but in the insufficient recognition 
that economic 
merely is it the case that economic growth is a means rather than an end, it is also the 
case that for some important ends it is not a very efficient means either. (Sen 1985). 
We could go a bit further down this path and remember an economist and professor 
at Columbia University, Jagdish Bhagwati, who already in 1958 argued that growth 
could even be impoverishing growth (Bhagwati 1958). This has occurred in several 
occasions. When the rate of natural resource extraction and their export increases, 
looking to maximise income, the economy might grow, but the country can receive 
less income added to the loss in reserve of such resources. 
This indicates that it is possible to grow and not achieve development, and that it is 
even possible to grow and to under-develop  a common experience in the 
impoverished world. How many countries have managed to sustain significant 
economic growth rates for relatively long periods?  only a few. And of those few, 
how many have actually developed?  even fewer. Moreover, to complicate things, it 
-
developed countries. 
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However, some argue that growth may be necessary in certain circumstances, 
especially to overcome critical gaps, for example in education and health. But that 
does not justify any type of growth. Manfred Max Neef was very clear on this. In an 
open letter to the Chilean Minister of Economy, in December 4, 2001, he wrote: 
If for example, I dedicate myself to fully plunder a natural resource, my economy 
may grow, but at the expense of ending up poorer. In reality people do not realise the 
aberration of mainstream macroeconomics, which counts the loss of heritage as an 
increase in income. Behind all growth figures there is a human history and a natural 
history. If these stories are positive, growth is welcome, because it is preferable to 
grow poorly but to grow well, rather than to grow a lot but in bad conditions.[ii] 
In rich countries, for example, having more and more material goods does not mean 
that there is greater happiness. Studies show how the growth of GDP per capita in 
the United States, for example, has been sustained in the past six decades, but 
happiness levels have not, rather, they have remained stable. The contributions of 
Jürgen Shuldt (2004), especially his book Bonanza macroeconómica, malestar 
microeconómico, explain well this line of thought. 
Thus, we can state that economic growth, caused by the greed of capital, which 
engages in accumulation by production and speculation, occurs on the basis of 
growing structural inequality. Perhaps this also explains the high levels of frustration 
and unhappiness that exist in affluent societies. Widening the horizon, we observe 
the social inequality of the planet, so characteristic of capitalism. In this regard, the 
civilisation of inequality is a matter that occurs globally and even in economies 
considered to be successful. 
It suffices to look at some of the figures on the unequal distribution of wealth in the 
world: the 85 richest people in the world have as much as the poorest half of the 
world population  1.7 million people according to a report by Oxfam (2014). This 
report also shows that 1% of the richest population owns almost half of the global 
wealth. Reviewing inequality figures in Germany, the country of the "inventors" of 
the much-touted social market economy, is equally sobering: in 2008, the richest 
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10% of the German population owned 53% of assets, while half of the population 
owned 1% (Der Spiegel 2014). 
It follows then that the very organisation of the economy must change in profound 
ways. This is perhaps one of the biggest challenges. Economic growth, transformed 
into a fetish to which the world powers and large segments of the population pay 
homage, must be unmasked and disarmed. Something easy to say but hard to do 
without consensus and popular participation. 
From that perspective, we must take into consideration all that is derived from these 
readings to realise the geophysical and socioeconomic boundaries of today's 
economy, and its engine, growth. It is alarming that, rather than seeking radical and 
profound solutions to the runaway train in which humanity travels, the deepening of 
essentially predatory practices continues. We will have to see if the redoubled effort 
to deepen the mercantilist logic of the so-called green economy  which continues to 
expand the frontier of colonisation on the planet, for example, with the carbon 
market  is the commercial response to environmental problems. 
The post-growth debates 
Many renowned economists like Nicholas Georgescu-Roegen, Kenneth Boulding, 
Herman Daly, Roefie Hueting, Enrique Leff, José Manuel Naredo and Joan 
Martínez Alier have demonstrated the limits of economic growth. Even Amartya Sen, 
who does not question the market or capitalism, speaks against economic growth 
when it is understood as synonymous to development. 
Currently, there are increasing calls, especially in industrialised countries, for an 
economy that promotes not only a steady growth, but also de-growth.[iii] 
It is appropriate to bring up again the ideas of Herman Daly, an economist who 
worked at the World Bank, and was categorically clear: the economy must be 
understood as a subset of the ecosystem. As things stand now, he argues that the 
 machine that metabolises natural 
resources, processes them to exhaustion, and discards them by polluting. It must do 
this in order to operate. That is the logic of capitalist accumulation. 
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Therefore, Daly argues there are two clearly identified limits: the ecological 
catastrophe and the absolute saturation point. The first has already been discussed 
earlier in this paper. We should reflect on the second point and ask, why should we 
continue growing? There is no doubt that there are already many people, especially 
in the global North, which have saturated their ability to meet their needs with ever 
more material goods. Is there a future for this nonsense? These are fundamental 
questions. 
Another notable economist, John Maynard Keynes (1930) addressed this issue. He 
posited that the absolute limit of saturation in terms of consumption would be 
reached by 2030.[iv] These and other considerations have raised, particularly in the 
global North, the urge to make way for a steady economic growth and, as soon as 
possible, a de-growth. 
All these considerations about de-growth somehow find a precedent in the work of 
John Stuart Mill. The English economist anticipated in 1848, the year in which the 
Communist Manifesto of Karl Marx and Friedrich Engels was published, some 
foundational thoughts of what is now known as a stationary economy. Mill said: 
While minds are coarse they require coarse stimuli, and let them have them. In the 
meantime, those who do not accept the present very early stage of human 
improvement as its ultimate type, may be excused for being comparatively indifferent 
to the kind of economical progress which excites the congratulations of ordinary 
politicians; the mere increa
it should be matter of congratulation that persons who are already richer than any 
one needs to be, should have doubled their means of consuming things which give 
little or no pleasure except as represe
countries of the world that increased production is still an important object: in those 
most advanced, what is economically needed is a better distribution, of which one 
indispensable means is a stricter res  
I cannot, therefore, regard the stationary state of capital and wealth with the 
unaffected aversion so generally manifested towards it by political economists of the 
old school. I am inclined to believe that it would be, on the whole, a very considerable 
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improvement on our present condition. I confess I am not charmed with the ideal of 
life held out by those who think that the normal state of human beings is that of 
struggling to get on; that the trampling, crushing, elbowing, and treading on each 
other's heels, which form the existing type of social life, are the most desirable lot of 
human kind, or anything but the disagreeable symptoms of one of the phases of 
ch, while no 
one is poor, no one desires to be richer, nor has any reason to fear being thrust back 
by the efforts of others to push themselves forward. (Mill 1848). 
Today, one of the most renowned Latin American thinkers, Enrique Leff, 
recommends transitioning to another form of organisation for production and 
society. Assuming these challenges, he questions and proposes: 
How to deactivate the growth of a process that has embedded in its original structure 
and in its genetic code an engine that drives it to grow or die? How to carry out this 
purpose without generating an economic recession with social and environmental 
impacts of a global and planetary scope? [....]. This leads to a strategy of 
deconstruction and reconstruction, not to blow up the system, but to re-organise 
production, to disengage the gears of market mechanisms, to restore the threshed 
material for recycling and rearrange new ecological cycles. In this sense, the 
construction of an environmental rationality capable to deconstruct the economic 
rationality implies processes of re-appropriation of Nature and re-territorialisation of 
cultures (Leff 2008). 
Rising to this challenge is an increasingly pressing issue in industrialised countries, 
the main parties responsible for the global environmental debacle. It is not that poor 
countries should maintain their poverty and misery for the rich countries to keep 
their unsustainable living standards. Absolutely not. Instead, what should be noted 
in the South is to not attempt to replicate lifestyles that are socially and ecologically 
unsustainable. 
It is, therefore, equally urgent to responsibly address the issue of economic growth in 
"underdeveloped" countries; thus, initially, it is at least appropriate to distinguish 
"good" growth from the "bad" one. Growth that, as previously referred to in the 
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letter from Max Neef, is defined by the corresponding natural and social histories left 
behind, as well as for the future that this growth can anticipate. 
On the one hand, structurally impoverished and excluded countries should seek 
options for a dignified and sustainable life, one that does not constitute a caricatured 
reproduction of the Western lifestyle. While on the other hand, "developed" 
countries will have to resolve the growing problems of international inequality they 
have caused and, in particular, will have to incorporate criteria of sufficiency in their 
societies rather than trying to argue at the expense of the rest of Humanity the logic 
of efficiency understood as a process of permanent material accumulation. 
Rich countries must, in sum, change their lifestyle, which threatens the world's 
ecological balance, because, from this perspective they also are, somehow, 
underdeveloped or "mal-developed" (Tortosa 2011). To achieve this change, they 
will have to retrace much of the journey, backtracking on a growth that cannot be 
replicated at a global level. At the same time, they must assume their responsibility 
to make way for a global restoration of the social and environmental damage caused; 
in other words, they must pay their ecological and historical debts. 
To revisit the essence of economic growth appears, then, as an indispensable task. 
What should be asked is whether there are ways of developing productive forces that 
can move in another direction. For now, what is clear is that the destruction that 
produces economic growth in the form of capitalist accumulation is effectively 
leading to a dead end. An alternative development should involve, undoubtedly, a 
different economic logic. This new economy must be rethought by designing and 
implementing alternatives with a holistic and systemic vision, in line with Human 
Rights and the Rights of Nature. 
The conclusion reached is that growth cannot be the engine of the economy, much 
less its ultimate goal. It is urgent to discuss de-growth in a serious and responsible 
manner in the global North (stationary growth is not enough), while simultaneously 
pursuing post-extractivism in the global South. 
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Overcoming the colonial boundaries of extractivism 
Extractivism is a form of accumulation that began to emerge five hundred years ago. 
It is a category that allows us to explain the colonial and post-colonial looting, 
accumulation, concentration, destruction and devastation, as well as the evolution of 
capitalism to its current form. Development and underdevelopment are items to be 
understood within this context. 
economy began to gain a capitalist structure. As one of the foundational elements of 
capitalist civilisation, extractive accumulation was developed and consolidated, 
driven by the demands of the metropolitan centres of this nascent capitalism. Some 
regions specialised in the extraction and production of raw materials (i.e. primary 
goods) while others assumed the role of producers of manufactured goods, generally 
using the natural resources of poor or impoverished countries. The first export 
Nature; the latter, mostly, transform it to export finished goods. 
Extractivism[v], since then, has been a constant in many countries of the global 
South. With varying degrees of intensity, extractivist practices pervade all Latin 
American countries. Talking about extractivism has become common in everyday 
discussions in these countries, following an increasingly brutal intervention by 
businesses driven by transnational interests. Extractivism is at the heart of the political 
discourse of various political tendencies, not only among those who ascribe to neo-
liberalism, but also including those that distance themselves from it. A critical reading 
of these discourses and of their arguments is necessary to develop any alternative 
proposal. 
It is, therefore, essential to know the meaning and scope of extractivism, its basis, 
foundations, and history. It is a complex endeavour because it is a practice that, in 
Latin America, has been the basis of the economy for hundreds of years and it has 
percolated its societies, which seem trapped within an extractive DNA.[vi] 
The extractive visions of neoliberal governments should thus be debated, as well as 
those of progressive governments, which in practice deepen this mode of 
accumulation even if in their rhetoric they recognise the need for a transition. The 
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neo-extractivism of progressive governments puts forwards some valid points, such as 
a better state control over extractive activities and an increased participation in the 
mining or oil revenues. Yet it remains too close to a logic of accumulation deepening 
the dependent and underdeveloping dynamics of its colonial roots. 
Overcoming extractivism and its colonial shackles is a fundamental condition to 
overcome underdevelopment. However, on the way out of an extractive economy, it 
will be necessary to continue such activities for some time. A well thought-out 
transition, firmly adopted by society, will be needed. It should become very clear that 
a solution to this complex dilemma of societies that are rich in natural resources yet 
remain cursed to an almost inevitable impoverishment will not be reached by 
maintaining or, worse, deepening extractivism. 
Therefore, it is necessary to consider a key point: the immediate planned de-growth 
of extractivism (Acosta 2011);[vii] and in the same line, overcoming the very concept 
of development, giving way to alternatives to development as those proposed by the 
Unceta 2014). 
This option would not deteriorate Nature any further and would undermine deeply 
unequal social structures. The success of such strategies in creating a social, economic, 
cultural, ecological transition depends on their consistency and on the degree of social 
support and the weight they have. 
Post growth and post extractivism, a shared discussion 
It follows from the discussion above that humanity is urged to debate in a serious and 
responsible manner the urgent economic slowdown in the global North. This, as 
noted above, must necessarily come in hand with post-extractivism in the global 
South, where we will also have to question the growth strategies implemented so far. 
This demand does not imply in any way to deny the issue of inequalities and social 
inequities. Quite the opposite. It demands  following the reflections of Enrique Leff 
(2008)  a strategy of deconstruction and reconstruction, in order not to turn 
unliveable the life of human beings on the planet. It is necessary to reorganise 
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production, disengage the gears of market mechanisms (especially the world market), 
restore the matter used to recycle and rearrange it into new ecological cycles. It is also 
of urgency to dismantle the irrationality of speculation in all its forms. The world 
needs a socio-environmental rationality capable of deconstructing the present 
dominant economic rationality, to build processes of re-appropriation of nature and 
re-territorialisation of cultures. 
Enrique Leff (2008) says that speaking of de-growth or stationary economy is not the 
core issue: 
De-growth not only implies to downshifting or to de-linking from the economy. It 
is not equivalent to the de-materialisation of production, because that would not 
prevent the growing economy from continuing consuming and transforming nature 
frugality of some responsible consumers does not deactivate the growth-obsession 
installed at the root and soul of economic rationality, which carries inscribed the 
impulse to accumulation of capital, economies of scale, urban agglomeration, market 
globalisation and concentration of wealth. Jumping off the moving train does not 
directly lead to retrace the path. To de-growth it is not enough to get off the 
the rejection of the commodification of nature, it is necessary to deconstruct the 
economy. 
to growth is not only de-growth but also deconstruction and transition to a new 
economic rationality. The task is to question the modernizing thinking, science, 
rationality". This irreparably leads to raise post-growth ideas from a much broader 
perspective, not only economic but also social and political, without losing sight of 
the broader cultural dimension. We must leave the society of growth; that is the first 
point. 
Given these challenges, it strongly surfaces the need to rethink sustainability in 
her words, the task lies in 
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knowing the true dimensions of sustainability and assuming the capacity of Nature 
to tolerate disturbances that could not be subordinated to anthropocentric demands. 
This demand requires a new ethic to organise life itself. It is necessary to recognise 
that conventional development, sustained in economic growth, leads Humanity to a 
dead end. The limits of Nature, rapidly overflowed by anthropocentric life-styles, 
particularly exacerbated by the demands of capital accumulation, are increasingly 
noticeable and unsustainable. 
The task seems simple, but it is extremely complex. Instead of maintaining a 
separation between Nature and human beings, we must facilitate their reencounter; 
something like trying to tie the Gordian knot of life, broken by the strength of an 
idea of social organisation that is predatory and, indeed, intolerable. Nature 
establishes the limits and scope of sustainability, and the ability of systems for their 
self-renewal, of which productive activities depend. That is, if Nature is destroyed, 
the base of the economy itself is destroyed. 
To sum up, the economy must bring down the whole theoretical framework which, 
according to José Manuel Naredo (2009), emptied of any materiality the notion of 
production and completely separated economic reasoning from the physical world. 
That process meant the epistemological rupture that displaced the idea of economic 
system, with its carousel of production and growth, to the simple field of value. 
This urges us to avoid actions that eliminate diversity, replacing them with 
uniformity. And it is exactly this that provokes mega-mining or monocultures, given 
that these uniformed activities, as recognised by Godofredo Stutzin (1984), "break 
equilibriums, producing even larger imbalances". And now, when the limits of 
sustainability in the world are being literally surpassed, it is essential to build universal 
environmental solutions. 
On the other hand, if the economy has to subordinate itself to the mandates of the 
Earth, capital should be subdued to the demands of human society, which is part of 
Nature itself: human beings are Nature! This demands giving way to schemes of 
profound redistribution of wealth and power, as well as construction of societies 
founded in plural equities. Not only is the issue of class struggle at stake here, 
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meaning the capital-labour confrontation. It is the question of overcoming the 
concept of "race" as a structuring element of dependent societies where racism is one 
of the crudest manifestations of this dependency. It is an essential and urgent task to 
overcome patriarchy and sexism. 
As a corollary 
Having more does not make people happier. From that perspective, it does not matter 
how many things a person produces in their life, but how the things they own help 
them have a better standard of living. This means we need to get over this dominant 
religion of economic growth, of endless accumulation of material goods and the logic 
of progress itself which has been around for long  maybe more than 500 years  
nurturing the foundations of the capitalist economy. 
This dilemma will not be resolved overnight. We must build  as Eduardo Gudynas 
recommends over and over  plural, clear and precise transitions from utopian 
horizons, such as good living or sumak kawsay, although it would be better to talk 
about good coexistence, as Xavier Albó suggests (2009). 
Good living, as a proposal free of prejudices and under construction, opens the door 
to develop alternative visions of life with its assumptions of harmony with Nature, of 
reciprocity, relationality, complementarity and solidarity between individuals and 
communities, with its opposition to the concept of perpetual accumulation, and its 
return to use values. Without forgetting or even less so manipulating its ancestral 
origins, it can provide a platform to discuss, set up and implement responses to the 
devastating effects of climate change on a global level and the increasing 
marginalisation and social violence in the world. It can even contribute to proposing 
a paradigm shift in the middle of the crisis that is hitting many of once core countries. 
In that sense, the construction of good living, as part of deeply democratic processes, 
may be useful in finding even global answers to the challenges that humanity faces. 
As it is easy to understand, questionings of that kind are beyond any instrumental 
correction of a development strategy and of continued economic growth. 
Development discourses that justify visions of domination and exclusion, of colonial 
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roots, can no longer be sustained. It is required a counter-discourse that subverts the 
dominant and its related practices of domination, while generating new rules and 
logics of action. Its success will depend on the capacity to think, propose, unfold, and 
even to show indignation  if that is the case  globally. 
Consequently, good living or sumak kawsay, by opening the door to a transition 
towards a new civilisation, demands another economy. This will not emerge 
overnight and even less through the guidance of enlightened leaders. It is a 
construction that is patient and determined to dismantle several fetishisms and to 
foster radical changes, restoring the values, experiences and above all the existing 
practices in the Andean and Amazonian world, nurturing from those visions and 
experiences synchronised with the praxis of life in harmony and fulfilled life that are 
developed worldwide. 
From the above, as a way to sum up, we can conclude on the need to consider the 
following: 
It is evident that economic growth cannot be the goal of an economy proper of a 
civilisation other than a capitalist one. Moreover, for some chores it may even be 
counterproductive. We must accept that permanent economic growth in a finite 
world is crazy. We must dismantle, then, both the economy and the society of 
growth. Moreover, if we already accept that economic growth is not equivalent to 
development, even more so that should be valid for a determined construction of 
good living or sumak kawsay, which represents an alternative to development. 
De-commodification of Nature, as part of a conscious reencounter with Pachamama, 
is a crucial issue. Plainly, the economy must subordinate to ecology. De-
commodification of Nature will come hand in hand with the dematerialisation of 
production processes, oriented to a more efficient production, capable of using fewer 
resources. Economic objectives should be subject to the operational laws of natural 
systems, without losing sight of respect for human dignity and ensuring the quality 
of life for all people. 
If we talk about de-commodification of Nature, this action should also be 
implemented with common goods, understood as those goods that belong, are of 
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usufruct or are consumed by a more or less extensive group of individuals or by 
society as a whole. These goods can be natural or social systems, tangible or intangible 
(Wikipedia, for example), different from each other, but common to be inherited or 
built collectively. 
Decentralisation is another core aspect of another economy. In many areas, such as 
in food and energy sovereignty for example, answers-actions that are closer to people 
are required. This means that, from communities themselves, from their own 
territories (rural and urban) more accurate responses will have to be found; responses 
that often have already been present for a long time and that have not succumbed to 
the capitalist mandate. This action, as part of an exercise in cultural re-
territorialisation, is guided towards recovering the protagonist role and control that 
the people, meaning, of communities, have in decision-making, to strengthen 
participation and local processes. 
The equitable distribution of income and redistribution of wealth (including labour, 
which shall also be subject to a process of de-commodification) is a fundamental step 
towards the construction of another economy that will lean towards good living. If 
the economy must be subordinated to the mandates of the Earth, the economy (not 
just capital) has to be subdued to the demands of human society, which is not only 
part of Nature but is Nature itself. This requires a profound redistribution of wealth 
and power, as well as building societies founded on equality and in plural equities. 
As we have already said, the question of class struggle, meaning the capital-labour 
conflict, is not the only one at stake. At stake is also the effective overcoming of 
ethnic, social, economic, political, gender and intergenerational inequalities. 
The democratisation of the economy, of an alternative economy, complements what 
was noted above. It is essential that decision-making in the economic field, at all 
levels, is increasingly participatory and deliberative. This implies ensuring the rights 
of both producers and consumers. The principles of communal social organisation 
should govern and go beyond of the economic, financial and conventional 
utilitarianism. 
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In sum, as part of a great transformation, which will have to be eminently cultural, 
we need a vision that overcomes the fetish of economic growth, that is conducive to 
the de-commodification of Nature and of common goods, the decentralisation and 
the change in production and consumption structures, the redistribution of wealth 
and power, as the basis for a strategy of collective and constant construction of 
another economy, essential for a different civilisation. 
We aim therefore to an economy that will tend to the reproduction of life and not 
that of capital. This task implies local, national and international actions that require 
a future utopian horizon, but that equally demands short and medium term answers. 
A central issue that should be considered will be that the vast majority of the 
population, systemically doomed to exclusion and even poverty, does not reflect on 
these problems. On the contrary, they aspire to permanently live with the same levels 
of consumption that the wealthier groups at global and national level, without asking 
whether it is possible or even convenient. We should remember that society, in the 
North and the South, is bombarded with messages that predispose it to mass 
consumption. It would even seem that marginalised individuals have had a consumer 
chip of high aspirations incorporated into their heads, but that they cannot achieve 
this consumption due to a lack of resources to finance them or because, if this were 
to occur, the global environmental problems would deepen. 
In hand with consumerism comes wasteful spending of all kinds. For example, 
according to FAO, every year more than 1.3 billion tons of perfectly edible food is 
wasted: 670 million in the global North and 630 in the global South. These 
situations, aberrant from any point of view, are worsened as increasingly more 
agricultural land and vast resources of all kinds are destined to produce supplies for 
xplains why, despite the 
undisputed technological advances, not even hunger has been eradicated from the 
planet, and this is not because of lack of food. That exists. 
of organising the economy, recognizing the limits of Nature and ensuring a dignified 
life for all the inhabitants of the planet. In this endeavour we will also have to leave 
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behind the "civilisation of waste" as the economist Jürgen Schuldt (2013) 
appropriately defined the current situation. 
We must achieve a great historical transformation and make the step from an 
anthropocentric conception to a (socio) bio-centric one, overcoming an economy 
inspired in growing tied to the accumulation of capital to one at the service of life. 
of human beings on Earth. 
From this perspective, we must consolidate and extend the validity of Human Rights 
and the Rights of Nature, seen as a starting point for the democratic construction of 
democratic societies, that is, to ensure greater and more effective citizen and 
community participation. 
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JULIETTE ROGUET1 
Bricherismo in Peruvian touristic 
areas: the configuration of gender in 
asymmetrical  and intercultural  
encounters2 
San Blas, a major tourist district of Cusco, is a cosmopolitan area that gives visitors 
the opportunity to enact their own culture through the staging of an  
Andean world. Cultural hybridity gives travellers the possibility of various 
interpretations and readings of local society. In these areas, we observe the 
convergence of manifold imaginaries, a dynamic shaking the following classical 
dichotomies: local/global, modernity/tradition or specific/universal. This district is 
also one of the most famous   of Bricher@s. In Cusco, a casual 
encounter between a traveller, who is looking for exoticism, and a young  
 is not a mere coincidence. A bricher@, within the context of tourism, is a 
technician of seduction and a romantic expert in conquering travellers. While visiting 
Cusco or any touristic Peruvian city, foreigners often make amorous encounters with 
Andean lovers prepared to be their intimate travel guide. These gring@  as 
they can be called, develop a folkloric  constructed according to the 
representations of Peruvian exoticism. These encounters of seduction form a social 
interface in which cultural, socio-economic and sexual fantasies allow for a reading 
of complex power logics. In a context of tourism, western  relationships with 
                                                          
1 JULIETTE ROGUET 
(IHEAL), Paris. 
2 This article was originally published in http://www.alternautas.net/blog/2016/7/15/bricherismo-in-peruvian-
touristic-areas-the-configuration-of-gender-in-asymmetrical-and-intercultural-encounters on July 15th, 2016. 
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local people synthesise social markers of difference and also discrimination process at 
the intersection between gender, sexuality, race and class. 
Bricherismo is a phenomenon that appeared in Cusco during the 1970s, describing 
how Peruvian men and women seduce Western tourists so as to gain economic or 
symbolic benefits from them. The term  could be supposedly derived from 
the English word 3 Indeed, these persons succeed in entering Northern 
countries throughout migrations, or/and obtain benefits from the cultural and 
economic capital of their partners while living in Peru. Members of this specific group 
use foreigners as a mean of transportation, a social elevator or a way to improve their 
symbolic capital.Bricherismo is a social phenomenon that covers a wide range of 
practices. Firstly, this phenomenon relates to an important period of migration 
during the Peruvian military conflict. In this period, touristic development was 
perceived as a way to escape the national crisis. Today, this practice has been 
diversified, and is present in the Peruvian collective imaginary, the term brichero 
forming part of the common language. Besides this term, most Quechua translations 
are characterised by sexual connotations like ,   or « Saq'ra 
chisguete »,  water  Obviously, those terms highlight the malicious intention 
of those individuals who take advantage of the  appetite for total-escape 
from his/her daily reality. Furthermore, these relationships also make sense for 
tourists, as an experience with a local people gives them access to the  way 
of  during their trip. Bricheros create a dynamic of exotic imaginaries at the 
interstice between their social and economic ambitions and the  desires in a 
narcissistic perception of the Other. 
Ironically considered as an  adventure tourism official 4, the brichero is 
an anti-hero, adulated and hated at the same time. A postmodern pendejo 5 in the 
vein of Don Juan. This social role is carried out by a complex and hierarchized group 
                                                          
3 Different speculations about the origin of the « brichero » term exist, one of the most widespread opinion is 
that brichero comes from the Spanish word « hembra » which means « woman ». Another interpretation of 
this term is that could be a derivation of the English word « breeches ». 
4 http://www.blacponcho.net/ 
5 The « pendejo » term refers itself to the malicious and tricky anti-hero character, admired for his free 
lifestyle. Typical of the Latin-American world it takes his origins from the Mediterranean Europe. 
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of urban young individuals. In this article, the focus will be oriented toward a specific 
male subgroup of bricheros named waykis  This Quechua term stands for « brother 
of a man », which is used in a performative way with the purpose of manifesting their 
proximity with the renovated Andean culture and the Inca heritage. These 
individuals characterize themselves by forging an Indian identity, which can be real 
or reinvented, to seduce foreigners. The Inca fantasy is translated into some strategic 
behaviours in both the body and the speech. The Andean culture is mixed with a vast 
patchwork of new age elements. Waykis are part of the Neo-Indian nebula, concept 
developed by Molinié and Galinier6 as a reconfiguration process of  in the 
light of a current system of representations; a hybrid combination of practices, 
symbols and beliefs that is emerging due to the impacts of globalization on Peruvian 
society. Cultural components identified as  or  are reinvented by a 
global and modern society to produce new structures, new objects and new practices7. 
The hybridity process generates an urban indigeneity adapted to the necessities of 
tourism. The waykis exemplify this phenomenon as they develop a  8 
made to satisfy  imagination. 
The brichero   identity, carved upon the anxiety for exotic consumption, 
becomes a real job for those individuals, a way to subsist in their everyday lives. 
Identity constitutes for the waykis the main resource in the sentimental and 
mercantile conquest of foreigners. These individuals form their cultural and social 
being according to the coveted  fantasy. They produce, in a professional way, 
an exotic  that fits with  fantasies. In a mutual game of reflection, the 
representations of tourist behaviour influence this practice and reproduce a fancy of 
the Western world. Bricherismo transforms the radical otherness of the indigenous 
                                                          
6 Galinier, Jacques, Molinié, Antoinette, Les néo-Indiens. Une religion du IIIe millénaire, Odile Jacob, Paris, 
2006. 
7 García Canclini, Nestor, Cultures hybrides. Stratégies pour entrer et sortir de la modernité, Collection 
Americana, Presses de  
8 Muller, Elise, « La poétique du « sauvage ». Une pratique du tatouage dans le monde contemporain. » Thèse 
de Doctorat en sociologie dirigée par David le Breton, Université de Strasbourg, 2012. 
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into a universalization of Andean particularisms, which represents the exaltation of 
the Inca utopia. Flores Galindo9 developed a theory on the Andean utopia: the 
glorification of the Inca Empire and History serve each period of time through their 
manifestations of thought, which are suitable at the present time and adapted to the 
imaginaries. The  of 10 developed in the waykis seduction 
strategies gives insight on issues related to touristic development. 
The analysis of these encounters of alterity, within the context of seduction and in a 
touristic environment, gives us the possibility to reflect upon powerful relations 
between gender, race and class. How can femininities and masculinities be analysed 
in an intercultural context and asymmetrical socio-economic situations? The focus 
on seduction strategies gives the possibility to investigate gender staging in this 
specific context of cultural-mixing. The commercial exploitation of romance 
interrogates the lack of transcendence in post-modern societies. The encounter of 
fantasies allows us to study the complex identity process marked by domination 
logics. 
Voyage as a transition of identity: Thoughts on intersectionality in Bricherismo 
In order to understand how bricherismo sheds light on the intersectional dynamic of 
social relationships, we have to focus on the specific context of tourism. Voyage 
transforms identities, and the relations of  11 between local 
people and travellers reveal a broad spectrum of domination systems. Interactions 
occurring in this practice form part of   a stereotypical 
sexualisation of the exotic Other. Consistent with the mutual representations, all 
aspects of tourist and brichero  identities are consubstantial. Economic and cultural-
                                                          
9 Flores Galindo, Alberto, Buscando un Inca: identidad y utopía en los Andes, Lima: Horizonte, 436 p, 1988. 
10 Hobsbawm, Eric and Ranger, Terence, The Invention of Tradition, Cambridge, 1983 (traduction française : 
L'invention de la tradition, trad. par Christine Vivier, Éditions Amsterdam, 2006. 
11 Despres, Altair, « Au-
Zanzibar », Centre Européen de Sociologie et de Sciences Politiques, Working Papers n°4, 2015. 
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sexual exchanges within asymmetrical relationships translate a lived experience of 
domination. Power relations influence and reproduce themselves within the couple 
and through fantasies. Racial, cultural and social issues cannot be reflected upon 
separately, apart from sexuality and gender, within the particular context of identity 
transition that this kind of travel engages. According to Elsa Dorlin:  
antagonisms, national/nationalist mythologies, unresolved nodes of colonial  
need to be added to the analysis of the typical  race, 12. 
Victor Vich13 analyses the brichero as a metaphor for the globalisation of Peruvian 
society. In the  opinion, this social practice embodies consumption society 
throughout hegemonic powers in symbolic, mercantile and sentimental aspects. The 
assumed subversive appearance of the phenomenon is absorbed and submitted to this 
prevailing system. Sexual interactions and seduction typify relationships between 
people, especially in an intercultural context. Sexual behaviour and the imaginary of 
fantasies in a touristic context become indicators of inequalities. The  
outlook on local culture is part of a more global problematic related to their own way 
of life. The transgressive experimentation of an  culture might be a way 
for them to reassure their own status within Western developed societies. According 
to tourist statements14, visiting Peru reveals to them how lucky they are in their own 
country. Their Peruvian trip is considered as a way  find  
                                                          
12 Dorlin, Elsa, « Vers une épistémologie des résistances », p 11, in, Elsa Dorlin (Dir.), Sexe, race, class, pour une 
épistémologie de la domination, Actuel Marx Confrontation, PUF, Paris, 2009, pp. 5- 18. 
13 Vich, Víctor, «La nación en venta: bricheros, turismo y mercado en el Perú contemporáneo», Cultura y 
Neoliberalismo. Grimson, Alejandro. CLACSO, Consejo Latinoamericano de Ciencias Sociales, Buenos Aires. 
2007.http://bibliotecavirtual.clacso.org.ar/ar/libros/grupos/grim_cult/Vich.pd 
14 Statements recorded during three long field-works in Cusco, Arequipa, Mancora and Lima, from 2012. I 
Strauss. I collected data 
from structured and semi-structured interviews. I realised 32 interviews with 3 different groups of informants: 
bricheros assumed (14), Peruvian men and women directly and indirectly linked to bricherismo (8) and 
foreigner men and women who had an experience with a brichero (10). I also made a large number of 
participant and non-participant observations in strategical touristic places and in non-touristic Waykis
In the last field-work (November 2015-May 2016), I employed a quantitative approach. I passed out 
questionnaires, the first previous test was realized on a sample of 200 tourists. The second sample was 
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Tourism supplies therapeutic benefits to the individuals who are looking for a break 
from their everyday life. It is a way to respond to frustrations like an overflow valve, 
offering a perspective of a new  of 15. Bricherismo is closely linked 
to eco-friendly and ethno-tourism. Travelling means also penetrating the culture of 
the Other through a romantic crystallization of exotic societies. Individuals aspire to 
reconnect with archaic forms, as they are searching for intensity. This research for 
authenticity can be analysed as a cultural revalorization or a biased participation to 
 prostitution of  The  of a touristic destination indicates a 
friendly alterity with a smooth change of scenery, which cannot be anxiety-
provoking16. The encounter of the Other shows a reflection which refers itself to the 
identity of the external observer. Tourists cannot experiment a stressful experience of 
difference. Waykis reflect the reversed image of the tourist and the touristic Peru 
travellers seek to avoid. The experience of otherness allows them to consider the 
existence of  possible  This  quest is analysed by local 
people; therefore, they propose an   built in resonance with 
the Peruvian foreign imaginary. According to Rachid  studies17, a voyage 
could be compared as a  of  where people look for a self-emancipation 
and intimate revelations. Héloise Lhérété18 says about travellers that they  
dreams in exchange for  Bricheros are storytellers and dream catchers, they 
produce a mystical gallantry to fascinate foreigners. Stories related to Andean 
cosmovision, like Pachamama19 or complementarity between masculinity and 
femininity, are often used as seduction strategies. Shamanism and spirituality using 
                                                          
realized on 240 tourists. These surveys were accomplished in Lima and Cusco, February-May 2016, through 
random sampling in touristic places.  
15 Amirou, Rachid, Imaginaire touristique et sociabilités du voyage, Le sociologue, PUF, Paris, 1995. 
16 Idem. 
17 Idem. 
18 Sciences Humaines, n°240, 2012-8, Paris, 2012. 
19 Pachamama could be translated as « mother earth ». It constitutes one of the most important deities of the 
Andean belief system. Pachamama -Indianism. 
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sacred plants form part of the wayki  attractiveness. Traditional knowledge is not the 
point; their ability is to create fascination and to perform folklore. 
The moment of the voyage and the specific dispositions of the lovers redefine power 
relations within the couple. Traveling is a transiting heterotopy; an ephemeral 
nonstandard space-time. This is a - 20 where tourists and bricheros 
experiment alterity to become an  in a transition  self to  This self-
transition reframes the configuration of gender and cultural stereotypes. 
Reconfigured gender in an intercultural - 21: What about power 
relations? 
Travellers and bricheros can redefine their gender behaviour in a social space far from 
the dominant system of codes and standards. However, as Pruitt and 22 
question in their study about romantic tourism in Jamaica, is it possible to talk about 
a  empowerment within the gringa23 and wayki  couple because of their 
economic capital? How can we analyse inequalities and dominant relations that occur 
in these economic and cultural-sexual exchanges? 
Bricherismo suggests that racialisation and gender relations are interdependent and 
that they can vary according to the social context. Within the practice of bricherismo, 
power relations are extremely ambiguous. Complying with different postures and 
variations of economic, cultural and symbolic capitals of the individuals, relations of 
domination are likely to reproduce or reverse themselves. Besides economic purposes, 
bricheros seduce Western white women because of a fancy based on a racial and 
                                                          
20 Augé, Marc, Non-lieux, Introduction à une anthropologie de la surmodernité, Paris, Éditions du Seuil, 1992. 
21 -
ecedented 
-
spaces where we tinker. These places are characterized themselves by non-standard temporality, 
relationships, relation to the space and norms. 
22 Pruitt, Deborah, Lafont, Suzanne, « For love and money, romance tourism in Jamaica », Annals of tourism 
research 22, no 4:267-282, 1999. 
23 The term « gringa/gringo » forms part of the common Peruvian parlance. It mostly refers to every foreigner 
eyes and hair. 
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cultural hierarchical system. The conquest of a tourist brings variations in the 
symbolic power game. The body of the  Other is conquered by a strategical 
manipulation that indicates a submission of wayki  body to the dominant aesthetical 
patterns in an idealisation of the Western world. In a bricherismo relationship, the 
occidental woman shifts continually between dominated and dominant position. She 
is at the same time object of fascination and object of mistrust. At the specific 
moment of travelling, the non-standard gender behaviours of women participate to 
build a stereotype of wanton women and easy girls. This representation develops a 
possibility: the accessible fantasy of white woman for a  
The amorous conquest of the tourist allows a symbolic participation to the idealised 
  and, at the same time, contributes to a revalorization of particularisms 
using an alternative discourse. The romantic commodification of Bricherismo 
illustrates a hegemonic system of thoughts and also the creative capacity of 
individuals to overturn stigmas. The voyage implies an identity transition that is 
disrupting the normal course of events. The excitement of passions transforms female 
tourists as gringas  looking for transgression. This experimentation of identity 
produces a fantasy of the white woman that changes itself into the hyper-sexualized 
gringa stereotype. The research of individual emancipation boosts  
24: the experimentation of exoticism through sexual behaviour 
generating, as a result, the  strategy of folklorization and Neo-Indianism. 
The  body is not an end, it is a mean: once  the relationship 
brings benefits. Tactics do not oust feelings and the relationship does not prevent 
selfish calculations. 
The masculinity of the wayki depends on the ambiguity of the foreign white  
representations. On one hand, in terms of racial dimension, the conquest of a white 
woman by a  man could be interpreted as a demonstration of virility. On the 
other hand, the stereotypical representation of the foreign women sexuality involves 
a social sanction of the  erotic capital. The gringa  stereotype emerges related 
                                                          
24 Furt, Jean-Marie, Michel, Frank (dir),  ; Éditions 
L'Harmattan, Paris, 2003. 
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to the brichero  discourse on transgressive behaviour in the  -  We 
observe a circulation of representations which determine power relations in the 
couple and according to the social situation. Becoming a wayki constitutes a way to 
escape from the dominant model of masculinity in a Peruvian society where beauty 
and social success is embodied by the  In this regard, the sexual or romantic 
conquest of a Peruvian white woman seems unattainable for subaltern male 
individuals. By penetrating the milieu of tourism, cholos 25 can seduce white women. 
Therefore they strategically reaffirm their hybrid  to fascinate and take 
advantage of the relationship. This voluntary economic dependence reframes the 
classical social division of sexes in the Peruvian society. A cholo  seducing a tourist 
for money or other advantages constitutes a transgression towards the standards of 
gender and racialized domination. In the collective imaginary,bricherismo can 
symbolise the impediment to the development of Peruvian society. This 
phenomenon represents a form of passivity and dependence vis-à-vis Western 
civilisation. The social sanctions of  reinventing indianness are tangible. 
Indeed, they live and reinforce discrimination of the popular class and the native 
people. 
The economic, social and symbolic benefits drawn from the tourist are a 
demonstration of virility and expertise within the bricheros  group and related to their 
system of values. The transformation ofwaykis  erotic capital into a way of living 
brings another dimension to the redefinition process of masculinity. The gender 
domination is reaffirmed out of hegemonic requirements. The wayki does not 
exchange sexuality for money, his social and cultural capital is used in a strategic way 
to shut down the economic domination of his partner. Masculinity is reaffirmed 
outside the economic dimension because of the  knowledge which ensures 
him a dominant position during the travel with the tourist. The strategic -
 discourse transforms the economic power of the tourist into a dissonant 
                                                          
25 The « Cholo » term is extremely ambiguous in the Peruvian parlance. It indicates initially an individual from 
diversified themselves. This word is usually used in a pejorative and racist way but it depends on the situation 
cholo 
 shared ethnical identity. The 
waykis  
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situation. This uncomfortable asymmetrical situation prompts women to 
symbolically transfer her economic power to the man. In the voyage and specific 
intercultural context and in the mutual projections of fantasies, the wayki-  
couple constitutes a space of gender domination reproduction. 
The fantasy of the Inca, the « savage » or the rebel meets the white libertine, the 
emancipated Western woman or the hit girl. The transitive bodies are elaborated by 
the reciprocal influences of collective representations. The experience of alterity 
allows reflection upon our own identity. Bricherismo is the encounter of two roads 
looking for an exotic change, two selves staging into the world of the Other. The 
traveller becomes gringa  through the Peruvian man, who becomes in turn a wayki 
in the representation of her Western world. The relationship is a  in which 
each partner uses the other one to leak from his world and emancipate themselves.  
Conclusion 
The change of scenery in a romantic way allows living the  utopia throughout 
the body. The Inca fantasy forms part of the imaginary of cultural tourism as  
existential, initiatory and transformative 26. The wayki recaptures the 
 romanticism projected on his world and employs it to seduce her. He 
shapes a mystified native as an embodiment of this sacred self, highly coveted by 
travellers. The fantasy of a passionate, rebel and savagely virile man becomes a way 
for each of the partners to ensure a place in the hegemonic system. This mutual 
enchantment rephrases the dialectic of domination. Waykis produce a tactical reading 
of the occidental world in their relations with -  societies. But, 
simultaneously, powers mechanisms tend to reproduce themselves at all levels of the 
practice. The contemporary ethnicity may be a manifestation of integration of the 
subaltern  postures. 
Bricherismo is an evasion occurrence, where the leaks from one world to another, or 
from self to self, intersect and meet themselves. These movements  the voyage, the 
                                                          
26 Amirou, Rachid, Bachimon, Philipe (dir), Le tourisme local, une culture de l'exotisme, Éditions l'Harmattan, 
Paris, 2000. p 68 
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social climbing, the individual emancipation, the distortion of identity or migration 
 are at the same time real and imagined. The  trip is a movement produced 
in order to feed an individual achievement. The wayki is a nomad and an emerging 
migrant. Fleeing from his reality is related to the  conditions and goals. 
The tourist and her sexual conquest embody alterity within a social and cultural 
hierarchy, a dominant exoticism. The brichero thinks his ascent in the development 
scale through a staging of an alternative way and thanks to the calculated seduction 
of the   The occidental woman lives the impulse of experimentation 
within the voyage and with the brichero. The gringa  representation transforms itself 
and influences the bricherismo practice, specifically masculinity. In a permanent and 
complex North/South power game, we observe how racialization process confronts 
cultural stereotypes and influences the social construction of sexuality. The 
production of the Waykiand Gringa figures emerges from a multiply-determined 
dynamic where all the representations of  categories are consubstantial. 
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Immediately after the results of the referendum were counted in most of large urban 
centers of Bolivia, Vice-President Álvaro García Linera delivered a press conference 
from Palacio Quemado in which he called the results 
technical draw between those in favor and those against the plebiscite to lengthen 
term until 2025. Although the official results posted by TSE (Tribunal Supremo 
is perhaps too soon to predict the ways in which the MAS will reconstitute its political 
forces both within and beyond the institutions of the State. Regardless of changes in 
the wake of these results, what is crucial is that MAS lost two of its most important 
political bastions (Potosí and El Alto), which symbolically introduces evident fissures 
cal hegemony3. 
                                                          
1 GERARDO MUÑOZ is a fourth year PhD student in Latin American literature at Princeton University. His 
explores cases of fractured hegemony and political principles. He is a member of the Infrapolitical 
Deconstruction academic collective (www.infrapolitica.wordpress.com). 
2 This article was originally published in http://www.alternautas.net/blog/2016/5/12/introduction-to-dossier-
crisis-of-the-latin-american-progressive-cycle on May 12th, 2016.  
3 Le Monde diplomatique, Febrero 2016. 
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democratic institutionalization. 
Perhaps more importantly, under the 
installed in pursuit of a strong democratic horizon beyond the conventional 
antinomies of social movements and State; charismatic leadership and motley social 
articular those published and 
systematically contributed to the linking of democracy and movements perhaps 
unlike any other politico-theoretical reflection in its transformation of the State form 
at the center of the post-neoliberal epochality4
current predicament, of its shortcoming5. 
As a recent and brief exchange between Álvaro Garcia Linera and Silvia Rivera 
Cusicanqui demonstrated, the specter of identity continues to override the possibility 
of a democratic breakthrough. If, on the one hand, Rivera Cusicanqui blamed Garcia 
6. 
Whereas Rivera spoke from a semi-epistemic privilege of knowing the Indian; Garcia 
and hegemony, and not on the basis of disagreement or political contestation. This 
third position --  which I am calling posthegemonic  is the one that this dossier 
                                                          
4 To access 
http://www.vicepresidencia.gob.bo 
5 
ebeian and the State: Grupo Comuna and the Intellectual Career of Álvaro 
Viewpoint Mag. https://viewpointmag.com/2015/02/25/the-phantom-the-plebeian-and-the-
state-grupo-comuna-and-the-intellectual-career-of-alvaro-garcia-linera/. Also, on the relations Linera and 
condition of constitutive power". 
Alternautas 1:1, December 2014. 
http://www.alternautas.net/blog/2014/8/31/k1gjjqvwi5c2eqc5hl3ckgm3i4fdyp 
6  
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seeks to put forward, against the coming winds of political voluntarism and 
reaffirmations of counterhegemonic or new identitarian formulations. I agree with 
 premised on identity, 
albeit subaltern identity, runs the infinite risk of turning democratic recognition into 
compulsion, no matter how counter-intentionally. Indeed the last thing democratic 
politics would want is the kind of organization of the social whereby people must 
the horizon of subaltern politics is far from moving towards the end of subalternity 
 it only co-opts its notion at the service of a given ideology of po 7.  
This basic but fundamental premise allows us to think the valence of a radical 
democratic horizon in the region at a moment where communitarian, decolonial de-
linking, and State hegemonic articulation seem to exhaust the conditions of political 
ref Identidad 
Boliviana (2014) or Socialismo comunitario: un horizonte de época (2015), are the 
cause of the recent political defeats or shortcomings of the Bolivian process. Moving 
against identitarianism, opens the potentiality of a post-hegemonic politicity for a 
coming democratic horizon. This democratic horizon remains far from the criollo 
liberal ideology (intensified through neoliberal dismantling of the State since the 
1990s), which has also traditionally fomented diverse techniques of governmentality 
that have haunted cultural locations and their subjects8. In a fundamental way, raising 
not be understood as a condemnation or celebration of the political processes in the 
region within the last fifteen years or so. What is at stake here is precisely the offering 
of a democratic post-hegemonic possibility, in order to move beyond that which 
already undermines the deepening of what some of the contributors here  as well 
                                                          
7 Culture, Theory, and 
Critique, Vol.56, No.3, 2015. P.274-75 
8 See Gareth Williams, The Other Side of the Popular: Neoliberalism and Subalternity in Latin America. Duke 
University Press, 2002. 
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as many other thinkers, observers, and scholars  
transformation of the Marea Rosada. In the end, the Bolivian process matters, but it 
does not exhaust what should be of interest here, that is, the question of democracy 
understood as republicanist institutionalization and radical freedom in the face of a 
post-neoliberal pushback prompted in different cities of the region9. 
 
The rise of the nuevas derechas is in fact a direct consequence of the hegemonic closure 
of populism that turned political dissent into consensus and permanent machination 
(post- -
by John Beverley, seems at the current moment to be equally limited or ironically on 
subjects and the State as mediated by consumption10. In fact, we are at the moment 
witnessing a fissure between consensual politics (whether from the Right or from the 
leftist communitarianism) and hegemonic State grammars that solely guarantee 
democratic passion vis-à-vis a reduction of politics to the political as enmity11. These 
two positions do not merely make enmity the dominant factor of the political. They 
make the political the dominant structuration of existence and common life. A 
collective and long lasting engagement can only produce a new posthegemonic 
reflection as a consistent option for Latinamericanist thought. It is in this light that 
this dossier proposes a preparatory and modest effort in this direction. 
                                                          
9 What has been lacking since the independences in the early nineteenth century in Latin America has been 
democratic republicanism. At the historiographical level this argument has been made by Rafael Rojas in Las 
Repúblicas de aire (Taurus, 2012), and Los derechos del alma (Taurus, 2014). For a recent defense of 
republicanism as a radical form of democracy, see José Luis Villacañas essay Populismo (La Huerta Grande, 
2015). 
10 - is Latinamericanism after 9/11. Duke University 
Press, 2011. 
11 The understanding of the political as the division of enmity is of course that of Carl Schmitt. For a 
Gaze: Essays on Carl Schmitt. Duke University Press, 2015. The crisis of the principial politics alluded here is 
also in reference of the ongoing work of the Infrapolitical Deconstruction Collective 
(www.infrapolitica.wordpress.com). 
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The contributions collected in this dossier are varied in style and argumentation, as 
well as in the case studies discussed.  Yet, they are not meant to be read as 
comprehensive reflections on the region throughout these years. Instead, each of the 
contributions essentially takes up a paradigm that allows us to rethink a problem or 
a series of problems that traverse different key sites12. These are also conjectural texts, 
but to the extent that they seek to think through central issues of Latin America 
observation s
should also admit that there have been other conceptions of it that have circulated in 
the contributions of important political observers and scholars such as Maristella 
Svampa, Pablo Stefanoni, Salvador Schavelzon, or Raul Zibechi, some of them 
American progressive governments seeks to complement the historical determination 
with that of the analytical, so as to open up other categorial possibilities beyond 
hegemonic structuration and grand-historical narratives. There is a tension 
(which is fundamentally the crisis or krenein of thought, that is, of judgment)13. 
at recent developments in Brazil, 
Argentina, and Bolivia, Schavelzon argues that the progressive movement towards 
democratization has come to a halt through a centripetal redirection generated by a 
nti- or post-extractive 
outlook as an alternative to a new political cycle, what we are witnessing today is the 
-
onservative religious 
                                                          
12 According to Giorgio Agamben, a paradigm is a relation between a singular and a singular, thus no 
generalizable master theory or arche (9-32) 
in The Signature of All Things: On Method, Zone Books 2009. 
13 Tecnologías de la crítica. Entre Walter Benjamin y Gilles 
Deleuze. Santiago de Chile: Metales Pesados, 2010. 
8 9  |  A L T E R N A U T A S  3  ( 1 )   J U L Y  2 0 1 6  
values in the political arena, and takes note of the substitution of an old imperialism 
(U.S, Washington Consensus) with another (Chinese investments). The decay of the 
progressive political parties in both Brazil and Argentina is just a feature that 
Schavelzon thematizes in order to move beyond the impasse of right-wing cooptation 
and post-political fascination. 
Sergio Villalobos-
uses on the Chilean case not 
because Chile has to be included in the Marea Rosada, but rather because this case is 
the excess or specter that haunts the matrix of accumulation and developmentalism 
as a principial form of the Marea Rosada State form. Instead of producing a unilateral 
reading of economic forces (State location and forms of accumulation) Villalobos 
transformation demonstrates the extent to which those initiatives of social 
transformation taken upon by the governments of the Pink Tide have viability or 
er 
of the political force in the region, and leaves the question open regarding the kind 
constituted power, that could reappear against the parameters of political and State 
repres
by the preset calculations between history and imagination as a struggle for 
recognition. 
from exclusive neoliberalism to the new runfla 
important piece. Through a series of programmatic notes that invite further 
elaboration and investigation, Valeriano forcefully argues against the category of 
persistent political observer in Buenos Aires, Valeriano has contributed systematically 
(in a series of articles, of which this is just one condensation) to understanding what 
he sees as a process of liberation through a new democratizing force of consumption 
in the years of Kirchnerismo. In linking the principle of liberation and consumerism, 
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Valeriano challenges many central beliefs that govern traditional narratives of the 
ly, the passage from neoliberalism to a post-neoliberal 
redistributive State, liberation as a technique of market force, and a post-ideological 
(post-hegemonic) understanding of social action through inoperative figures such as 
runfla which coul
hypotheses challenge the claim for the subaltern subject position, while affirming a 
form of life beyond domination and resistance. 
ve their 
offers instead a viewpoint from the social movements that allowed for the emergence 
of the institutionalization of the progressive governments in the first place. Cava 
by doing so, pushes for a further deepening of the constituent process that opened 
well before the cycle itself. This task, according to Cava, is also one of reflection, as 
narratives, as to reopen political imagination to a new social and economic 
composition in the region, in a similar vein as Zapatismo did in the 90s. We can leave 
the process of mourning to a global left still haunted by the fall of the Berlin Wall 
horizon that mourns and restitutes a revolutionary will, posits a problem of 
imagination in politics that still depends on fissuring constituted power from below 
against contemporary forms of accumulation, corporate interests, and uneven 
patterns of exploitation. 
the central core of the dossier in light of her own work on the Latin American 
progressive actors and its ties with extractivism and contemporary designs of post-
neoliberalism. Svampa, author of books such as Maldesarrollo (2014) and Debates 
Latinoamericanos (2016), does not limit her thought on the region within the 
parameters of self-affection (defeat or triumphalism, unconditional support or 
militant criticism). Rather, her thought hinges in multiple registers that map out the 
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complexity of actors and dilemmas facing most, if not all, of the progressive 
the deepening of democracy, without losing sight of the dynamic of neoliberalism as 
a force that could reinstate itself further in light of the Macri / PRO victory in the 
Argentine National Election. Svampa endorses a political reason that exceeds 
locationality as well as the paradigm of sovereignty in favor of a democratic horizon 
-
 
Imagen e 
intemperie: las tribulaciones del arte en los tiempos del mercado total (Capital Intelectual, 
2015) raises pertinent questions in thinking the aesthetic register parallel with the 
art criticism is deployed not in only in light of the 
complex ways in which modern and indigenous art has been theorized in the 
Paraguayan art institutions (most notably, under the mission of Centro de Artes 
Visuales/ Museo del Barro), but also makes an effort to deploy aesthetic political 
at the edge of that liminal zone where the political and the aesthetic enter a threshold 
of indecidability. I am convinced that his reflections on the question of art and image 
are absolutely crucial in order to think what I believe is one of the central features of 
ailing, geopolitical conjuncture, that is to s
art, always in permanent dialogue with critical aesthetic theory (Walter Benjamin), 
becomes a threshold that allow for a particular mode of reassessing limits that separate 
aesthetics and politics, the national popular horizon and the temporality of archives 
and its heterogeneous traditions.  
posth
specificity of the Argentine Kirchnerista State and its demise leading to the electoral 
victory of Mauricio Macri, and the rise of other political forces to the national scene 
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such as Sergio Massa. The essay considers the limitations of populist culturalism and 
its adverse translation during periods of transitions. However, my analysis is not 
solely centered around Peronism during Kirchnerismo; since it also moves on to 
contest the 
deficient within the generic democratic horizon of the Latinamericanist reflection. 
The essay leaves an open space  a space that I call posthegemonic reflection within 
the temporal inhabitation of the interregnum  that necessarily abandons the 
cathexis of the master concept that continuously solicit identity and location. This 
has fundamental political consequences for the very notion of the political in terms 
of its categorial organization (civil society, movement, subject, or State) and 
principial formation of legitimacy (such as constitution or rights. In a certain way, 
these essays seek to produce a reassessment of the political in the region. There is still 
a need to further develop an aprincipial political democracy of the singular.  If we 
refrain from recoiling back to subject mediations, a space opens that invites 
disagreement about thinking not only the ruins of the Latin American Pink Tide, 
but also the ruin and inefficiency of the political categories and concepts that organize 
the reflexive practice of contemporary Latinamericanism.  
Finally, the last two pieces in the dossier bring to the present, albeit in dissimilar 
ways, past temporalities latent in the political map of the region. Andres Ajens' poem 
"Allende, Evo, Over", translated by Michelle Gil Montero, juxtaposes the proper 
name of two leaders of national-popular experiences in a constellation of references 
that signal the possible returns of other temporalities through a modality of writing 
that is no longer governed by the logos of transparence or communication. In the last 
kunumi letteredly illiterate a graphophagus, pure at times, already mot-
tled tion, where more than one language are disjointed, 
transfers an aporetic and impossible attempt at crossing a destination, since as a 
philosopher has recently reminded us, poetic language always arrives at an illiterate 
encounter14. This is, indeed, the sub
poematological experiments beyond the grammar of sense. Jon Beasley-Murray's 
                                                          
14 Giorgio Agamben.  (Trans. Gerardo Muñoz & Pablo Dominguez Galbraith). 
http://horizontal.mx/a-quien-se-dirige-la-poesia/ 
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"Pyrrhic Victories: The Fall and Rise of the Left Turns" is a generous critical response 
to the different texts of the dossier, while simultaneously recoiling back to the 
-
multitude guides the potential for insurrectional vitality and social mobilization. 
Rehearsing some of his important theoretical premises developed in Posthegemony: 
Political Theory and Latin America (University of Minnesota, 2010), Beasley-Murray 
invites us to take a distance from both disenchantment and enthusiasm by 
t these 
regimes sought hegemony, the more frustrated they were bound to become. But the 
fact that they ultimately (or even initially) failed to become hegemonic is not in itself 
the marker or symptom, let alone the cause, of their downfall. Rather, defeat was 
already inscribed in the moment of their triumph: in the ways in which they were 
more or less forced, upon assuming state power, to turn against the movements that 
established them in that power, and to find that (reciprocally) those movements then 
soo
resonances rendered inoperative the apparatus of identity and the ideal of 
transculturation in language; Beasley-
epochal ruin of the progressive cycle emphasizes the always-fissured nature of 
hegemony, thus opening a debate on how to come to terms with the notion of the 
as a compensatory strategy for the current categorial and grammar of crisis, Beasley-
Murray's response to the dossier pushes the limits of critical reflection, recasting the 
original stimmung of the 'pyrrhic victories', whose echoes and rhythms perhaps are 
perhaps still very much at work in the least expected zones of our present.  
This dossier would not have been possible with the generous interlocution and efforts 
of a series of friends, to whom I would like to, extend my gratitude: Alberto Moreiras, 
Sergio Villalobos-Ruminott, Pablo Dominguez-Galbraith, and Lindsey Reuben. My 
gratitude and many thanks to Anne Freeland and Ana Carballo for the superb work 
at Alternautas. 
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GERARDO MUÑOZ1 
The Exhaustion of the Progressive 
Political Cycle in Latin America and 
Posthegemonic Reflection 2 
Marea Rosada and Latinamericanist reflection 
More than a decade since the eruption of the 
governments  which could be said to commence with the electoral victory of Hugo 
Chavez in 1999, the political crisis of 2001 that led to the crumbling of several 
 depending on how one 
periodizes this epoch  a question has become inevitable after the recent presidential 
elections in Argentina: what is left of the Latin American Left? Is it still possible to 
isolate divergent tendencies in the Latin American progressive wave at the current 
moment of generalized international financial domination? Does the question of the 
astañeda (2006), that 
American political tradition? 
This set of questions is not only relevant for thinking the current geopolitical map of 
the region, but more importantly, the limits of the politicity of Latinamericanist 
                                                          
1 GERARDO MUÑOZ is a fourth year PhD student in Latin American literature at Princeton University. His 
explores cases of fractured hegemony and political principles. He is a member of the Infrapolitical 
Deconstruction academic collective (www.infrapolitica.wordpress.com). 
2 This article was originally published in: 
http://www.alternautas.net/blog/2016/5/12/yldqiikwbsvfrkj6lfbsjofl4fdual on May 12th, 2016.  
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reflection, both within and beyond the United States university circuit. If we are 
witnessing uncontested symptoms of the end of the Marea Rosada, we must ask to 
- -
- Latinamericanism after 9/11 (Duke Press, 2011) 
is still useful in understanding a heterogeneous Latin American map, whose opacity 
exceeds clear-cut political units.3 To think the exhaustion of the progressive cycle 
would necessarily entail taking a distance from a post-subalternist position, which 
remains relevant only insofar as it marks the alliance between the subaltern and the 
state in a hegemonic social pact. But if by exhaustion of the progressive cycle we 
understand the withering of the state form through the permanent processes of 
neoliberal decontainment, then hegemony is no longer on the side of the subaltern, 
but rather becomes the governmental machine that reproduces, polices, and 
 
On the same token, if clear, distinctive political units are subsumed by a new form 
of political opacity, what type of intellectual commitment and political horizon open 
up for Latinamericanist reflection? What is stated above does not entail that Latin 
American criollo positions have disappeared or decreased their influence in the 
reordering of Latinamericanist knowledge. Rather, what must be thought through is 
the ways in which an assumed post-political contemporary position  understood 
as the simplification and erasure of conflict from the idea of politics  of the 
progressive governments obliges one to account for an uncertainty of the conditions 
that make intellectual reflection possible. The displacements of the Leftist 
governments towards a center-right position reenact the argument about the spectral 
the different governments of the region have learned to modify its political styles and 
symbols in a transversal safety-valve relation with the state that allows for an even 
                                                          
3 John Beverley. Latinamericanism after 9/11. Duke University Press, 2011. 
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more complex architectonics that interweave neoliberal administration with state 
form. 
It has become difficult, if not imposs
Latin American progressive governments today. This question is more perplexing, 
since most if not all of these governments have entered into conflicts with the very 
social movements that were central for their electoral ascension leading to constituent 
reforms. Having to recur to heterogeneous forms of coercion or low-intensity 
disciplining, what begins to wither away is the very ground of legitimacy as the key 
for establishing long-lasting democratic institutionalization distinct from the liberal 
criollo political organization of the past (Garcia Linera 2011). If this opportunity is 
lost due to the an overdetermination of factors, populism emerging from a crisis and 
grounded in the logic of hegemony will always work on the side of subalternization 
on the one hand and charismatic presidentalism on the other (Zaffaroni 2008). 
The crisis also exceeds political institutionalization, spilling over in the active neo-
extractive model that upholds a new logic of neo-dependence, balanced with 
redistributive social policies, although always conditioned by the international prices 
of commodities (Svampa 2013). In the last years alone, the mass mobilizations in 
is of Venezuela have 
made explicit the extent to which the contemporary state form of the Marea Rosada 
is structurally dependent on international financing and its juridical-legal grounds. 
The fracture of Kirchnerist political culture 
The Argentinean case bears witness to some of the outlined contradictions disclosed 
by contemporary Leftist governments. I am not interested in arguing that 
Kirchnerismo is hyperbolic or symptomatic of all of the Marea Rosada, but rather 
that it does illustrate the limits of hegemony (in the case of the Peronist tradition) 
within latinamericanist reflection. In this precise sense it is a strong case that deserves 
attention. Besides the presidentalism that labors on the side of juridical-economical 
exceptionalism, as argued by Eugenio Zaffaroni, the crisis of Kirchnerismo is also 
perceived at the level of candidate building for political continuity. The fact that the 
Kirchnerist candidate Daniel Scioli was able to aggregate almost 50% of the vote 
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under his name speaks not of the power of Kirchnerismo, but of his appeal in spite of 
ideologues. Like traditional Peronism (1945 55), political culture was central to the 
Kirchnerist imagination, and in the last year alone it was easily perceived even by the 
outside observer how cultural apparatuses  
-militant TV 
 stood in irreconcilable positions that only allowed real discussion in 
terms of consensus or for clear-cut electoral ends.4 
The severe depreciation of conflict and antagonism within Kirchnerismo led to futile 
litical process 
as solely based on a proper name (Kirchner) at best, and at worst of an initial (the 
political forces  Renovador, 
 only distinguished themselves 
through external political factors, since each of the political positions was validated 
through a consensual logic through appropriation of the legacy of the 2001 destituent 
moment, promising different degrees of security, anti-corruption measures, and 
 
Sergio Massa, ex- -
his post-political block designed by Ecuadorian advisor Jaime Durán Barba), and 
hybridity that did not dismiss the Peronist apparatus. As Durán Barba repeated in 
his books and interviews, it was not that Peronism did not matter, but that people 
no longer identified themselves with such a traditional political identity (Durán 
                                                          
4 
the first round, an impasse signaled the precarious conditions of a long-term political continuation of 
kirchnerismo that rendered impossible the building of a solid political candidate for the presidency. 
http://www.perfil.com/columnistas/La-toma-del-poder-20150619-0057.html). 
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Barba 2011). Besides the fact that all three of them share similar political trajectories 
dating back to Menemism, the three candidates installed a corporate interpellation 
of government as efficiency in the political scene. In the specific case of Massa, he 
retorted to a securitarian rhetoric that took the Mexican 
exemplary model to implement the emergency powers in light of the perennial 
presence of drug trafficking and organized crime in Argentina.5 What is clear, leaving 
nuances aside, is that whatever Cambiemos turns out to be in the following months 
or years, what came to a radical halt was the expansion of the radical democratic 
horizon that opened up with both the insurrection of 2001 and the initial moment 
 
At this threshold, Kirchnerismo should be read as a paradox between the production 
of a strong cultural popular imaginary and the fragility of political institutionalization 
(which had borrowed and re-structured from the Peronist justicialista apparatus). 
According to the most in-depth analyses of Kirchnerist political culture, such as 
Kirhcnerismo, una controversia cultural (Ediciones Colihue, 2011) 
La audacia y el cálculo (Sudamericana, 2011), FpV produced a 
renovation in social languages and cultural symbols transversal to civil society and 
across multiple institutions. Tecnópolis, a science and technology mega exhibition in 
Villa Martelli inaugurated during the Bicentennial celebrations; Secretaría de 
Coordinación Estratégica para el Pensamiento Nacional, appendix of the Ministry of 
Culture and directed by philosopher Ricardo Forster; Centro Cultural Néstor 
Kirchner that opened in 2015; and 6,7,8, a political commentary TV broadcast 
which ran from 2009 until the end of 2015, orchestrated a contemporary cultural 
rhythm that hinged on habits and rituals long established in the Peronist sentimental 
fabric (Plotkin 2003). What changed from classical Peronism (1945 55) to the 
Kirchenrist reenactment was the impossibility of translation from culture to politics, 
at both the level of state policy and that of the base constituencies. 
                                                          
5 On the discourse of security during the last years of kirchnerismo, see the radio Clinämen 
http://ciudadclinamen.blogspot.com/2014/09/scioli-llego-hace-rato.html). For in depth sociological 
analysis of security forms in Argentina, see Temor y control: la gestión de la inseguridad como forma de 
gobierno (Futuro Anterior Ediciones, 2014) by Esteban Rodríguez Alzueta. 
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Whether the cultural realm is no longer the main driving form of populist politics is 
something to be disputed and further analyzed; but what seems to have become clear 
cultures of identification and subjective desires that are no longer the monopoly of 
the populist affective machine (Bellotti 2015). The kirchnerist political defeat at the 
national polls confirmed that the processes of translatability between political culture 
and political identities are swayed by an irreducible gap to this antinomy. Without a 
doubt the most explicit symptom of this conflict was the public witticism voiced by 
the Kirchnerist Minister of Interior, Florencio Randazzo, who in his appearances in 
one of 
punchline being, of course, that Daniel Scioli lost an arm in a water-racing event in 
1989. 
to the historical Peronist tradition. If Peronism is also the history of the bodies of its 
leaders  the missing and recovered body of Eva or the dismembered hands of Peron, 
as objet petit a of hegemony  
affect seems insufficient in times of the total sovereignty of financial markets and the 
-
-
as coined by John Kraniauska
-intensity consumer form of neoliberal subsumption at the everyday 
experience.6 
                                                          
6 El estado posnacional: más allá 
del kirchnerismo y el antikirchnerismo 
libera: seis hipótesis sobre el pasaje del viejo neoliberalismo excluyente al nuevo capitalismo runfla (que lo 
Lobo Suelto). 
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of grounding legitimacy in traditional symbols and myths, but also reveals the ways 
in which the triumph of a national-popular fervor is always-already inseminated by 
subjectivation. As noted by political theorist Joseph Vogl, the national space of 
containment can no longer compete on the same playing field with heterogeneous 
sovereign effects of market production and accumulation.7 The myth of globalization 
and international agreements based on economic interests rests on the strong case 
that national states are still autonomous in terms of decision-making and political 
legitimacy, when exactly the opposite is the case. 
nalysts 
such as Salvador Schavelzon, Bruno Cava, or Raul Zibechi, on the reverse side one 
within the Marea Rosada.8 
they have gone through a long process of learning from their mistakes after the 
neoliberal economic model. Their relevance hinges on how they occupy certain 
flexible zones of the st
elsewhere), and the foreclosure of politics to consensus and appeasement, rather than 
disagreement and democratic expansion. It is not a coincidence that the 
neutralization of political conflict, as observed at the beginning of the twentieth 
century by Carl Schmitt, goes hand in hand with a nomic distribution of economic 
investments, which in the particular case of the region takes the form of the extractive 
                                                          
7  Qui Parle, Vol. 23, Fall/Winter 
2014. 
8 
de la coyuntura sudamericana. Imágenes del desarrollo, ciclo político y nuevo conflicto social (Lobo Suelto, 2 
del Mondo  
(La Razón, 
erbol digital, 2 de Octubre 2015) by Maristella Svampa. 
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model that guarantee the compulsive modernization constitutive of the philosophy 
of history (Villalobos-Ruminott 2016).  
In the argentine political landscape the figure that best represents the emergence of 
this new right is the ex-mayor of Tigre Sergio Massa, whose political discourse in the 
last year productively articulated institutional Peronism in a national-popular register 
with a technocratic post-political security rhetoric. As studied by Diego Genoud in 
his political biography Massa 
combines multiple registers that circulate in contemporary Argentina that helped 
raise the Frente Renovador as a major national party. I would argue, in fact, that the 
locus of the late argentine political culture finds the best expression in massismo, 
understood as a set of articulations that suture political dissensus into one of 
consensus, albeit full-fleshed police presence in the territories. In contrast to the 
political inefficacy of S
In a way, Massa is the most visible figure of the neoliberal continuation from above 
that has redrawn the limits between state and neoliberal economy, Peronist political 
culture and flexible forms of consumer democratization. 
The turn to the commons 
Confronted with this new reality that signals the end of the progressive cycle, it seems 
that the age-old Leninist question 
agenda, requiring us to rethink the traditional antimonies  state and market, the 
new right and left wing populisms, social movements and political verticalization  
that have dominated Latinamericanist reflection during the last decade. An emerging 
as the transcendental mole capable laying the groundwork for an autonomous politics 
9 
                                                          
9 Emir Sader. El nuevo topo: los caminos de la izquierda latinoamericana. Buenos Aires: Siglo XXI, 2006. 
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movement on a horizontal plane, and like populism, it seeks to render political 
representation irrelevant through direct democratic participation and personal 
involvement in the decision making process. In a recent interview, Raquel Gutierrez 
Aguilar, who is also the author of one of the most significant books on social 
movements, Los ritmos de Pachakuti: Movilización y levantamiento indígena-popular 
en Bolivia (Textos Rebeldes, 2008), argued that before the inevitable leaning to the 
Aguilar, the commons is understood as breaking away from the civil society / state 
divide, drifting towards the autonomy of heterogeneous social movements or 
multitudes that constantly contest the common sense and the sensible experiences 
that order the social space and feed the traditional arrangement of the status quo.10 
logic of re-appropriation as the most significant determination of praxis. In a more 
: 
during the years of struggle a possibility emerged for the reconfiguration of such 
a body into something that, by contrast and for the sake of distinction, we can 
call the recommon res communis. The main features of this recommon, created, 
yearned for, and suggested by every successive assault against the state order of 
capital, consist in establishing what must be collectively reappropriated and, at the 
same time, in inhibiting the order of the centralizing rule that allows for the 
monopoly of decisions and the institution of nondeliberated procedures.11 
 Although Gutierrez Aguilar is critical of the 
forms of decision making in progressive governments of the region, citing Bolivia, 
                                                          
10 
Comunalidad en Mexico, in a recent radio interview: 
https://archive.org/details/151026RAQUELGUTIERREZCOMUNALIDAD. 
11 Raquel Gutiérrez Aguilar. "Beyond the "Capacity to Veto": Reflections from Latin America on the production 
and reproduction of the common". SAQ 113:2, Spring 2014. 
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her own position remains grafted to an understanding of the commons through an 
amphibological logic of appropriation, re-appropriation of what is proper and must 
-appropriation 
of that which has been initially expropriated, then the common is yet another version 
of a primitive reason of social centralized organization (state), which, instrumentalized 
from below (in a micropolitical register), maintains the Hegelian schematics of 
rical 
movement of a unified direction. 
More problematic still is the fact that, for Gutierrez Aguilar, the appropriation of the 
commons must be accomplished by reaching consensus, which coincides all the more 
with the post-political position of occluding conflict as constitutive of the political 
(Gutierrez-Aguilar 2014). The logic of consensus, moreover, will be consistent with 
the nexus between appropriation and governability as the space of identity formation 
and policing. Similar to Gutierrez-Aguilar, Raul Zibechi in Dispersar el poder (Tinta 
Limón, 2006) has articulated the decision power of the commons as 
12 At this point it is not clear how the turn to the 
structures neoliberal administration. However, this is not the only way to deal with 
or think through the problem of the commons. Against the formulation of the 
commons as instated by the proper, another notion of the commons could be 
understood as the dispersal of forms of life in retreat of hegemonic politicity, turned 
                                                          
12 
Consideraciones sobre 
he Seminario Crítico Transnacional, Universidad 
Complutense, July 2015. In her Rhythms of the Pachakuti (Duke University Press, 2015), Gutierrez Aguilar also 
situates the deliberate process of direct democracy in terms of consensus. She writes: "I firmly believe that 
this list of demands expresses an interesting, varied, and complex proposal for political transformation in 
Bolivia... The list of demands essentially seeks to take what is hidden, contained, and below  community 
methods for planning, reaching a consensus, and self-regulating coexistence  and place it "above and out in 
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another space offers a post-identitarian model of commonality beyond distributive 
13 
Another possible form of the commons is not only imaginable, but also historically 
rooted. In her brief gloss on the Paris Commune, Arendt notes how, at odds with the 
revolutionary hypothesis of Marx and Lenin, the communal form does not thrive at 
seizing power or consensus, but rather at the survival of radical freedom (Arendt 
1990). This communal form is irreducible to the way in which Latin American 
commons have been articulated around another identitarian ground of consensus and 
property and propriety. Hence, one of the tasks at the end of the progressive cycle is 
to render thinkable the question of the commons in a democratic horizon that would 
not be reducible to the creole traditions of liberalism, nor to the charismatic anti-
institutionalism of populism. 
Between the crisis of the articulation of the national popular projects and the 
contradictory conditions of the commons, a much-needed possibility for affirming a 
post-hegemonic form of latinamericanist reflection is in order. Post-hegemonic reflection 
is complementary to Jon Beasley- Posthegemony: 
political theory and Latin America (Minnesota Press, 2010), although not entirely 
reducible to habits, multitude, and affect. The conditions for post-hegemonic 
reflection are two-fold: aprincipial affirmation of politicity in the times of 
interregnum; and second, a politicity grounded in democratic disagreement instead 
                                                          
13 What remains to be discussed is to what extent an identitarian affirmation of the commons reaffirms, albeit 
in other terms, the Hegelian philosophy of history vis-à-vis a distributive ontology as the foundational ground 
for Latin American sovereigntist validation. An identitarian matrix of understanding indigenous communalism 
recently revived could a
friends (Semiotexte, 2015), the collective The Invisible Committee makes a distinction between a concept of 
the commons based on the improper and use, and another grounded in a chain of equivalence that legislates 
an operation of expropriation on the basis of consensual property and propriety. Obviously what interests 
us here is the second option of communalism against the anthropological reductionism of communitarianism 
and politics of the subject. An important critique of community and its opening to singularity could also be 
found in Walter Brogan, "The Community of those who are going to die", in Heidegger and Practical 
Philosophy (State University of New York Press, 2002).  
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of consensus. More incisive than posing the question of an effective political praxis, 
post-hegemonic reflection dwells on the fissure of hegemony opened within the 
epochal fracture of the principial form of politics and the architectonics of thought.14 
- -hegemonic 
wants to account for the limits of reflection on state form, the forces of financial 
capital, and the impossibility of establishing an epoché outside the regulatory frame 
of globalized machination. Instead of affirming yet another geopolitical nomic 
configuration (BRICS) in line with decoloniality, or a new culturalism based on 
post-hegemonic reflection amounts to the abandonment of 
principial politics of location and identity in line with democracy to come. It is an 
inescapable double-bind that desires no principle of legitimacy: on the one hand, it 
is a modest proposal for the non-interference of the freedom of thought, and on the 
other, the challenge of the impossibility of naming precisely that which for the 
moment lacks a proper name. 
Gerardo Munoz is a fourth year PhD student in Latin American literature at Princeton 
e State: crisis of sovereignty and pinriciples Latin 
He is a member of the Infrapolitical Deconstruction academic collective 
(www.infrapolitica.wordpress.com). 
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BRUNO CAVA1 
Can the Latin American Progressive 
Governments Outlive Their Success?2 
South of the border (2009) portrays the quintessential narrative of the 
Latin American progressive cycle.3 The documentary tells the story of the coming to 
power of Chavez in Venezuela, the first in a new harvest of pink leaders that distanced 
themselves from the monochromatic post-communist neoliberal order. Surrounded 
by an overwhelming support from the popular classes and the nationalist left, Chavez 
in Venezuela, Morales in Bolivia, Correa in Ecuador, the Kirchners in Argentina, and 
Lula in Brazil confronted openly the elites, the press monopolies, the right-wing 
destituent force, and in doing so, detached themselves from the governmentality that 
intensified inequality and poverty in the neoliberal 1990s. 
In a sense this film is constructed as an inverse road movie: that is, instead of filming 
the popular protests throughout its different territories, Stone strolls through 
presidential palaces adhering to the epic discourse of the chiefs of State. South of the 
border even goes as far as citing the fall of the Berlin Wall, stating that the new Latin 
American political cycle erupted against the triumphalist post-historical ideology of 
the Washington consensus. In this narrative made for exportation, the progressive 
                                                          
1 BRUNO CAVA is an associate fellow at the Universidade Nômade. He is the author of A multidão foi ao 
deserto: as manifestações no Brasil em 2013 (AnnaBlume Editora, 2013) and co-author of Podemos e Syriza: 
experimentações políticas e democracia no século 21 (AnnaBlume Editora, 2015). 
2 This article was translated by Gerardo Muñoz. It was originally published in 
http://www.alternautas.net/blog/2016/5/12/can-the-latin-american-progressive-governments-outlive-their-
success on May 12th, 2016. 
3 South of the border. Dir. Oliver Stone. Good Apple Productions 2006. 
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n finding an 
 
The year 2015 was the annus horribilis of the Latin American progressive cycle. This 
was the year in which governments were defeated on their own terms, that is, through 
massive electoral participation that included the poor popular sectors. For instance, 
kirchnerismo could only offer as presidential nominee a candidate whose political 
career was shaped during Menemismo.4 In Venezuela, the opposition allocated 16% 
of the votes in the National Assembly elections.5 
Soledad Chapetón became the mayor of El Alto, the second major city in Bolivia and 
the well-known plebeian heart and soul of the Gas Wars of 2003.6 Right after the 
multifaceted uprisings last June that led to the intensification of the political crisis, 
Rafael Correa admitted that he will not be running for the upcoming presidential 
elections of 2017.7 
in 2011 of almost a million discontented citizens. Cross-electoral polls have rated her 
popularity below the 10% support line.8 Although Dilma won the presidential 
election in October of 2014, it was by a very thin margin (3%) in which two things 
were proved, although the second was later proven false: 1. That Brazil was at the 
border of a deep systemic crisis, and 2. That she would not adopt neoliberal policies 
of fiscal adjustment, which were integrally inscribed in the 2015 political agenda.9 
                                                          
4 Salvador Schavelzon. http://www.la- -
 
5  -el-ocaso-de-
los-  
6 -nueva-derecha-
andina/ 
7 http://uninomade.net/tenda/junho-no-equador-e-o-
correismo/ 
8 -
as-manifestacoes-de-  
9 Bruno Cava. -in-brazil-
has-already-  
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It is in this context that the discourse on the exhaustion of the progressive cycle begins 
to take shape.10 At the same time, understanding it as a narrativ
insufficient and full of traps, since it seems to point to a defeat of what previously 
was a golden age of progressive usurpation of power. According to this faulty 
narrative, the downfall of these governments was instigated by financial markets 
deregulation, right wing golpismo, and elite alliance with U.S imperialism. In all the 
defeat that we have the duty to mourn. 
This self-critique is best expressed by the view that the majority of those who 
benefitted from the social beliefs did so to then turn in favor of the ideology of 
consumerism, voting the political opposition (in terms of a populism logic, this is 
translated as the people are always right except when they do not vote us), and 
lamenting for not 
of the progressive cycle became a bitter reality in the Argentine case and is beginning 
to be bitter without end in the Brazilian scene, it is necessary to take distance from 
any epic narrative structured around the opposition between imperialism and anti-
imperialism, progressives and neoliberalists, left and right; all categories that only had 
some theoretical validity in the 1970s, or perhaps with more analytical justifications 
in the 1990s. There should not be more mystification by adopting the grand 
narratives of the state. Instead we should confront the problems as they open a path 
towards action and thought. As I argued with Alexandre Mendes, the progressive 
governments have won.11 This entails that they have secured legitimacy by 
systematically repressing emergent constituent possibilities against new political 
                                                          
10 For instance, see Raúl Zibechi: http://www.aporrea.org/actualidad/a220180.html; Gerardo Muñoz: 
-sobre-el- ; Salvador Schavelzon: 
-fin-del-relato-  
11 Bruno Cava & Alexandre F. M Revista Lugar Comum n.º 45, 
http://uninomade.net/lugarcomum/45/ 
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imaginations that did not fit the prefigured ideological governmental mode of 
development and social organization of urban centers.  
In the last ten to fifteen years, the politico-economic project of the region was 
grounded in a theoretical matrix of production in the context of underdevelopment 
that dates back to the age-old CEPAL model (Prebisch, Furtado), in spite of new 
syncretic adjustments.12 In broad terms, this means an application of Keynesianism 
in longue duré: on the one hand, accepting that investment determines effective 
demands (one does not produce to distribute, but the other way around); and on the 
other, that in peripheral conditions it is imperative to govern over industrial and 
technological developments. From these premises one fundamental consequence is 
derived: accumulation leads to a general process of industrialization. 
The logic of investments in the industrial sector will expand productive capacities, 
altering the specific composition of imports, and thus leading to a diversification of 
the economy. However, since the relation between center and periphery is structural, 
the only viable option for Latin American governments is to use their fiscal surplus 
of its initial position. It is here that the well-
up (Svampa 2013). In other words, the export index becomes the strategic element 
of capitalist accumulation as the point of departure for the productive model. In 
theory, the developmentalist project should enhance the national market relative to 
the external demand, promoting a deep transformation of the national economy, thus 
possibly breaking away with the vicious circle of structural dependency. In other 
words, industrialization and State planning is the path for overcoming levels of 
poverty. 
Before the end of the progressive cycle, in fact, most of the criticisms against these 
governments stemmed from two main positions. First, those that point out that these 
governments were not sufficiently developmentalist, making it impossible to break 
away from neoliberalism, and an external alliance with financial forces hindering any 
real potential for emancipation. This line of argumentation is followed by the 
                                                          
12 
Record, 2005. 
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criticism, exemplified in the Venezuelan case, of not diversifying the national 
economy beyond the nonproductive matrix of petro-industry. In the Brazilian case, 
the critici
even if agro-business is also a large scale industry, intertwined to bio-engineering, 
financial, brand and commercial sectors. The second type of critique limits itself to 
the denunciation of extractivist excesses, as if the developmentalist project was 
grounded in an efficient direction, but only lacking an ethical dimension to impacted 
communities and more care for environmental policies. Both the industrialist 
critiques (1st position) and the social-liberal (2nd position) lose sight of a central 
internal limit to the progressive developmentalist model, to which I will return in the 
latter part of the essay.13 
Across the board, the progressive governments emerged from democratic 
mobili
-2001) 
a result of the insurgent cycle of 2000-2005 along with the Water and Gas wars in 
2000 and 2003.14 In the cases of Brazil and Argentina, the 1997 Asian crisis catalyzed 
the crumbling of neoliberal stability leading to the 2001 crisis in Argentina, whose 
social protagonists were piqueteros and cacerolazos before Kirchneirsmo  while the 
ascension of Lula to power came from three different electoral defeats (1989, 1994, 
                                                          
13 -
e 
anthropic principle of Malthusian thought with mathematic determinations. Some contemporary thinkers of 
capitalism, such as geographer David Harvey, regularly argue that capital is limitless and of infinite expansion. 
According to Marx, however, the limit of capital is class, and class power. The fragments on the machines in 
the Grundrisse
intensive via-a-vis the machination of the social. This would a strong third degree critique related to the 
moment of its maximum antagonism. From the South, this immanent analysis of developmentalism becomes 
contaminated with materials from the alter-developmentalist matrix, as developed by Alberto Acosta and 
will, one could also think of resistance as the transformation of subjectivity in its becoming. In this sense, one 
could turn the logic of developmentalism by becoming- -indio, 
devir- -pobre-deva- ). Deleuze and Guattari in the 
Anti-Oedipus deploy the concept Body-without-organs (BwO) as the figure of the catastrophe. 
14 Alexandre Mendes & 
http://www.diplomatique.org.br/artigo.php?id=1870 
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and 1998). It is important to emphasize, however, that the convergence of these 
revolts with alter-globalization movements in Seattle and Genova (articulated in the 
horizon of Chiapas) allowed for a mestizaje of the autonomist generation of the 1990s 
with the more traditional Latin-American left of the seventies. An example of this 
encounter was the organization of the Global Social Forums (FSM) that took place 
 
The democratic mobilizations conveyed a much-needed drift in governmental 
policies at a moment when the developmentalist model began to directly invest in 
the social sphere. The reallocation of public budget determined an unseen liberation 
of manual labor which reinvented the economy from below, promoted a period of 
economic growth that reduced social and regional inequalities. All of the socio-
economic indexes show the success of these social policies that, without the State and 
market mediations, transferred rent thus increasing the salary ceiling and expanding 
popular credit (WB Group, 2014). The impact of this transformation was felt at 
multiple levels, but there is no doubt that it sparked a profound change in most of 
Latin-American societies. There is a generalized interpretation of the success of the 
progressive cycle that points to the export indexes in connection to the expansion of 
the Chinese economy and the international commodities (like oil, which rose to a 
peak $100 a barrel) as the central key to the economic contention during the 
economic crisis of 2008-2009 without giving up the operation of redistribution. 
What seems to be left out from this analysis is the possibility of considering that the 
strengthening of the internal market was conditioned to the relative transformation 
of the social productive forces and the formation of virtuous economic circuits 
(regardless of the industrial success or limitations), as well as to the overall tendency 
towards autonomous exports. 
The developmentalist principles adopted by the progressive governments were 
formulated before the decline of the Keynesian Fordist model of the seventies and 
the arrival of financial globalization. In this way, industrialization is understood as 
the path opening towards emancipation, whether it is through proletarianization with 
diachronic analysis. Also, the developmentalist success of the Brazilian dictatorship 
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(1964-85), through the 2nd National Plan of Development (PND), drove to a 
began in California. After three decades, the productive sector no longer coincided 
with the industrial sector, since the developmentalist projects continue being 
measured through indexes that no longer account for the overdetermination of the 
nancialized forms.15 The attempt to isolate the 
working sector through investment indexes became a mirrored image, leading to a 
parallel accumulation of capital in the hands of the traditional oligarchic elites that 
should have been the target of their antagonism in the first place. 
In any case, it is important to emphasize the singularity of both Bolivian and 
Ecuadorian constituent political processes that forced mobilizations at the margins of 
developmentalist agendas, such as the plurinational constructio
16 -populism based on the economy of knowledge that 
copied not so much the Cuban model as it did the South Korean.17 In spite of these 
designs, the respective cases of TIPNIS and Yasuní-ITT signaled the resolution of 
tensions and contradictions within the rich Andean political experiences, impacting 
the developmentalist project as well as the dynamic between governments and the 
social movements. The complex biopolitical practices of autonomy and the common 
became reduced to a social-progressive horizon, as Alberto Acosta and Salvador 
Schavelzon have argued.18 No two other statesmen express the primacy of this 
necessity better than Rafael Correa and Vice-president Álvaro García Linera, who 
                                                          
15  KorpoBraz (2013) 
by Giuseppe Cocco. 
16 Plurinacionalidad y 
Vivir Bien/Buen Vivir: dos conceptos leídos desde Bolivia y Ecuador post-constituyentes (CLACSO, 2015) by 
Salvador Schavelzon. 
17 http://www.rebelion.org/noticia.php?id=171279 and 
 
18 
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have repeatedly affirmed the necessity of the developmentalist project as the 
19 In the rhetoric of Garcia 
internal limit of developmentalism from the left.20 
There is a lot of discussion on inequality, but not much about exploitation.21 Capital 
is understood not as social relation that organizes the very relations between society 
and state. Rather, the question of capital appears, inversely, as an organizing principle 
from both outside and above, a master trope that the state will oppose in a molar 
tension in the social division of wealth. It is no coincidence that the recent 
mobilizations are classified as wanting to destabilize the state in the name of restoring 
neoliberalism. This happened in the uprisings of 2013 in Brazil  in some respects, a 
far echo of the argentine ¡Que se vayan todos! 22  coinciding with the Arab uprisings 
of 2010-2011,23 and Venezuela in 2014 and those in Ecuador in 2015.24 All of these 
uprisings were delegitimized by the progressive governments, and re-coded as 
- 25 undermining its potential for 
political renovation. This was a common pattern across the region in terms of dealing 
with social movements in each occurrence of protest. 
                                                          
19 
 
20 
 (2015) 
21 I follow here the insight developed Giuseppe Cocco in the above-cited interview. 
22 
Revista Lugar Comum n.º 45, http://uninomade.net/lugarcomum/45/. 
23 
-estudantis-novas-  
24 http://nuso.org/articulo/por-que-protestan-en-
ecuador/ 
25 
http://www.rebelion.org/noticia.php?id=165376 
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We are dealing with a Leftist mixture of Hegelianism and Marxism, where the state 
appears as the privileged dialectical synthesis that justifies every phenomena through 
Real equals the Rational This could be transferred to the international scene, where 
a new dialectic between economy and the world becomes the BRICs synthesis as the 
international counter-power to North American imperialism. A version of this 
checks 
and balances.26 The sympathy for the Chinese model is not only nostalgia for the 
Cold War division, but more importantly a new developmentalist economic matrix. 
The restoration of the Washington consensus gets rewritten as the Beijing 
consensus.27 An explicit contradiction hides the all too familiar fluxes through a 
28 Since dialectics accepts anything, 
even waving red flags and aligning with the socialist party (as in the Brazilian case), 
it could govern along with national oligarchies and the corporate class. One cannot 
govern with Kátia Abreu, the agribusiness queen, and at the same time defend 
developmentalism as you were Rosa Luxemburg. Only Hegelians can accomplish this 
impossible task. 
The difference between speaking about inequality and thinking exploitation is that, 
in the case of the latter, what is emphasized is the social constitution embedded in 
exploitation, and consequently its antagonistic character. To speak of inequality 
instead of exploitation allows thinking to occur in terms of social stratifications in a 
sociological frame instead of through the antagonism constitutive of social relations 
                                                          
26 We could cite as example that the fundamental contradictions are central to the model of accumulation 
and the capitalist continuity. This process of deterritorialization of capitals is at the center of Giovanni 
Il lungo XX secolo; denaro, potere e le origini del nostro tempo (1996). 
27 
Nelson Barbosa follows principles of the post-1976 Chinese model. 
28 The changing face of China: from Mao to Market. Oxford University 
Press, 2005. 
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in capital. That is, the transformation of the social composition corresponds to the 
dissention of the social composition to a molecular form. There is little to lament, 
however, with the ideal of building a working class that will fit the European 
modalities of Fordist industrialism. The conditions for proletarization in Latin 
America already entail an intrinsic post-Fordist form of proletarianization. As argued 
by Giuseppe Cocco, in this sui generis proletarianization the poor are excluded as 
poor.29 Combating poverty has an ambiguous dimension in the official rhetoric that 
leans towards the domestication of the problem, instead of affirming its antagonistic 
potential. If the progressive cycle ideal of inclusion is the inclusion of the poor in 
terms of exploitation (and not only in quantitative terms of reducing inequality), 
then there exists a resistance dimension of the poor, a creative and productive 
 
The critics of the proletarization of the South, focusing on the moral pattern fixed by 
consumer democratization,30 or that of an anamorphic and disorganized sub-
proletarian tend to exclude the transformations at the level of class.31 This has been 
expressed not only in the new cycle of struggles beyond the progressive horizon, to 
the extent of even voting slightly to the right-wing political forces. In order to capture 
this polarization from below internal to the crisis, Giuseppe Cocco and I proposed a 
savage Lulism,32 a potential block of singularities of the new mobilization phase of the 
poor that was repressed by the Left itself.33 On the other side of mobilizations and 
constituent struggles, the conquests of the progressive cycle have systematically 
                                                          
29 This is the axis of the operaismo conceptual analysis used by Cocco to understand the mobilization of the 
poor in the last fifteen years in Brazil. See his books MundoBraz (2009) y KorpoBraz (2013). 
30 
 
31 -
emerged during the Lula years.   
32 
http://www.euronomade.info/?p=173 
33 Amarildo was the visible face of the 2013 Brazilian uprising, where the expression for organization of the 
poor, against the grain of biopolitical organization, was affirmed around those of color and indigenous 
submitted to the dominance of megaprojects of 
Cocco, Eduardo Baker and Bruno Cava, http://www.diplomatique.org.br/artigo.php?id=1569 
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worked miraculously, since it becomes a paranoid symbolic patrimony that must 
persist uncontested. 
It is not enough to lament or contest the end of the progressive cycle, or even 
traversed by multiple fluctuations, new social actors, and intensities. 
A critique sustained on how the progressive cycle was not being socialist, 
developmentalist, or voluntarist enough, paving the way from the rise of liberal 
opponents (Mauricio Macri in Argentina, Henrique Capriles in Venezuela, or 
Mauricio Rodas in Ecuador) is insufficient. It is important to acknowledge that the 
progressive governments succeeded and because of this victory, ambiguous results are 
now emerging. The dynamics of mass mobilizations will reshape the 
developmentalist projects and explain what national criollo intellectuals cannot 
longer clarify. The task is to liberate the analysis from black and white epics or 
dialectical narratives, as to reopen political imagination to a new social and economic 
composition in the region. We can leave the process of mourning to a global left still 
haunted by the fall of the Berlin Wall and the end of communism. First, one must 
- 34 All walls must fall in order to 
generate new experiences of action and thought.  
  
*In writing this article, I want to highlight the important interlocutors outside of Brazil, 
such as Diego Sztulwark, Veronica Gago, Salvador Schavelzon, Santiago Arcos, Pablo 
Stefanoni, Ariel Pennisi, Bruno Napoli, Mauricio Villacrez, Pablo Hupert, Nicolás F. 
Muriano, Melisa Gorondy Novak, Bernando Gutiérrez, Cesar Altamira, Gerardo 
Muñoz, Alberto Acosta, Oscar Camacho, and Nemo Niente. 
 
 
 
                                                          
34 Lobo Suelto! -pais-  
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SERGIO VILLALOBOS-RUMINOTT1 
The Chilean Case and the Latin 
American Pink Tide: Between Democracy 
and Developmentalism2 
 
The so called Marea Rosada (Pink Tide) specifically refers to the turn that several 
Latin American governments took by the end of the 90s, in favor of public and social 
agendas that opposed the neoliberal order that characterized the region in the 
previous decades. These new agendas also broke away from the age-old ideal of 
revolutionary partisanship, pursuing a critique of neoliberalism that was not reducible 
to a radical (impossible) delinking still embedded in the logic of accumulation. The 
new political agenda brought to the fore by the governments of the Marea Rosada 
without opposing neoliberalism tried to radically modify its logic and produce a more 
humane economy. In spite of the anti-imperialist and nationalist rhetoric that have 
flourished in the regional Left, it is also true that for cases such as the Chilean and 
the Brazilian ones the scene is dominated by a type of government that seeks to 
correct unjust income distribution while maintaining a disciplined fiscal budget as to 
facilitate its entry into international markets. 
Even so, the nationalizations that have recently taken place in Venezuela, Argentina, 
and Bolivia seem to contradict the balanced rhetoric and practice of the Marea 
Rosada. This series of heterogeneous initiatives seems to respond to an age old agenda 
                                                          
1 SERGIO VILLALOBOS-RUMINOTT (PhD. University of Pittsburgh, 2003) is Associate Professor of Spanish & 
Latin American Studies at University of Michigan. He is the author of Soberanías en suspenso: imaginación y 
violencia en América Latina (La Cebra, 2013)and Heterografías de la violencia: historia, nihilismo, destrucción 
(La Cebra, 2016) 
2 This article was translated by Gerardo Muñoz. It was originally published in 
http://www.alternautas.net/blog/2016/5/24/the-chilean-case-and-the-latin-american-pink-tide-between-
democracy-and-developmentalism on May 24th, 2016. 
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inscribed in the logic of the imperial geopolitical order toppled by contemporary 
globalization. In any case, it comes as no surprise that the Chilean case is still used 
today as the paradigm to distort the potential for more radical options. 
One must recall that Chile underwent its formal transition to democracy in the early 
nineties immediately after experiencing one of the longest and most brutal military 
dictatorships in the region. However, what gave the Chilean case its notoriety was 
not just its constricted democratization, but its position as an ideal model for 
implementing neoliberal policies in authoritarian conditions. While neoliberal 
policies were being applied in the rest of Latin America during transitional or 
democratic periods, Chile already opted for a distinct neoliberal path since the 70s 
(Harvey 2007), appeasing social unrest through forms of anti-communist security 
rhetoric. At the same time, the transition to democracy in Chile, formally 
inaugurated in 1990, was oriented to the administration of macroeconomic policies 
supplemented with neoliberal engineering born out of the dictatorship. Attenuating 
its social impact through light redistributive policies, such as fixed bonds and selective 
assignments, class composition or the overall pattern of wealth or ownership 
distribution were not altered in a significant way.    
To this one should also add that the high price of copper, the main national product, 
together with the arrival of China to the international market, produced an 
exceptional financial situation that favors the political strategies of a government 
uninterested in serious political or economic reforms. In other words, this increase in 
the price of copper on the international market produced a surplus in the fiscal 
budget that allowed for multiple redistributive initiates without really altering the 
monetary policies, the interest rates on property and profit, or the condition of 
international exchange. During the years that followed the Pinochet dictatorship, the 
administrations of Concertación de Partidos por la Democracia devoted themselves to 
politically managing this model, balancing its own deficiency vis-à-vis a permanent 
strategy of social deferral and forced social mourning, while incapable of advancing 
judicial accountability for crimes committed during the dictatorship; many of these 
criminals were recycled in the state bureaucracy and intelligence apparatus. 
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initiated by Kirchnerismo in Argentina could serve as a contrast to the Chilean case, 
since in Chile the processes of radical popular organizations that made explicit the 
crisis of governability of the dictatorships in the 80s were appropriated by the old 
political elite, constituting itself as the central political actor when the dictatorship 
ended. From this process of juxtaposition of old partisan cadres and its actors, 
minimally renewed through social democratic robes, a logic of hegemony under 
which the central actors continued to be the state, the national army, and the 
traditional political parties was rearticulated. Thus, in the 90s we see the emergence 
of a securitarian rhetoric directed not anymore against the communist, but against 
the delinquent, the drug lord, or even indigenous people and anarchists. This served 
a single goal: political decisions had to be consensually taken within Parliament and 
among parties, and not in the streets. There was a clear need to deactivate the social 
movements that, against all odds, had not ceased to occupy the streets and protest 
the inherent contradictions of the Chilean democracy. 
On the other hand, one of the clearest signs of the institutional or juristocratic 
(Hirschl 2007) limits of the Chilean model rest, precisely, on the indefinite 
postponement of demands of the subaltern indigenous population, traditionally 
punished under times of dictatorship and subjected to the policies of appropriation 
by banks and by the forestry sector. Chilean democracy, recovered during the early 
90s according to the official state discourse, was a zero-sum game for the Mapuche 
movement. The official acceptance of the multicultural and pluri-ethnic character of 
the nation, vis-à-vis a fetishistic, ideal, totemic indigeneity, only deviated the gaze 
from the repressive policies directed at the Mapuche people to the folkloric 
representation of the indigenous as yet another touristic catalogue of curiosities. The 
appropriation by dispossession studied by Marxist geographer David Harvey (2007) 
becomes evident not only during the time of the dictatorship, but also in the need 
for energetic developmentalist expansion that amounts to the sacking of natural 
resources such as rivers, lakes, and forests. 
The continuation of dictatorship within democracy 
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The concentration of wealth, the precarization of the lives of the popular sector, the 
hasty increase of financial profit in pension investments, health, or banking, along 
with the public debt and criminal interest rates, the sustained drive to privatize 
natural resources, and the overwhelming presence of corporate elites within the state 
apparatuses (the same families rotate in public appointments), not only confirm the 
limited character of the Chilean democracy, but the perpetuity of the dictatorship 
within the so- -election of Michelle Bachelet, following a 
series of social protests that bear witness to the incapacity of the center-right 
administration, was conducted on the basis of a promise for structural constitutional 
reforms and deep changes in the health and education sectors; changes that have not 
taken place as of today. 
Certainly, these reforms have yet to take place, and have only been accommodated 
through institutional consent, capturing the social demands of recent years within 
parliament. Chile, the exemplary model of a center-left government, is in fact a classic 
example of a governmental administration responsible for the neoliberal model and 
its macroeconomic policies in the hands of an uncreative political class that 
superficially reinvented itself by changing its name from La Concertación to La Nueva 
Mayoría. The political frame of this false premise remains the same as the one 
conceived in the 1980 Constitution, which functioned as an effective juridical trap 
fomenting the operative legacy of the dictatorship. 
The question of the state form 
I would like however to restate the fact that this description of the Chilean case is not 
symptomatic of the rest of Latin America, nor is it based upon a political discontent 
or a moral denunciation on my part. To be precise, I think that the Chilean case 
allows us to formulate the question about the form and function of the late Latin 
American states in general. This is a central question that needs to be raised at the 
moment. 
First, I would like to clarify what I mean by late state form. I argue that it is not simply 
a question of the historical evolution of the state, but rather, it is related to the process 
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of institutional re-foundation that the region has been going through. Taking into 
consideration the constituent processes and new constitutions in Venezuela, 
Colombia, Bolivia, and Ecuador, and to some extent the constitutional reforms in 
Chile and Central America, this new beginning is regularly associated with the 
evident failure of the post-colonial republican project that emerged out of the 
consequences of nineteenth century emancipatory movements and civil wars. I do 
not mean that this failure is associated with a precise moment of globalization 
understood as the universalization of the flexible pattern of accumulation constitutive 
of contemporary capitalism, but rather globalization itself is the coup de grace of a 
republican post-colonial project always already in crisis. 
Second, it seems to me that it is important to determine the specific function and form 
of this late Latin American state. In principle, discussing the form is relevant because 
what is at stake goes beyond the differentiation between an institutional 
restructuration and the contingent political organization at the level of government. 
These two levels of analysis are not enough. From the question about state form 
emerges the problem of the status of law and power as a single machine that allows 
us to take a certain distance from the monumental notions that tend to delimit 
politics on variations of one and the same model of domination. In the same way that 
a contemporary genealogical discourse broke away from the institutional or 
monumental schematics of power, we need to think the state not as a transcendental 
entity, but as a field of struggle (campo de lucha), as defined in the discussions of the 
members of the group Comuna in Bolivia and Álvaro García Linera (2010). 
In a similar way, instead of thinking sovereignty as an attribute proper to the juridical 
state order (always already pre-defined as the master key of modern governmentality 
and condition of the biopolitical closure), it would be pertinent to think of 
sovereignty as an indeterminate relationship. One could argue the same for law. Far 
from being a simple ideological supplement to domination (a mythic violence that 
conserves the social order), it is also a performative practice open to juridical 
critiq Homo Sacer, or in Deleuze re-
associationism and jurisprudence); that is, the possibility of thinking the state, the 
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sovereign relation and the law not as separate markers on social life, but also as 
indeterminate instances that wage and define the political struggles in the present. In 
this sense, the question of the late Latin American state form is also a question of the 
instances where that state, far from being a simple ideological apparatus of 
reproduction and confirmation of class domination, is a field in which this 
domination is articulated, but also where it could be interrupted.3 
Post-neoliberalism? 
Finally, the question of the function of the late Latin American state form is related 
to the possibility of discussing what has been called post-neoliberalism; or 
alternatively, second-order neoliberalism, which, hinging on the state as the katechon 
or the containment of the demands of social movements (through diverse forms of 
repressive and persuasive strategies), guarantees the hegemony of capital and secures 
the macroeconomic space for flexible patterns of accumulation.4 In this sense, if 
neoliberalism was effectively implemented in Chile, within the frame of an 
authoritarian government that resulted in policies of fiscal adjustment, reduction of 
social expenditure, and financial deregulation; neoliberalism of the second order does 
not seem to need military dictatorships, since it articulates itself with a state that lacks 
interventionist potential with the ultimate responsibility of securing the productive 
and extractive processes in line with what Maristella Svampa has termed the 
commodities consensus and destructive-development (maldesarrollo) (2007).5 
I want to linger on this aporia: if on the one hand the state form indicates an opening 
for struggles of social transformation, on the other, the determination of its function 
is what demonstrates the extent to which those initiatives of social transformation 
taken up by the governments of the Marea Rosada have viability or remain palliative 
                                                          
3 Jacques Derrida. The Beast and the Sovereign I. Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 2009, pp. 408-443. 
Gilles Deleuze. Pure Immanence: Essays on A Life. New York: Zone Books, 2005. 
4 For post- La razón 
neoliberal: economias barrocas y pragmatica popular (Tinta Limón, 2015). The flexible pattern of 
accumulation is the object of exploration in Gareth Willi The Other Side of the Popular (Duke, 2002). 
5 http://www.alternautas.net/blog/2015/4/22/the-commodities-consensus-and-valuation-languages-in-latin-
america-1 
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have the redistributive policies not only been able to produce substantial welfare 
structure, but also remain active enough as to keep the constituent political processes 
expanding the democratic institutions in their struggle against transnational capital? 
Perhaps this is, once again, the lesson to be learned from the Chilean case: far from 
confirming the empowerment of social movements that have disputed neoliberal 
-designed 
Constitution that has consistently expropriated citizen participation, enclosing their 
demands within the narrow institutional parliamentary frame. To repeat, this should 
not be taken as a moral critique of the status quo, but as a historical reflection on 
 
subject produced within national identity, nor an ethnic-political subject of the 
-
on the contrary, to a cathacretic figure, unrepresentable by the 
modern categories of the political as George Didi-Huberman has recently suggested 
pueblo expuesto), as in the case of the 
juridical and historical narratives about The People, narratives that conform and 
pueblo figurante) that deactives the very coordinates of juridical, political, 
and cultural representation polluting the logic of populism and its fictive ethnicity 
with multiple forms of participation and social constitutions (Williams 1999). 
(hegemonic) imagination, but rat
possibility of interrupting the savage processes of accumulation in force today. It is 
Marea Rosada should have placed their bet (instead of 
inscribing them as another emancipatory subject), so as to locate a central actor to 
wage a battle no longer situated in the infinite reproduction of the total apparatus of 
development (its governability, security, private property, and the market), but in the 
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potentiality of other forms of power and social organization. This would be a politics 
the plebe names the improper site of a community without attributes that allows for 
dissent as the fundamental condition for a profane republicanism in our times. 
is due both to the inability to fulfill their promises and to the structural exhaustion 
of the modern Latin American political imagination.6 In this sense, the progressive 
and democratic character of these governments does not transcend that historical 
imagination, placing them in what we might call a late version of traditional 
criollismo. This criollismo tardío (including the decolonial delinking option) is a 
horizon of thinking still unable to understand politics and history as something other 
than the battle for recognition, limiting contemporary heterogeneous practices of 
resistance to neoliberalism to the identitarian agenda of state politics. 
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SALVADOR SCHAVELZON1 
The End of the Progressive Narrative in 
Latin America2 
This question seems to come up after every electoral defeat or disappear whenever 
there is a victory. After more than a decade of continuous political successes in 
Venezuela, Argentina, Brazil, Uruguay, Ecuador, as well as other Central Americas 
countries, 2015 was the year that signaled adverse results and a drop in electoral 
support began. Without diminishing the importance of elections, whence the 
progressive governments derived their legitimacy, it is the time to evaluate the vitality 
of the political projects away from the narratives that constituted them in their peak 
moment.  Beyond the polls, there looms an undetermined time of change. Due 
exhaustion of the model and to the internal transformation of the progressive, 
plurinational or Bolivarian political narrative (electoral defeats), we find a political 
language that was able to inscribe a new political time in Latin America, which comes 
to an halt with leaders involved in charges of corruption and as well as accompanied 
by the lowest indexes of popular support. 
Since progressive governments occupy the center of the political spectrum, there has 
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been a reshuffling of forces and mounting mobilization on both the left and the right. 
The map of the political situation is not homogeneous and cannot be generalized, 
but gobernistas (governists) -  the term used in Brazil to refer to militant government 
supporters with strong participation in social networks and characterized for not 
accepting the slightest criticism, combined with a rhetoric of pragmatic politics  
expressed some degree of concern. After taking the first policy measures in the 
aftermath of its close win in the October 2014 elections, gobernismo in Brazil showed 
remarkable difficulties in holding on to its own narrative. Brazil was probably the 
country where the end of the political cycle was visible for the first time. In part, due 
to the fact that it was the country that did not experience a strong systemic 
transformation of the political system, obliging the PT to govern with political allies 
that did not necessary shared their same ideals. The defeat of kirchnerismo in 
Argentina and chavismo in Venezuela tragically demonstrated the political fragility of 
the situation. A few years ago it would have been difficult to imagine losing broad 
popular support or achieving victory by thin margins.3 
The political climate is not very different from the one in Bolivia and Ecuador, where 
in referendum for presidential reelection. In 2016, too, Dilma Rousseff lost the 
support of allies, which opened an impeachment process in the parliament. 
Although it is true that contemporary electoral campaigns are confined to political 
marketing and to the languages of commercial advertising, it is imperative to analyze 
the nature of the progressive political projects at a greater depth; that is, beyond the 
electoral moments and against rhetorical arguments that sustain the progressive 
narratives. In this analytical register, we find that the social movements that ignited 
                                                          
3 
(La Nación 16/11/2013). http://www.lanacion.com.ar/1680549-la-ultima-
entrevista-de-ernesto-laclau-con-la-nacion 
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new political agendas that in turn paved the way for the emergence of the progressive 
governments have lost most of their creative energy and potential for effective 
transformation. The disappearance of the social movements and urban protests from 
the political scene reintroduced the discourses and insistent practices favoring 
governmental administration.4 It is from this space whence conservative positions, 
led by corporate lobbies, could in fact win spaces that are far removed from the 
political vision that initially supported the governments. 
The arrival of a neoliberalism foisted by taking minimal decisions or renouncing 
other alternatives, has delimited the space of the narrative of social inclusion, the 
battle against inequality, the sovereignty and privilege of the social space; in short, all 
the elements to which these governments committed themselves following the 
election of Hugo Chavez in 1999. After leading an electoral campaign that exalted 
these principles, Dilma Rousseff appointed conservative ministers and opened the 
doors for austerity policies and fiscal adjustment that ran counter to her promises 
during the campaign. This resulted in the end of the grand narrative that functioned 
to legitimize the government. In this way, according to polls (April and May 2015), 
popular predecessor Lula da Silva, a likely candidate for 2018, is starting to be affected 
by current discontent.5 
In addition to an indignant opposition, government criticism has quickly reached the 
mass of its own voters. To the most cynical governists, however, neoliberalism is a 
                                                          
4 Joao Pedro Stedile, leader of the largest social movement in Latin America, MST (Movimento Sem Terra) 
reforma agrária, sobretudo nos últimos dois anos. As únicas famílias que aparecem como assentadas foram 
com o governo Dilma. No final do ano, com a troca do ministro da Fazenda, quando parecia que ela poderia 
recuperar seus compromissos de campanha, nos assustamos ao vê-la retornando à política neoliberal, com a 
reforma da Previdência. Depois fez acordo com (José) Serra (PSDB-SP) para encaminhar as reservas do pré-
sal [oil reserves] a empresas e levou ao Congresso uma lei antiterrorismo que nem na Europa se atreveram 
a levar. Fez cortes que atingiram fundamentalmente educação, saúde, moradia e reforma agrária. É burrice, 
é um governo que não se deu conta que, com a agenda neoliberal, perde a base social que o 
http://www.bbc.com/portuguese/noticias/2016/03/160304_stedile_rs 
5 In December 2015, the opposition taking advantage of the lack of popular support, translated the crisis into 
a process of impeachment that began in May 2016 leading to Rousseff deposition of her executive position 
and the temporal taking command of ex-vice-president Michel Temer. 
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stage left behind, and the current drop in popularity is due to a crisis in the making 
for which they hold no responsibility, and to the influence of the mainstream media. 
decline of the 
very low during the clashes of June 2013, and later during the FIFA world cup in 
s  PT), 
corporate power, the allied conservative parties, and the opposition became 
indistinctive political actors. 
A perception of a conservative front being joined by progressivism is precisely what 
triggered the breaking of the progressive narrative. In the opposite direction, the 
presidential election of 2014 allowed the PT to recover its historic voters thanks to a 
remarkable polarization of the electorate. It did away with both Marina Silva, 
perceived as an associate of neoliberalism, and Aetius Neves, outplayed by the focus 
on social issues during the campaign. It would not be too strange to compare this 
situation to other national realities. During times of election there is always 
polarization, in contrast to the time of governing, when there tends to be a unified 
conservative front.6 
But the disenchanted majority vote for Dilma was followed by real outrage at the 
appointments to the cabinet and the first government measures. Together with 
austerity, in sharp contrast to the campaign promises still 
Partido dos Trabalhadores) accepted the inclusion of the 
economic advisor from the opposition, and to undertake spending cuts weighing on 
the working classes and on education. Another shocking appointment (as Minister 
of Agriculture) was that of Katia Abreu, director of the corporate agricultural 
association, who some time before had been awarded by the indigenous peoples a 
symbolic prize for her role defending environmental crimes and promoting the 
expansion of agribusiness in indigenous lands. These gestures to the markets did 
                                                          
6 In opposition to the movement from the streets lived in Brazil in 2013; the polarization that was imposed in 
2014 was again the frame of the political situation when the impeachment, presented by the government as 
a coup d`Etat, was proposed. 
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nothing to neutralize the demonstrations of hundreds of thousands of citizens calling 
-corruption platform, they hinted at the 
possibility of a closing of the cycle in a most conservative way. The voices that were 
first heard in the streets are now also being expressed in Congress. There, the 
influence of la Bala, el Buey y la Bíblia (the Bullet, the Ox and the Bible  also known 
as BBB) has grown significantly as they control the House of Representatives and 
exert much more influence in the government than social movements. These political 
forces on the far right have recently united in favor of the impeachment of Dilma 
Rousseff, in spite of having received allocated key political ministries and support 
from the PT. 
Conservative sectors both in government and within the opposition managed to curb 
ongoing anti-homophobic educational initiatives (such as the lack of printed material 
on anti- -
forces) to pass a constitutional amendment reducing age of criminal responsibility (to 
sixteen years of age), and to allow outsourcing in all sectors of the economy. The end 
of the cycle is happening in Brazil through the abandonment of the project of change 
that brought progresismo (left) to power and the inability to mobilize the citizenry and 
in some cases (i.e. the deterioration of labor rights, an initiative from Rousseff
government after raising the age for retirement). Nevertheless, progresismo is still in 
command, and in Brazil could very well come out on top again by campaigning 
against the same sectors with which it actually runs the country. 
The worship of technocracy 
The end of the cycle entails the acceptance of a conservative model considered to be 
a necessary condition for stability and political continuity. Opinion polls and 
electoral calculation therefore determine the gobernista political project, leaning 
towards the cult of institutions and technocracy while maintaining a discourse that, 
by focusing on social issues, caters to its original constituency.  In Argentina, 
Kirchnerism lost the presidential election fielding a candidate, Daniel Scioli, who was 
first launched into to political sphere by Carlos Menem. He never enjoyed Néstor 
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Peronism is still more than Kirchnerism, and that it holds political positions very 
to be that the progressive governists want to defend their governmental position vis-
a-vis a metamorphosizing of right-wing discourses. By abandoning the route that 
would allow for antagonism between the government and the rural entrepreneurs 
(Argentina), or taxation of net wealth (in Brazil and other countries), there is a return 
to explicit policies of security and nationalist discourses that displace the struggle for 
social rights and a Latin Americanist integrationist effort. 
Old politics are also creeping into the Movimiento al Socialismo (Movement towards 
Socialism  ic tendencies have led to co-opt media 
and recycled opposition figures, as if decisions on candidates and election agreements 
had no consequences on the grounds of the political project. Any objectives other 
than occupying institutions are thus being dismissed, and popular mobilization is 
Any attempts to put forward stronger reforms and to question both the shape and 
 as promised in the wake -
election in 2014  are being abandoned. 
On the other hand, the dynamics of the political system have made it impossible for 
renewal of the movements that led the left and progressive presidents to power. 
Indeed, political campaigns are financed by the corporate sector, and State revenue 
depends on some of the worst development and extractivist activities. They are also 
the basis for spurious alliances with both local chieftains and multinational capital 
with no other aim than to cash in as fast as possible on investment. Most social 
policies depend on this source of financing. Both the brand and the popularity of the 
progressive governments are now closely associated with an economic model that is 
highly dependent on international prices, which also has catastrophic ecological 
consequences. 
An assessment of the Latin American progressive governments should include 
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important criteria such as: progress in regional coordination; the declaration of 
unconstitutionality of the laws of impunity for dictatorship related crimes; the 
sovereign debt negotiations; poverty reduction, social intervention and infrastructure 
building in poor neighborhoods. The end of the cycle is related to the disruption of 
these agendas, an increase in poverty in Argentina and unemployment in Brazil, and 
to the constraint on the rights and the guarantees of urban dwellers and indigenous 
peoples facing eviction from their territories. The negotiation of bilateral agreements 
in Ecuador and the imprisonment of opponents in Venezuela have broken some 
taboos too; in particular, the thought that a political program could be defined 
against national political status quo still haunted by the colonial and dictatorship 
wounds. The balance sheet is equally negative in regards to industrialization and the 
phasing out of the primary economy model, now wholly dependent on the 
international commodity prices. The fall of the price of the commodities, on the 
other hand, fuels the political crisis from an economic dimension and ads more 
weight to the coming of the end of the progressive cycle. 
The new ideological framework 
When talking about structural changes in the inequality and economic model, 
progressive governments seem to have been transformed by power and institutions, 
rather than the other way around. The force by which the progressive governments 
took place in the early 2000s merely contested the executive (presidentialist) role with 
their agenda, but that at the same time accepted the structural limits  instead of 
transforming the tools of the State  in exchange for political stability and clientelist 
advantages of many of its political leaders. While orthodox recipes are announcing a 
comeback, the possibility of strengthening processes arising from the principle of 
Buen Vivir (Good Living) and aiming at another type of development, vanishes from 
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the scene.7 At the same time, the new ideological framework of progresismo ensures 
popularity and keeps the governments in power, but abandoning the principles and 
the anti-capitalist demands that inaugurated the progressive political cycle riding on 
a wave of popular demonstrations that was able to depose unpopular presidents in 
Bolivia, Ecuador, Argentina, and Brazil. This is made quite clear by the progress of 
three elements: consumerist ideology,8 consensus on development, and the political 
agenda brought in by religious sectors. 
Governist propaganda presents consumption growth as the access of millions of 
people to the middle class. In addition to abandoning the peasant, indigenous, and 
is being shelved. On top of it, access to consumption does not include access to 
healthcare, education, and quality transportation, all of which remain beyond the 
th, has already resulted in some setbacks for progressive 
legislation. It halted changes in the Argentine Civil Code, and legitimized the collapse 
of the bond between governments and minority struggles historically embraced by 
the left, thus stopping incipient progress in some countries. 
a critical position during the Argentine dictatorship, into a progressive world leader 
cannot be reduced to a marketing or media invention.9 It marks the end of 
progressivism as we know it. Consumption growth and a conservative agenda are 
now entwined with a statist and hyper-presidential perspective linked to nationalist 
political identities  with their Batllista variant in Uruguay (José Batlle, president of 
                                                          
7 ink beyond development, 
connected with the fights against fracking, extractivism and violation of indigenous territories see Schavelzon 
(2015) Svampa & Viale (2014), Gudynas & Alaiza (2011) Acosta & Martinez (2009), Escobar (2010). 
8 The idea of the democratic expansion of the consumer sector prospers by including the popular sector into 
the middle class. This project does not only entail economic inclusion, which has been questioned, but more 
importantly it seeks to democratize through the Western capitalist way of life, associated with consumerism, 
debt, and individualism, rather than collective association. 
9 La Nación, 2004). 
http://www.lanacion.com.ar/659247-la-iglesia-advirtio-que-la-muestra-de-ferrari-es-una-blasfemia 
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Uruguay, 1899 1903 and 1911 1915), Peronista in Argentina (Juan Domingo 
Peron, president of Argentina, 1946 1955 and 1973 1974), Emenerrista in Bolivia 
(Revolutionary Nationalist Movement, MNR, founded by President Víctor Paz 
Estenssoro (1941-1952) and the big coalition that governs Brazil with parties from 
the right  if not to supporters of the dictatorship themselves, if we are to judge by 
the development model that is being adopted. 
Maybe one should take seriously the proposal to found a new International led by 
the Pope, which was called for by Italian philosopher and politician Gianni Vattimo 
and hailed by some of the main gobernista players who attended the Forum for 
Emancipation and Equality (Foro por la emancipación y la igualdad) in Buenos Aires, 
in March 2015.10 Rafael Correa staged in a sudden and rather overplayed attack 
against what he called the "abortion agenda" with the aim of preventing legal 
regulation on this issue, and against "gender ideology" on minority rights  which 
peoples. 
Thus, a politics in the name of social, racial and decolonized antagonisms is being 
replaced today by conservative values conveyed through a sense of brotherhood and 
reconciliation that leaves aside the fight against class and ethnic inequality. Popular 
sectors are being framed and demobilized through the establishment of State and 
religious paternalistic welfarism. The new perspective comes with a new 
consideration of dissidence as radicalism  that is, contrary to the interests of the 
nation. In geopolitical terms, the increased repression and criminalization of 
dissenters is conducted with an eye to the East  that is, with a discourse and an 
economic vision close to that of authoritarian regimes such as Russia and China, 
devoid of any anti-capitalist emancipatory horizon. 
Progressivism and the left in power, substituting working class and social and 
were. They take the path of security and consumption that defines the new 
                                                          
10 Foro por la Emancipación see: 
https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=UXVixgBeXfA 
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developmentalist nationalism. This is quite obvious in Nicaragua, where Daniel 
Ortega and the Sandinistas returned to power in 2007. The reconciliation with the 
church, which they fought in the 70s, is now a fact: a law has been passed prohibiting 
abortion under any circumstance. In 2014, moreover, the Nicaraguan Congress, with 
no debate and no previous information, passed another law giving the green light to 
the construction of an inter-ocean canal. It grants sovereign rights for fifty years to a 
Chinese company, and suppresses and criminalizes farmers and populations who will 
be displaced by the new canal. The political cycle founders also when development 
policies draw progressive or leftist Bolivarian governments close to the nationalist-
liberal efforts currently undertaken in Peru, Colombia and Mexico: they are all 
manipulating State power to guarantee a model that is anything but progressive. 
Instead of an anti- or post-extractive outlook as an alternative for a new political cycle, 
-
-
policies linking territorial struggles with the struggles in the cities, the new cycle is 
giving way to a system of political restoration, combining social nationalism, religious 
discourse, and individualistic republicanism, all conveyed through a fuming anti-
State discourse. 
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DIEGO VALERIANO1 
Liberation through Consumption: Six 
Hypotheses on the Passage from 
Exclusive Neoliberalism to the New 
Runfla Capitalism2 
1. Throughout this last decade and a half, and in parallel to the general crisis of global 
capitalism, a wide popular urban sector of the periphery (from Argentina but also 
from elsewhere) sought a favorable cycle that included themselves in consumption. 
One could think of this new access to wealth as a process of liberation (unlike the 
orthodox critique that interprets it as alienation), with the caveat of amplifying the 
 
2. With the increase of consumption there are new modes of sensing, desiring, 
thinking, socializing; but also other ways of being, loving, enjoying, and dying that 
have been radically altered. New possibilities emerge and the traditional knowledge 
of governing populations radically breaks down. Far from pointing to a decline in the 
old forms of social organization, collective action opens a new gap in a time that is 
unprecedented and incalculable. The feast of consumption and the social conflict are 
the new promiscuous standards that enable the transfiguration and organization of 
the everyday. Many actors belong to this new process, more often than not against 
their will, such as the unions, the NGOs, the grassroots and social movements 
                                                          
1 DIEGO VALERIANO writes for the argentine digital publication Lobo Suelto 
(www.anarquiacoronada.blogspot.com) 
2 This article was translated by Gerardo Muñoz. It was originally published in 
http://www.alternautas.net/blog/2016/6/21/liberation-through-consumption-six-hypotheses-on-the-
passage-from-exclusive-neoliberalism-to-the-new-runfla-capitalism on June 21st, 2016. 
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(whether in alliance with the State or not) and citizens in pursuit of justice. 
3. The old neoliberal regime that produced social exclusion was destroyed, first and 
foremost, from below; that is, from the daily experience of the great majority that 
populates the periphery. Runfla3 capitalism was built on its corpse. Runfla capitalism 
entails a new superior stage of consumption, of popular stability that is both festive 
accomplice by unleashing a populist rhetoric that took great efforts in sustaining and 
fomenting its participation in this process. 
4. If we posit the idea of liberation at the center it is because the engine of runfla 
capitalism is consumption by those from below. This took place, mainly, in the 
spatial periphery of the world-system, as it was called in the past but that in our times 
has transformed into the effective BRIC axis. The success of runfla capitalism 
depends, I want to emphasize, on its access to consumption as the authentic political 
kernel of the current transformations underway in the region. The new government 
they are defended on a daily basis in the streets by runfla lives. 
5. This process of liberation always has to be understood ambiguously and in constant 
dispute. It is true that this process of consumption can also be interpreted on the 
and technological systems; but also in the "subjective" sense, such as the pattern of 
consumption or the constant subordination of time to guarantee the vitality of 
consumption, etc.). Nevertheless, we insist on the fact that these processes contribute 
in vitalizing runfla lives through consumption. Those from below (the youth, the 
thieves, the immigrants, the cholas) without ever abandoning being so, learned to 
exploit the social hierarchies for their own benefit. They do did so through the 
technique of permanent transgression in the territories to the point of making the 
                                                          
3 Translator Note: Runfla: The term runfla is not easy to define or translate, and thus we have chosen to retain 
the original Spanish term. According to the Diccionario etimológico del lunfardo (Penguin, 2011), runfla is 
characteristic of the plebe, "gente de mal vivir", referring to the lumpen and the indecent. In an exchange with 
Valeriano wishes that this term were not reduced to its lunfardo etymology. According to Valeriano, runfla 
necessarily lacks conceptual definition and should be understood just by its sound. 
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territories incomprehensible, irrational, extensive, festive, and ungovernable (at least 
from the point of view of the old art of governing). 
runfla vital
registers: statistical indexes, imposed restoration, solidarity and depolitization, and a 
capture the liberating force of this process? These struggles for the process of 
liberation are waged furiously on a daily basis. Today these are more sharply expressed 
permissive governments. There is a long lasting confrontation between the runfla 
lives and the repressive state (and privatized) apparatus, and from what can be seen 
today there is no truce in sight. In any case, runfla capitalism is inseparable from a 
generalized form of urban micro-guerrillas, and the micro-politics of life, where 
consumption, the feast, and the new conflict open worlds to come. These worlds are 
far more interesting than the previous ones, but less comprehended by the 
standardized and conventional forms of analysis. 
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GERARDO MUÑOZ1 
The Democratic Horizon of 
Emancipation: Interview with Maristella 
Svampa on the Crisis of the Progressive 
Cycle in Latin America2 
Maristella Svampa is a sociologist and researcher at CONICET (National Technical and 
Scientific Research Council) at the University of La Plata. She is the author of a dozen 
books that have had a significant impact on the academic and public discussion of regional 
politics, social movements, and the function of the state in Latin America. Among her 
most recent books are Fifteen Myths and Realities of Transnational Mining in Argentina 
(Colectivo Ediciones Herramientas, 2011), Maldevelopment: Extractivism and Plunder 
in Argentina (co-written with Enrique Viale, Katz, 2014), and Latin American Debates: 
Indianism, Development, Dependency, and Populism (Edhasa, 2016). Over the course of 
rstand the 
progressive actors of the region, as well as an inquiry into the geopolitical configuration at 
the intersection of state form and transnational capital. Her well-known thesis of the 
Americanist thought of 
this decade, expanding the analytical frameworks through which we understand the so-
called Latin American Pink Tide, that is, the series of progressive governments that came 
                                                          
1 GERARDO MUÑOZ is a fourth year PhD student in Latin American literature at Princeton University. His 
explores cases of fractured hegemony and political principles. He is a member of the Infrapolitical 
Deconstruction academic collective (www.infrapolitica.wordpress.com). 
2 This interview was originally published in Spanish on the digital magazine Fronterad and can be found in 
http://www.fronterad.com/?q=maristella-svampa-y-crisis-ciclo-progresista-en-latinoamerica. It has been 
translated by Anne Freeland and was published in http://www.alternautas.net/blog/2016/6/21/the-
democratic-horizon-of-emancipation-interview-with-maristella-svampa-on-the-crisis-of-the-progressive-
cycle-in-latin-america on June 21st, 2016. 
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to power following the election of Hugo Chávez in 1999. Her analysis of the new forms 
of extractivism (mega-mining, fracking, and deforestation, among others) constitutive of 
the current processes of accumulation has shed light on the internal workings of the 
redistributive policies of these states and their development models. In this interview, 
Svampa takes up some of the questions that have been central to her work in light of the 
so-
the decline of the progressive governments with the electoral defeat of Cristina Fernández 
de Kirchner in Argentina, the succession of Nicolás Maduro in Venezuela, and Evo 
Morales to run for a fourth term was reje
reflection is oriented toward a horizon of radical democracy against all 
identitarianisms
otherwise. 
GM: How do you see the exhaustion of the cycle of progressive governments in 
light of the resounding electoral victory of Mauricio Macri in the recent election 
rise 
Brazil, Ecuador, and Venezuela? 
 Argentina. Between 
2000 and 2015, a lot has happened in Latin America. Over the course of these fifteen 
years, the different progressive governments went from being considered a new Latin 
American left, arousing keen expectations of political change, to being understood in 
terms of a twenty-first century populism. In the passage from one conceptualization 
to the other, something important was lost, there was a sense of abandonment, the 
loss of an emancipatory dimension of politics and the evolution towards traditional 
forms of domination, based on personality cults and the identification of the leader 
with the state. 
hing to erode the legitimacy of 
the progressive governments. We know they have. But I think the possibility of the 
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rise of a new right is due largely to the mistakes and excesses of the progressive 
governments, which have been emphasizing their least pluralistic, most populist 
dimension, evident in the concentration of power in the executive and in their clear 
intolerance of dissent. 
On the other hand, the extractivist model has shown its limitations in the context of 
a sharp decline in international commodity prices (some have called it the end of the 
2013), but 
also to have thrown these countries into an ever-deepening economic crisis, 
demonstrating the inability of these governments to transform the productive 
models, their dependency upon and consolidation of a primary product export 
model. It has also shown the volatility of the success of this model, with rising poverty 
and the disaffection of the middle classes. 
If we look at the Argentine case, there was no indisputable triumph of the right. 
Macri won by a small margin, and he was as surprised as anyone at the results of the 
first round, which led to the ballotage (the second electoral round). In fact, 
Kirchnerism was the architect of its own defeat. We must keep in mind that 
Kirchnerism had long ceased to be a center-left phenomenon, even if it enjoyed a 
quasi-monopoly of that space over the past decade, and this surely explains part of 
the exhaustion of a society in the face of the dramatization and polarization of politics 
that Kirchnerism exacerbated. Its support for the candidacy of the many-faced Aníbal 
Fernández (accused of having ties to drug trafficking), dismissing the claims of his 
progressivism.3 So there were many factors: corruption and enrichment of the 
governing class, including the presidential family and the vice president, crony 
                                                          
3 Jorge Lanata presentó un informe 
que vincula a Aníbal Fernández con el narcotráfico. 
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capitalism (known as capitalism among friends), sustained inflation since 2007, and a 
significant deterioration of the economy.4 
GM: How do you see the emergence of Cambiemos-PRO and Macri on the 
Argentine political scene? Are we witnessing a rearrangement of certain 
economic policies of Kirchnerism, or is it simply a neoconservative restoration? 
Or maybe a combination of the two? 
MS: The new Macri government represents a break, but also some continuities with 
the previous government. I will discuss only some of them. To begin with, we have 
the ideological break: as of December 10th of 2015, Argentina ceased to be governed 
by a regime identified with an intense populism, based on the concentration of 
-leadership; the new regime is one 
of right- -
pro-business, but one that is prepared to work to build its political base, and 
understands politics in terms of management and marketing.5 
the nineties. I have no doubt that this will lead to greater social inequality, but this 
also depends on the limits that Argentine society imposes on the new government. 
Public sector layoffs, spiraling inflation both pre- and post-devaluation, pro-business 
measures, the exorbitant increase in utility prices, and a weak social agenda, testify to 
a government that tends to focus on a single sphere, and not that of the majority. 
On the other hand, we must not forget that we live in a different society than we did 
two decades ago, and this is clear in the capacity for social protest and the expanded 
language of rights. All this suggests that there should be little room for such a 
of variable parameters, oscillating between, on the one hand, a less state-centered 
developmentalism and a recognition of the importance of the social, and, on the other 
                                                          
4 
Maldevelopment. 
5 
El arte de ganar: Cómo usar el ataque en campañas electorales exitosas (Debate, 2011). 
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hand, a post-nineties neoliberalism, in the style of the former Chilean president 
on between the 
one and the other will play out, which of the two tendencies will prevail, but the first 
-
centered developmentalist neoliberalism. 
On the other hand, there is a continuity with Kirchnerism with respect to 
extractivism mega-mining (the government has already announced the elimination 
of mining taxes), fracking, land-
appointment of CEOs to various ministries has caused considerable alarm, and 
these communities have forgotten the recent past. After all, Miguel Galuccio, the 
CEO of YPF, came from a major multinational company almost on the scale of Shell 
and the Kirchnerist minister of mining, Jorge Mayoral, is associated with firms that 
supplied Barrick Gold. Kirchnerism was particularly effective in consolidating a 
powerful business community, although it availed itself of a language of political 
mediations and a narrative of heroic progressivism, and could count on the complicit 
and further extractivism, so we will very likely see new situations of repression and 
disregard for democracy.6 
GM: Two recent books  Neoliberal Reason: Baroque Economies 
and Popular Pragmatics (Tinta Limón, 2015) and your Maldevelopment: 
Extractivism and Plunder in Argentina (Katz, 2014) (with Enrique Viale), expose 
the limits of the economic model of redistributive policies coupled with the 
The Other Side of the 
Popular: Neoliberalism and Subalternity in Latin America (Duke University 
Press, 2002). This economic model seems to consist of complex registers that 
function simultaneously at the macro and micro levels, that negotiate inclusion 
in the sphere of consumption and more global models of extractivism. How 
                                                          
6 Maristella Svampa. Estruendos en la mina. Revista Ñ, February 22, 2016. 
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at the moment? How do you understand the relationship between consumption 
and accumulation in the popular processes in the region in the past years of 
progressivism? 
of commodification of nature and of social life is associated with certain social 
paradigms and imaginaries of consumption. That is, they contribute to the 
consolidation of a way of life, that which is currently hegemonic, grounded in certain 
ideas of progress that permeate our language, our practices, our everyday life; how we 
conceive of quality of life, the good life, and social development. Ulrich Brand speaks 
imperial toward nature and in its social relations and that is in no way democratic, in 
that it does not question any form of domination. The imperial way of life does not 
simply refer to a lifestyle practiced in different social milieus, but to imperial models 
of production, distribution, and consumption, cultural imaginaries and subjectivities 
strongly rooted in the everyday practices of the majority in the north, but also, 
incr  
In this sense, the progressive regimes have not been very innovative with respect to 
the models of consumption, because they have stimulated the model of the 
consumer-citizen or of inclusion through consumption, rather than a model of 
citizenship based on rights. This is not what happened in the seventies and the 
beginning of the eighties, when part of the Latin American left, despite being rather 
indifferent to environmental issues, thought 
the universalization of the model of consumption of the societies of the north, which, 
in its expansion toward the richest sectors of the societies of the south, not only 
implied increased concentration of privilege and wealth, but also constituted an 
unsustainable development model. I want to underscore this because today the 
progressive governments are far from questioning consumption; they glorify it. I 
remember in 2015, Cristina Fernández de Kirchner boasted that the Argentines were 
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7 We are moving away from the association 
of Coca-Cola with the United States, a country in which there is a campaign against 
the consumption of soft drinks as a cause of obesity. Latin America is an emerging 
market for a lot of products, which become aspirational symbols, something that the 
various governments encourage while simultaneously availing themselves of an 
antisystemic rhetoric. 
Much of the prominence of the notion of development is due to the fact that the 
models of consumption associated with the hegemonic model permeate the entire 
necessity of 
bringing about cultural change with respect to consumption and the environment, 
based on a different theory of social needs and the relationship with nature. The 
correspondence between the models of production and consumption, the 
generalizati
different struggles (social and environmental, urban and rural, for example), and their 
respective emancipatory languages, notoriously more difficult. 
GM: Along with the crisis of the progressive cycle we see an explicit return of 
the politico-theological. In what way do you think Pope Francis affects the 
current Latin American map? There are some who think that there could be an 
alliance with a certain Franciscanism as a new contentious force in the 
international arena. This is the argument that Gianni Vattimo made at the 
Forum for Emancipation and Equality in Buenos Aires, where he predicted that 
the Vatican would become a Fourth Communist International.8 What do you 
think are the limits of such an alliance? 
level of complexity to the current Latin American configuration, but I think the 
                                                          
7 Diego Valeriano. Consumamos, lo demás no importa nada. 
8 Forum for Emancipation and Equality, here: 
https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=oRBcrromnDE  
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importance of his role in Europe is exaggerated. And this exaggeration has less to do 
with the Latin American reality and much more to do with a certain ideological 
vacuum in Europe, beyond the promising leftist movements, like that which has 
emerged in Spain. In Latin America, despite the crisis of the progressive movements, 
there is no such vacu
organizations and social movements, which have contributed and continue to 
contribute to the emergence of a new language of valorization (of the land, of nature) 
and a new political grammar. 
On the other hand, Latin American societies are very religious, but Catholicism has 
lost ground to evangelical churches whose conservative and reactionary character is 
alarming, and which are beginning to occupy political positions (as a parliamentary 
bloc in Brazil, or a sector within the Movement Toward Socialism in Bolivia, or in 
the context of indigenous organizations aligned with the government, as in Ecuador). 
Francis is a relevant figure and his new encyclical, Laudato Si, is critical of the 
extractivism of the current governments, whether of the right or of the left, and is 
surely a source of support for social and environmental organizations. But his 
environmental preaching has found little resonance in the current governments. 
GM: Bolivia seems to be one of the countries on the Latin American political 
in the referendum to authorize another presidential term). But to what point is 
the hegemonic communitarian horizon proclaimed by vice president Álvaro 
García Linera himself over the years in his public speeches, and published on 
the website of the Vice Presidency of the Plurinational State9 sustainable in 
the context of extractivism or internal domination within the logic of 
hegemony? 
social power in a country where the indigenous majority has historically been 
                                                          
9 See Geopolítica de la amazonia (2012) and Socialismo comunitario: un horizonte de época (2015). 
Vicepresidencia del Estado Plurinacional de Bolivia. 
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been easy; in its early years it had to contend with regional oligarchies that threatened 
the new constitution of the Plurinational State was approved, and thus a new stage 
began, with the growing hegemony of the Movement Toward Socialism (MAS) and 
characterized by its redistributive programs, a new agrarian reform, economic growth 
and stability, and the strategic nationalization of certain companies, along with the 
escalation of natural gas extraction and agribusiness.  
But conflicts like the one with the TIPNIS (Indigenous Territory of Isidoro Secure 
National Park) over the construction of a highway without due consultation with the 
indigenous populations reconfigured the political scene, unmasking the real politics 
of the government, beyond its eco-communitarian discourse in defense of 
Pachamama. The indigenist and most autonomist wing of the government thus 
succumbed to the more statist wing, increasingly oriented towards a traditionally 
populist form of domination. Vice president Álvaro García Linera who during the 
that conflated the leftist NGOs and dissenting indigenous groups with international 
organizations
the intellectual collective Grupo Comuna) would say, after TIPNIS, nothing was the 
same again in Bolivia.10 In the past few years the ruling party has increasingly 
displaced oppositional indigenous organizations (marginalizing dissenters and 
creating power structures recognized by the state), silenced critical journalists by 
cutting off public support, and generated a growing process of self-censorship in the 
non-official press; and finally, the threat to expel the critical and leftist NGOs, for 
which the government wrote a new law for disciplinary purposes. 
It is in the framework of this attempt to close off channels of expression that the 
                                                          
10 Luis Tapia. El Leviatán criollo. La Paz: Autodeterminación Ediciones, 2014. 
1 5 1  |  A L T E R N A U T A S  3  ( 1 )   J U L Y  2 0 1 6  
government launched its proposal to renew the term of the presidential ticket, which 
has just been rejected in a referendum (with 51.56% against and 48.44% in favor), 
in a context in which the political opposition is weak and fragmented (despite 
11 
Moreover, the concentration of power forecloses the possibility of an emergence of a 
new political leadership from below. If the government had won the referendum, Evo 
Morales and García Linera would have been permitted to remain in power for twenty 
consecutive years. Only ten years ago, these same leaders would have vehemently 
opposed any other political figure or party that attempted to perpetuate its rule in 
this way, and yet today, they can unabashedly claim that only the renewal of their 
own mandate can guarantee the continuation of the process of change within the 
framework of a popular government and prevent the dreaded return of the right. 
The topic of reelection is not a new one in the Latin American conjuncture and has 
been a source of social polarization. In 2013, Cristina Fernández de Kirchner flirted 
with the possibility but found that there was too much social opposition. In Ecuador, 
Rafael Correa also had to renounce the prospect of reelection after a year of conflict 
with both the right and the left in 2015. To my knowledge, the only ones who 
succeeded in authorizing indefinite reelection were Hugo Chávez, in 2009, in his 
second attempt, and the Sandinista Daniel Ortega in Nicaragua, whose government 
is unequivocally authoritarian. These governments, despite their differences, 
represent a process of concentration of executive power in a hyper-presidential 
framework and ultimately represent a messianic historical narrative, because they 
believe that historical change is effected by a leader and not by a change in the 
correlation of social forces.12 
In my opinion, we do no service to the Latin American left by leaving these problems 
to the political right. Neither the defense of freedoms nor the critique of the 
                                                          
11 Official results here: http://52.86.73.107:55  
12 Maristella Svampa. La sociedad excluyente: la Argentina bajo el signo del neoliberalismo. Buenos Aires: 
Taurus, 2005. 
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concentration of power is the ideological property of the right. Moreover, in line with 
what Roberto 
of popular participation and the concentration of power can go hand in hand.13 And 
reelection is clearly a move towards the concentration of power. Finally, it is precisely 
the most vulnerable sectors and those on the left who are the victims of the recurrent 
closures of political spaces and violations of human rights. In sum, returning to 
the region, it is today an exemplary case that is putting the critical intelligence of the 
various Latin American lefts to the test. 
GM: Critical Latin Americanist discourses (produced within and outside of 
 
positions itself at once against the institutional verticality of the state and 
against the charismatic process of populism. But the discourse of the common 
or the communal is also installed within the rhetoric of some of these states 
(such as the Venezuelan or the Bolivian).14 To what extent can the 
communitarian (identitarian) be a democratic horizon of emancipation? 
MS: Concepts in the process of their construction tend to be disputed concepts. So 
there is a symbolic debate around the new horizon of concepts and a risk of their 
to concepts like that 
World Bank and the neoliberal governments. This is occurring today not only with 
                                                          
13 Roberto Gargarella. La sala de máquinas de la Constitución: dos siglos de constitucionalismo en América 
Latina (1810-2010). Buenos Aires: Katz, 2014. 
14 Three major works on the so-called communitarian turn in Latin America: Dispersar el poder: los 
movimientos sociales como poderes antiestatales (Ediciones desde abajo, 2007) by Raúl Zibechi; Los ritmos 
del Pachakuti: movilización y levantamiento popular-indígena en Bolivia (Tinta Limón, 2008) by Raquel 
Gutiérrez Aguilar; and -populares en tensión 
y la reconstitución de la dominación en la Bolivia del MAS (SOCEE/Autodeterminación, 2015) by Huáscar 
Salazar Lohman. 
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buen vivir, installed within the 
governmental rhetoric in countries like Ecuador and Bolivia, and to a lesser extent in 
Venezuela.15 Both likewise appear in the pro-establishment rhetoric of certain 
international organizations. 
Beyond the debates, it should be emphasized that the grammar of the common 
appears as an element of convergence between the countries of the north and those 
of the south. But the nuances must also be emphasized: while in the countries of the 
north the grammar of the common is oriented toward the public, that is, against 
policies of adjustment and privatization (against neoliberalism), against the 
appropriation of knowledge, the new economy of knowledge (cognitive capitalism 
and its forms of appropriation), and only more recently against extractivism 
(particularly against fracking), in our peripheral countries, the common is opposed 
rather to the various forms of developmentalist neoextractivism, which include land 
grabs, privatization of seeds, and overexploitation of natural resources as a whole. 
From a perspective consonant with the reality of Latin America, the Belgian François 
Houtart associates common goods with the common good of humanity, in the most 
general sense, which implies the foundations of the collective life of humanity on the 
planet: the relation to nature, the production of life, collective organization (politics), 
result of all the different aspects of the life of human beings, of men and women, on 
the earth.16 The Common Good of Humanity as a democratic horizon of 
emancipation refers to the defense and reproduction of life, which are threatened 
today. Its potentiality, within the framework of the current civilizational and 
environmental crisis, is huge. 
GM: Lastly, in Maldevelopment you reflect on the role of women in relation to 
forms of resistance that are not domesticated by state power, but expressed 
                                                          
15 Plurinacionalidad y Vivir Bien/Buen Vivir: dos conceptos leídos desde 
Bolivia y Ecuador post-constituyente (Ediciones Abya-Yale, 2015), by Salvador Schavelzon. 
16 common goods to the . HAOL, No. 26, Otoño, 87 102. 
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within a logic of s
underscore the role of popular feminisms in the emergence of a pro-communal 
ethos, especially those visions tied to feminist economy and eco-feminism, 
based on an ethic of care and values like r 17 
Do you think that feminisms and these new struggles for the commons reappear 
now at the center of the agenda in the face of the exhaustion of state 
progressivism? 
er of the agenda with the 
crisis of progressivism. We must not forget that these progressivisms have absorbed 
part of the creative energy of the various social movements and organizations, which 
they rewarded with certain policies, but while taking away their autonomy, in the 
sense of lessening their capacity to determine an agenda, a political agenda 
independent of the government. 
Of course, there are a number of territorial, socio-environmental, indigenous, and 
feminist struggles that through their persistence, their insistence on the protection 
and reproduction of life, on the quest for a non-exploitative relation to nature, from 
a perspective that emphasizes eco-dependence, open up new relational ontologies, 
that question dualistic and hierarchical views, that appear independently of the 
market and the state. But the danger is that, in the face of the failure of state 
progressivism and the loss of power of the social organizations and movements that 
are organically linked to these states, a disenchantment will spread and the new 
grammar of life, of the common, based on the principles of complementarity and 
reciprocity, will be considered unrealistic. We know that it is necessary to recreate 
the very idea of a pluralistic, democratic, emancipatory project of the left, but this is 
not the same task today as it was fifteen years ago. The experience of the progressive 
governments has opened many wounds, not only in the social movements and 
organizations but also in Latin American critical thought. 
 
 
                                                          
17 Maristella Svampa, Maldesarrollo. 398.  
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A BOOK REVIEW by MICHELA RUSSO1 
On the Imaginaries of Crisis 2 
Review of Ticio Escobar, Imagen e intemperie: las tribulaciones del arte en los tiempos 
del mercado total. Madrid: Capital Intelectual, 2015. 
Imagen e interperie: las tribulaciones del arte en los tiempos del mercado total3 is a 
collection of five essays and an interview, written during the past ten years by Ticio 
Escobar, one of the most distinguished figures of the contemporary cultural, and 
political, panorama in Latin America on the question of art and representation.4 
Perhaps the most influential art critic in Paraguay, as well as a philosopher, lawyer, 
-2012), 
Ticio Escobar has been an attentive reader of different artistic practices at both the 
                                                          
1 MICHELA RUSSO is a Ph.D. Student and Graduate Assistant Teacher at the Department of Hispanic Studies 
at Texas A&M University. She studied Political and Theoretical Philosophy at SUM Institute, Naples (Italy). 
She is currently working in a dissertation on the politico-cultural imaginaries in contemporary Bolivia. 
2 This book review was originally published in http://www.alternautas.net/blog/2016/6/21/book-review-ticio-
escobar on June 21st, 2016. 
3 
the Time of Total Mar
meanings evoked by the original Spanish. Although at first glance there seems to be little difference between 
meaning derived by the use made in photography, which refers to the action of exposing a surface to light. 
́s  
Didi-  with which Ticio Escobar is in open conversation throughout this book , especially 
in his ́s, peuples figurants (2012), where the notion of exposure gets complicated precisely by 
the reference to light. Didi-Huberman, in turn, moves from Walter Benjamin  
references  the German 
philosopher writes on the cult value and the exhibition value of a given work of art (Illuminations, 2007). 
 
4 
respectively as 
́n de la distancia. The Invention of Distance. 
Cuatro Ensayos  Four Essays ́n: AICA Press / Fausto Ediciones, 2013). This bilingual publication was 
realized after the conferral to Ticio Escobar of the Premio AICA a la Contribución Distinguida a la Crítica de 
Arte during the 44th AICA (International Association of Art Critics) Congress in 2011 in Asunción, Paraguay. 
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local and global levels for decades, confronting questions posed by indigenous and 
popular art, crossed with a form of critique of mercantile-capitalist discourse. Among 
́n de las artes 
visuales en el Paraguay (1982), where Escobar began delineating, in the light of the 
Enlightenment definition of art, the question posed by different forms of popular 
production, whose imageries have been so vividly present within the cultural texture 
of the region. El mito del arte y el mito del Pueblo: cuestiones sobre arte popular (1986), 
1989), pivots on the analysis 
La belleza de los otros (1993) engages with 
the notion of otherness. 
The work of Ticio Escobar, however, cannot be said to openly thematize what has 
 landscape 
in the past twenty years or so (Schavelzon 2016). Nor can Paraguay be said to have 
ural 
phenomenon, and its inchoate crisis, a review of his latest publication? 
-
Cold War cultural and political epochality, which incidentally coincided, in 
Paraguay, wit
that has seen, on a global scale, the rapid diffusion of a new world order characterized 
by a neoliberal definition of the political, the social, and, why not, the cultural, 
through the diffusion of open markets, new constitutionalism, and multicultural 
work in a larger geopolitical context appears more evident if we observe, as Patrick 
Iber does in his Neither Peace nor Freedom (2015) on cultural Cold War, that the 
signification of internal political conflicts and, thus, the meaning of the role played 
by intellectuals in Latin America at that time, was overdermined by the inscription 
writing in an epoch of transition but also a writing of transition. It is a writing during 
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the transition from dictatorship to democracy in Paraguay, but it is at once a writing 
overdetermined by the inscription into a global context, embracing questions central 
concerned with the intersection of the aesthetic and the political, may help us to 
of imagination: the manner in which we imagine is fundamentally a condition for 
the manner in which we do politics; politics cannot overlook the faculty of 
imagination, as Didi-Huberman argues, following Hannah Arendt. 
In this respect, it is important to mention that Escobar is also the founder and 
director of the Centro de Artes Visuales / Museo del Barro5 in the capital city of 
Asunción. The museum, instituted in the 80s, has played a central role in carrying 
on such discourses on popular, indigenous, and urban art, and conveying, among 
others, imaginaries that evoke a pluricultural and multiethnic Ibero-America national 
frame. Here, the exhibition of indigenous and popular art pieces is not organized 
following ethnographic, folkloric or historical semantics, but exclusively according to 
El Mito del Arte 8). The reflections on different artistic practices, 
the status and the role of image and the notion of art, together with the cultural 
initiatives promoted by the museum, have also been directed towards supporting and 
strengthening the fragile and tormented democratic process in the country. 
The creation, in the year 2000, of a parallel space named Espacio/Crítica, is crucial in 
this respect as a supplement to the expositive capacity of the museum, articulating a 
variety of intellectual practices. This space promotes workshops and discussions, 
research and publications, while hosting a series of seminars concerned with themes 
like Identidades en Tránsito [Identities in Transition], Estudios de Contingencia 
[Studies of Contingency], and, most recently, Imágenes Disruptivas [Disruptive 
Images].6 Escobar reminds us that, as Walter Benjamin noted, capitalism seems to be 
taking more time to change the cultural superstructure than the economic base, and 
it is precisely this discrepancy that allows the identification of revolutionary practices 
                                                          
5 For details on the Museo del Barro, see: http://www.museodelbarro.org 
6 http://espaciocritica.org 
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within the same superstructure (Imagen e Intemperie 51). Through his work and in 
and aesthetic practices cannot but play a decisive role within social and political 
processes of change. 
It shall not be taken as an overstatement, then, if we consider the book Imagen e 
intemperie 
work over the years and, for this same reason, as a contribution which somehow 
complements, or it is complemented by, the work of the museum. The 
problematization of the disruptive potential of images bridges both dimensions, 
especially when confronted with the fetishism of the image produced by the alliance 
between market, politics, and culture. 
The essays featured in the book can be grouped in two parts; first, Escobar enters into 
edge of the crisis of European modernity, both as a limit-experience or experience of 
the limit, such as Walter Benjamin, Martin Heidegger, Emmanuel Levinas, Michel 
Foucault, Jacques Derrida, and Roland Barthes.7 Second, we see an ongoing 
conversation with many of those contemporary thinkers who are the heirs of the post-
structuralist debates, like Jacques Rancière, Georges Didi-Huberman, or Slavoj 
maîtres of the crisis had involuntarily opened the way for 
recommencement. 
                                                          
7 Here, I would like to stress, en passant, the proximity between the ideas of crisis, limit, and critique, as 
theorized by Willy Thayer in ́as de la Crítica: entre Walter Benjamin y Gilles Deleuze (2010), which, 
art critique
conveys a constellat
selecting, but also excluding (22 24; 31 35). Both terms would, then, recall each other, while indicating the 
possibility of engaging with limit-experiences or experiences of the limit of signification(s) or within a given 
The critical moment  understandable both as a moment pertaining to the practice of criticism, and as grave 
and severe momentum  would be intimately intersecting and intersected by an instance of crisis. Escobar 
dwells on the question of limit as a form of indecidability between inclusion and exclusion, referring to 
ept of parergon. This figure enables us to think the frame of any given 
representation as something which is simultaneously both inside and outside, and neither outside nor inside 
the work of art, making the work of art the liminal dispositive par excellence. 
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Escobar sets out, then, from the affirmation of the crisis of art provoked by the loss 
of its autonomy, that is to say, the loss of the aura, the specificity of the work of art. 
Nevertheless, Escobar argues, we remain within the frame offered by the 
breach already 
 paragraphs point, as is well 
known, to the imbrication of aesthetics and politics, which is, in turn, a sort of subtext 
Imagen e intemperie, 
Escobar engages with a series of reflections on the question of representation, and in 
the second part on the relationship between art and ethics. 
The essays echo each other through a writing which is almost aphoristic, intermittent 
and fragmentary, and, I would say, necessarily incomplete, whose montage, or textual 
collage, to quote Marek Bartelik, president of AICA-international (International 
Association of Art Critics) (Escobar 2013), is visible only at the surface. This writing 
which is also the tragedy of language itself, that is to say, the promise, impossible to 
fulfill, to re-present what is, in fact, irremediably absent. In other words, this is the 
tragedy of the impossibility of reducing the distance between the sign and the object, 
where the sign announces the object but shows the image, and, similarly, between 
the subject  and its gaze  
ng 
, which, says 
Escobar, indicates nothing but the exclusivist nature of the work of art; its aristocratic 
origin, which considers the artist as a genius and sacralizes the work of art, drawing 
it apart from the masses; bourgeois individualism and authority over private property. 
The loss of the aura could have had, then, an eminently political potential and the 
reduction, or even the cancellation, of the distance between the work of art and the 
experience. The sacrifice of the autonomy of the work of art, that is to say, auratic 
distance and its cult value, had, thus, a progressive sense and a democratizing effect 
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(El mito del arte 18): the possibility for the work of art (and culture in general) to get 
closer to the masses. Technology and technical reproducibility, in principle 
antithetical to and incompatible with the notion of aura, may have represented the 
ideal way to evacuate such a process. However, and this is also the subject of the 
e 
cult value of art with an emancipatory politicization though modern technology, such 
a loss of autonomy actually meant the subjugation of art itself to objectives external 
to it. 
The expansion of technology altered the aesthetic experience, fracturing the 
autonomy of aesthetics and declaring the crisis of art, but at the same time it 
inaugurated a process of re-auratization through an exacerbation of what Escobar 
conveys artistic contents) in all the spheres of human life during the epoch of what 
Guy Debord had called the society of the spectacle
new aestheticism appeared in a market format; capitalism anticipated the avant-
gardes, took on infinite reproducibility, and removed distance and the autonomy of 
exhibition value, and the institution of a new concept of aura, that is to say, the 
- ́n de la distancia 240). At 
between the great art 
collective and social projects and the support of state politics, says Escobar, for any 
democratizing possibilities, awakening the emancipatory potential of any given 
situation, while looking for modalities of critical and creative appropriation of 
imaginaries (Imagen e Intemperie 62). 
However, the question is not, says Escobar, about dismantling the distinction 
between the erudite [culto] and the popular, but to consider it as contingent and 
provisory (El Mito del Arte 
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ambivalence towards the question of the aura, calling, as a practice of dissidence and 
disagreement, against the consumerism of the image, for a recuperation of the aura 
and that minimum distance between the image and the object necessary to enable 
the play of the gaze and the economy of desire while offering and at once subtracting 
the presence of the object itself. But how does one accomplish such a task without 
falling into idealist traditions and authoritarian privileges? Escobar goes back to 
popular and indigenous art, whose ritual forms surround bodies and objects with 
absence and invest them with the power of imageries, able to perturb and disturb 
everyday life (El Mito del arte 20).  
Escobar paganizes the aura and depicts a scene constituted now by a proliferation of 
auras, which are alternative auratic models, represented by certain indigenous 
forms of art, whose artistic practices had always occurred at the margins of modern 
Western art. According to the modern gaze, these practices were nothing but 
craftsmanship and folklore, committed to archaic rites and superstitions, and realized 
through rudimentary techniques: they did not comply with formal requisites of 
sense of the term (Imagen e Intemperie65 67). Nevertheless, there is something in the 
scene of the ritual representations that confers to bodies and things the auratic cult 
value, the unrepeatable manifestation of distance, the luminescent appearance of the 
aura. Whether it is the inscription in another order of signification or the execution 
of an aesthetic function, at stake is the production of a distance through the distortion 
f ́n de la distancia272), in a word, a secularization of the concept of 
Escobar wonders about the critical possibilities of artistic practice in a global context 
more and more marked by blends of pluricultural registers. 
Reviving the question of the transgressive vocation of art, the role of the avant-garde 
and, implicitly, its relationship with the political, Escobar maintains the need for a 
de-essentialization of figures like avant-gardism, emancipation and utopia, in order 
to consider them as hazardous historical products, and finally take responsibility for 
DOSSIER: The end of the Progressive Cycle | 162 
the challenges posed by any minoritarian -
strategy proposed by Deleuze and Guattari at the end of the 70s). This refers to what 
part of the book, dedicated to the question of representation. The title of this essay, 
which in th
an art installation by Osvaldo Salerno at the Museo de Artes Visuales in Santiago de 
Chile in 2005. In this work, the opening sides of a quadrangular window had been 
draped with tulle where the words Nandi Verá had been written with beeswax. Due 
to the porosity of the tulle, the wax, during the writing process, has passed into the 
other side. This image points to the porosity of the work of art, which, through the 
play of the gaze, and its constant displacement, opens to the possibility of the event, 
maintaining the space as Imagen e 
Intemperie 136). Here the question of otherness also emerges, and theUnheimlich 
inquietude it provokes, a 
This essay is followed by the second part of the book which, with 
with the relationship between ethics and art. According to Escobar, the ethical 
consists in being able to disturb the hegemonic imaginary order. Art will not solve 
historical conflicts, whether political, social, economic, but can offer a variety possible 
images, imaginaries and scenarios; it can provoke demands, activate desires (Imagen 
e intemperie 160 161). An interview in two parts conducted by Kevin Power, who 
was a poet, essayist, and art critic working with Spanish and Latin American 
contemporary art, and who also served as vice-
and Centro de Arte Reína Sofia, closes the collection. Here, the two converse on 
the political situation of Paraguay from the dictatorship to the transition to 
democracy, the collapse of a geopolitical order shaped by the Cold War and its bipolar 
imaginary, and the role art played in this context. 
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As I have already mentioned, Escobar works at the edge of that liminal zone where 
the political and the aesthetic enter a threshold of indecidability. I am convinced that 
his reflections on the question of art and image are absolutely crucial in order to think 
a newborn, although already tremendously ailing, geopolitical conjuncture, that is to 
exclusively national or state-driven discourse in order to see 
which nonetheless may open more punctual, interstitial or intermittent, even 
nomadic spaces disconnected from the ones limited or restricted to a party 
organization. That is to say, spaces which are possibilities in spite of all (Didi-
Huberman 2012), against the totality of the machine, its system and networks of 
significance; in other words, the ground of the hegemonic system that upholds all 
hegemony. 
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A POEM by ANDRÉS AJENS1 
ALLENDE, EVO, OVER2 
near the ekeko of alasitas, lord  
of wands, beyond, more-  
over the indio, false or ver-  
ified, in the words of silvia rivera,  
nobody voices over you, falsely    
or de-votedly, d evoted, evo,  
 
a miner, pastor, cocalero,  
so-called president. But  
whenever we evo-  
ke the indio, fishy or seal-  
ed in gold, an Andean metaphysics  
-  
 
a turn of phrase by jesús or silvia  
or the vice president or saenz but  
by denis arnold weaving  
aguayos with juan de dios  
yapita (1998), that Andean  
order of things which denis, lit-  
                                                          
1 ANDRÉS AJENS is a poet, essayist, and translator. He is the author of collection of essays La flor del extérmino 
(La Cebra, 2011), translated as Poetry After the Invention of América: Don't Light the Flower (Palgrave, 2011). 
His most recent poetry books are Bolivian Sea (Flying Islands, 2015), Æ (Das Kapital Ediciones, 2015), and 
Cúmulo lúcumo (3600). He is editor of the literary magazine Mar con soroche 
2 This poem was translated by Michelle Gil-Montero and was originally published in 
http://www.alternautas.net/blog/2016/8/12/allende-evo-over on August 8th , 2016. 
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igating and maybe just delit-  
erating jacques the ripper,  
like silvia, reiterates: metaphysics  
of the indio, authéntic  
or ináuthentic, the whole pro-  
 
the clause, before the de-constructed,  
 
 
alias chachawarmi: were we to  
translate that as mother-patria?  
but what is patria, now of all   
times, in bolivia, chachawarmi? mot-  
tled delinquent peeks, me-  
rely dominations? camba-colla  
unsurmountable ascent or boundless  
micro-loco-meddled disasters?  
the DEA will never get it (the CIA maybe  
a little in ñancahuazú, with pre-gale-force  
currencies, greening along the gorge) between  
shinahota, okinawa, san ignacio, fortuna,  
gabriela and ernesto fidel, morón,  
de los robles, cachuela  
esperanza and el loco all aboard  
if spilling over a bit,  
by leaps and bounds.  
              * * * 
like the devil etcheverry turning back to chapare  
like che on his way back from la higuera  
like uru murato, irohito, chipaya, and even mataco  
like mbói bebe and hans staden, what a liking   
for ink, kunumi letteredly illiterate   
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a graphophagus, pure at times, already mot-tled 
                * * * 
(oh, emma, how can we not burn el alto!) 
  
 
  
ALLENDE, EVO, aquende 
el ekeko de alasitas, señor  
de las varas, allende  
el indio, el falso como el ver-  
dadero al decir de silvia rivera,  
nadie habla aquí por ti, falso    
o vero; overo, evo,  
jamás lo habrás sido, antes  
minero, pastor, cocalero,  
dizque presidente. Pero  
cada vez que el indio entra  
en escena, el trucho  
como el salmonídeo, meta-  
física andina aletea; la  
 
giro de jesús ni de silvia  
ni del vice ni de saenz sino  
de denis arnold trenzando  
aguayos con juan de dios  
yapita (1998), tal orden  
andino de las cosas que denis, ley-  
endo y acaso nomás desleyendo  
a jacques el destripador,  
como silvia, reitera: metafísica  
del indio, del auténtico  
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como del inauténtico, todo el pro-  
 
de la cláusula, de la de-construida  
-  
 
alias chachawarmi; ¿fuéramos  
a traducir eso por patria-madre?  
¿qué fuera, pero, patria, y sobre todo  
hoy, en bolivia, chachawarmi? ¿a-  
bigarrados morosos entreveros, só-  
lo dominaciones?, ¿camba-colla  
insuperable ascensoría o inmensurables  
micro-loco-interferidos desastres?;  
la DEA jamás entendiera (la CIA acaso  
algo en ñancahuazú, con pre-venda-  
val verde en la quebrada) entre  
shinahota, okinawa, san ignacio, fortuna,  
gabriela y ernesto fidel, morón,  
de los robles, cachuela  
esperanza y el loco de borda  
desbordado apenas aquí,  
de vuelta en vuelta. 
              * * * 
como el diablo etcheverry de vuelta al chapare  
como el che de vuelta de la higuera  
como uru murato, irohito, chipaya, y aun mataco  
como mbói bebe y hans staden, qué  
manera de comer, kunumi tan letrado iletrado  
grafonófago puro a ratos, ya abigarrado 
                * * * 
(uy, emma, ¡cómo non quemar el alto!) 
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JON BEASLEY-MURRAY1 
Pyrrhic Victories: The Fall and Rise of 
the Left Turns2 
All victories are Pyrrhic, to a greater or lesser extent. That is, no victory is ever 
complete; victors always have to concede something to the vanquished. At the very 
least, for instance, those who emerge victorious from a political (or other) struggle 
either depend upon or, worse still, have to make do without the recognition on the 
part of the vanquished that they have indeed won. Either, that is, the losing side sign, 
metaphorically or otherwise, the equivalent of some kind of document of surrender, 
in which case they have retained the power to determine that the struggle is indeed 
at an end. And this retained power forces an acknowledgement, on the part of the 
winners, that their victory cannot be total even if the surrender is unconditional. Or, 
worse still, the losers do not sign such a document, either because they refuse to 
acknowledge defeat or because they will not or cannot acknowledge the victors and 
the legitimacy of their victory. In which case, symbolically and perhaps not just 
symbolically, the struggle continues and victory remains elusive for the victors. All 
the foundation of much postcolonial theory: either the master (the colonizer, would-
be hegemon) depends upon recognition from the slave (the colonized, would-be 
subaltern). Or, worse still, something escapes and he has to make do without it. And 
in fact something always escapes, which leads to the frustration of any and every 
project for hegemony, stuck between the demand for recognition, which would be a 
                                                          
1 JON BEASLEY-MURRAY is Associate Professor of Latin American Studies at the University of British 
Columbia. 
2 This article was originally published in http://www.alternautas.net/blog/2016/8/12/pyrrhic-victories-the-fall-
and-rise-of-the-left-turns on August 8th, 2016. 
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form of defeat in any case, and the reality of its withdrawal, its stubborn subaltern 
betrayal, which makes even that defeat elusive. 
None of which is to say there are not in fact winners and losers, that (say) by some 
kind of postcolonial ruse the colonized emerge victorious from the violent clash that 
is colonial rule, whether that be thanks to their mastery of mimicry, their 
destabilization of the signs of power, or some similar conceptual subterfuge. No. 
Pyrrhic victories are still victories. The toll they take on the vanquished is always 
worse than the toll taken on the victors, at least in the short run. (And by contrast in 
the long run, a all 3. But the point 
is that the winning side is always frustrated by the means by which it wins: it 
desperately wants a hegemony that is forever unattainable. For the outcome of any 
struggle is always only determined posthegemonically. 
American Left won, in some not insignificant sense. From Venezuela to Argentina, 
Bolivia to Brazil, it took over the levers of state power, which is nothing to be sniffed 
at. Taking advantage of this victory, as well as of other contingencies such as a 
favorable geopolitical climate, the exhaustion of their immediate enemies, and an 
unanticipated commodities boom, left-leaning governments of different stripes have 
had almost unprecedented freedom to experiment with a variety of progressive 
political, economic, and social solutions to some (at least) of the problems that have 
long ailed the region. They helped write new constitutions that threatened 
dramatically to improve participation and do away with some of the entrenched 
hierarchies of the creole republics. They ploughed money into diverse schemes to 
alleviate poverty, reduce inequality, and improve public services for those who most 
need them. And they presided over a series of reforms that increased the visibility and 
improved the social and legal rights of women, gays and lesbians, indigenous peoples, 
and others who have historically been marginalized and oppressed. In other words, 
there is no point denying that the Left Turns have indeed constituted an almost 
unprecedented achievement on the part of the Latin American Left, even at the same 
                                                          
3 Cited in Vincent Barnett, John Maynard Keynes (London: Routledge, 2013), 153. 
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time we insist that they did not go far enough, that in some way they could never 
have gone far enough. 
But equally, we can take it as given that nothing in these victories depended on 
hegemony, the more frustrated they were bound to become. But the fact that they 
ultimately (or even initially) failed to become hegemonic is not in itself the marker 
or symptom, let alone the cause, of their downfall. Rather, defeat was already 
inscribed in the moment of their triumph: in the ways in which they were more or 
less forced, upon assuming state power, to turn against the movements that 
established them in that power, and to find that (reciprocally) those movements then 
sooner or later abandoned them and escaped the scene. Or in the ways in which, as a 
condition of gaining state sovereignty, they had to bear the burden of renewing or 
sustaining a social pact that was always fictive and perpetually in crisis, and as such 
they had to do the dirty work for which their bourgeois opponents were no longer fit 
for purpose. And perhaps most damagingly, at least in the short to medium turn, in 
the ways in which as a result they became increasingly dependent on the elusive 
powers of sovereignty itself, and so became fixated on charismatic leaders that soon 
outstayed their welcome and misread the true sources of whatever power they had 
indeed won. 
In turn, however, the various recent victories of an insurgent Right, achieved in very 
disparate circumstances (from impeachment in Brazil to electoral victory in Argentina 
to, say, internal drift in Uruguay) are also in some way Pyrrhic, conceding something 
to the forces that they replace. So the apparent defeat of the Left across the region
is far from ushering in 
some kind of posthegemonic age, let alone the renewed hegemony of the Right. After 
crises and transitions, from Caracas to Montevideo, Brasilia to Buenos Aires, does 
offer an opportunity to draw up a balance of forces, of victories in defeats and defeats 
in victories on all sides. It allows an assessment of what the Left has achieved, and the 
multiple ways in which the struggle (as always) continues. 
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The Left Turns won, in the first place, because they capitalized on a striking series of 
Caracazo 
of 1989 and include also the water and gas wars in Bolivia 
Caracazo, for instance. If 
anything, coming so soon after the triumphant inauguration of Carlos Andrés Pérez 
as Venezuelan president in the wake of elections that had been substantially free and 
fair (and attracted a turnout of over 80% of the electorate), the riots of February 1989 
might better be described as antidemocratic. Or rather, as with the subsequent so-
called Argentinazo 
gap between politics per se (democratic or otherwise) and existence itself that Alberto 
Moreiras, among others, conceptualizes in terms of infrapolitics.4 For what was most 
striking about the majority of these protests was the way in which they simply did 
not fit within any conventional notion of the political, and did not appear to be the 
expression of any recognized (or recognizable) political actor. And yet they exerted 
immense pressure upon political processes, not least on the fiction of a social pact 
upon which the political compact depended--in Venezuela quite literally, as the 
Caracazo 
of these various mobilizations was just as striking elsewhere. They forced a 
reimagining of the political and as such (and Hugo Chávez himself was one of the 
first to realize this) expressed a constituent power, a desire to re-found the political 
on new bases. But in each case, a kind of latency period followed the protests before 
any political organization or party could emerge or reconfigure themselves so as to 
capture this constituent energy, thus demonstrating that the mobilizations themselves 
were indeed not political in any meaningful sense of the term. It fell to the Left to re-
cast them in political terms, by means of a constituent process that then created the 
                                                          
4 
́ ́gü ́ ́s,  
trans. Jaime Rodríguez Matos with Sam Steinberg and Alberto Moreiras, Transmodernity 5.1 (2015), 142-158. 
Also, the publicat  
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social identities and actors upon which the new regimes could base their own 
legitimacy. 
A similar process had taken place before, of course, in the ructions at the end of the 
nineteenth century and the beginning of the twentieth that led to the rise of populist 
regimes in much of the region. So it is no surprise that left-turn governments were 
continually characterized (for good or ill) as populist in one way or another. But the 
term is misleading, not least because it implies that they were little more than a 
throwback to some previous political form. In fact, however, the Left Turn was 
distinctly post-neoliberal, in that it involved attempts to deal or reconcile with 
specific problems (but also opportunities) that neoliberalism had put on the agenda. 
For the infrapolitical revolt was largely a response to the increasing colonization of 
everyday life and ordinary habits by political or commercial interests that is a feature 
of the neoliberal age. Remember that the Caracazo started as a protest against the rise 
in bus fares for commuters; the Cochabamba water war concerned the most basic of 
natural resources. In short, these were revolts against a particular form of biopolitics. 
The regimes that followed the revolts then had to negotiate with this new biopolitical 
horizon, whether by confronting (or allying with) more expansive forms of 
extraction, by adopting ever more immanent modes of communication and 
governance that tended to bypass established institutions, or by promoting a drastic 
enlargement of the domain of political conceptualization, attributing rights for 
instance to the natural environment. In this context, the rise to prominence of a 
buen vivir
biopolitics, in that it is a recasting of the relationship between politics and life itself 
that would have been inconceivable in any preceding, populist, era. 
In other words, the Left Turns did not so much oppose or roll back the innovations 
in politics and economics that go by the name of neoliberalism, as instead build on 
and extend them, albeit in new, unforeseen directions. On the one hand, then, many 
left-wing governments of the past decade and a half have shown remarkable reverence 
for markets, including the stock markets. This led to a certain timidity in economic 
policy, visible perhaps above all in Brazil, but elsewhere, too. For all the desires for 
Socialism inscribed in left-
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attempt to transform the mode of production. This was true even in a country such 
as Argentina, where small but symbolically significant steps had been taken in that 
direction in the fall-out of the 2001 disturbances, for instance by workers at the 
the state. So it is unsurprising if in many cases (again, perhaps particularly in Brazil, 
as Salvador Schavelzon notes) the Left in power continued with many of the 
economic policies that they had inherited. 
On the other hand, they introduced new programs (the bolsa familia, for instance) 
that sought more equitable ways to redistribute capital surpluses. Moreover, and in 
contrast to the populist developmentalist regimes of the 1940s and 1950s, on the 
whole the governments of the Left Turns spurned protectionism and Import 
Substitution Industrialization, instead embracing transnationalism but putting it to 
political, and social integration. Consistently, then, rather than refusing or negating 
-wing governments 
modify its logic and produce 
 
In short, the Left Turns were built on two foundations: an infrapolitical revolt, 
manifested in social protests and mobilizations; and habits of thought and behavior 
bequeathed by neoliberalism. These two elements coexisted, in more or less uneasy 
synchrony, paradoxically presided over by a reinvigorated state that in principle they 
both opposed. And as became clear, for example when indigenous protests threatened 
infrastructure construction that would benefit hydrocarbon extraction in Bolivia, 
when forced to choose ultimately the state would always favor free trade from which 
it could reap rents and secure its own precarious position. 
At the heart of any reflection on the legacy of the Left Turns has then to be an analysis 
-
1 7 5  |  A L T E R N A U T A S  3  ( 1 )   J U L Y  2 0 1 6  
state may be weak by comparison to the military regime that first imposed so-called 
in part thanks to its renewed capacity to recast popular protests in political terms, 
ial movements 
like a hegemonic project, with its characterization of politics in ter
the old dichotomy of coercion and/or consent Gerardo 
Muñoz hints at the more properly posthegemonic workings both of the marea rosada 
opular 
cultures of identification and subjective desires that are no longer the monopoly of 
 
continuity of dispositions and customs, that have little to do with ideology (and 
which indeed can be paired with very diverse ideological discourses), upon which the 
Left Turns and their successors both build. The state then benefits from and acts 
these ingrained habits. 
This image of the state as the conductor of a variegated and diverse orchestra, 
wielding little more than the symbolic power of the baton to maintain a specific 
tempo and ensure resonance and (relative) harmony between very distinct forms of 
activity and expression, all of which are the fruit of long training and practice, is 
probably as good a picture as any of a posthegemonic form of leadership in which 
neither coercion nor consent are strictly at issue. (Pierre Bourdieu similarly liked to 
use images drawn from sport to illustrate the workings of the habitus and to disrupt 
the age-old debate about structure versus agency.5 With the rise of the New Right, 
we may see (or hear) rather different rhythms less of the frenetic bombast of a Hugo 
Chávez, for instance, with his injunctions for constant mobilization but the basic 
                                                          
5 
materializes at just the place the ball is about to fall, as if the ball were in command of him--but by that very 
In Other Words: Essays Towards a Reflexive Sociology, 
trans. Matthew Adamson (Stanford: Stanford University Press, 1990), 63. 
DOSSIER: The end of the Progressive Cycle | 176 
principle of a state that seeks not to overwhelm but to orchestrate will no doubt 
remain in place. This is perhaps a literalization of the frequently-noted confusion of 
politics with entertainment, already anticipated to some extent in (what John 
Kraniauskas has called) Eva-Peronism, but whose latest apogee is surely Donald 
 the United States presidential elections.6  
-
second and more quickly still, identitarianism. What is common to an orchestra has 
little to nothing to do with the identities of those constituting it, however much they 
are fully invested and embodied in the collective. An orchestra is a machinic 
arrangement that has very disparate parts: brass and strings; French horns and 
cymbals; musicians at least notionally from very diverse backgrounds. What they have 
in common, beyond certain habits and experience, is a score and a mode of attention 
directed to the conductor. None of this depends upon identity. Hence what I think 
is an element of miscommunication in the interview between Muñoz and Maristella 
rizon 
wonder that Svampa should wish to go more slowly, to re-open the conversation: 
is a s
At the same time, in turn Svampa moves too quickly in her eagerness (following 
the common good of humanity, 
in the most general 
Muñoz and Svampa seem to agree) has been the shift to the common or commons 
as one of the key areas for political debate, conflict, and strategy, then their current 
decline, and the rise of a New Right that seeks now to inhabit this very same terrain, 
                                                          
6 4. "From the point of view of Eva Perón, the Peronist state may be approached as a peculiar combination of 
tactics and entertainment, in which, on the one hand, the military institution met a working class in the process 
of (Peronist) re-organisation and, on the other, the exercise of state power passed through the formats of the 
-Revolution: El fiord and the Eva- Angelaki 6.1 
(April 2001), 147. Obviously, the key difference between Eva-Peronism and Trumpism is that it is business 
(specifically, property development) that takes the place of the military in this equation. 
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shows that there is nothing necessarily progressive or noble about the concept. In this 
sense, the better comparison is not between the commons and communitarianism 
but more simply with community. The weakness or blindspot of communitarians is 
that they believe all communities, intrinsically, to be of value. But (to put it most 
bluntly) everybody knows that some communities are better than others. 
Some, perhaps most, communities are exclusionary in one way or another. They can 
be violent both towards other communities and towards those who have no 
community, as well as imposing various forms of internal hierarchy and oppression 
on their own members. In other words, there is no particular normative dimension 
to community. And perhaps we should say exactly the same thing about the 
commons. It is not unusual to see the common (or the commons) praised for some 
inherent virtue it is assumed to possess. But surely this is but a legacy of the fact that 
the initial stages of capitalism involved the enclosure and privatization of common 
recognize that some commons are better than others. The so-
for instance, or indeed any other endemic disease, is common, and yet hardly to be 
desired. And there are plenty of instances of common resources and the networks 
structured around them that are rightly denigrated: these days, for instance, the 
characteristic of decentralized Islamic terror is that it is organized around just such 
common sites of information and inflammation that any would-be jihadi can access. 
Or (to take another extreme) the databases and image collections of paedophile 
named individual. So we may want to fight to expand and preserve the commons, 
but not all commons, or not all equally. 
No doubt it would be nice to live in a world with more certainties. A world in which 
there were straightforward virtues to champion and vices to condemn. Surely this is 
as soon as you have managed to categorize a given phenomenon according to the 
dichotomy colonizer/colonized, then effectively the work of thinking comes to a halt 
and a form of Puritanism takes over. The rest is either celebration or castigation. But 
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the decolonialists are not the only ones. For all his disagreements with them, John 
Beverley offers a similar gesture in his call to defend the Left Turns, and the 
achievement of left-wing governments in power.7 But to point out that the victories 
of each and eve
simple realism, and a refusal to abdicate thought in the name of politics. Such 
abdications demean politics and thought alike. 
But life is messier than that. And Diego Valeriano points us to the messy promise of 
runfla 
consumption, of popular stability that is both festive and inclusive. 
populist rhetoric that took great efforts in sustaining and fomenting its participation 
runfla 
cholas
Latin America. 
Surely there was already something of this vitality way back in the festive 
redistribution of stockpiled goods that characterized the Caracazo, the event that 
serves as the Ur-moment for the entire Left Turns cycle. And if something always 
escapes, then what escapes (in the dual sense both that it was not fully captured and 
that it was also produced or further fomented by) the marea rosada is perhaps precisely 
this irreverent, decidedly un-Puritan, transversal attitude to consumer culture that 
-politics of life, where consumption, the feast, and the new conflict 
are finally witnessing the full de-auratization of the aesthetic, for both good and ill, 
 where 
as Pyrrhic as those of the Left half a generation ago is in the fact that the real 
                                                          
7 John Beverley, Latinamericanism After 9/11 (Durham: Duke University Press, 2011). 
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anything, the fact that capital is now invested in everything, everywhere, makes it 
more vulnerable than ever. Meanwhile, the players who currently play in tune with 
conductor at all. 
 
 
 
